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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study explores the nascent political economy of the online social network 
industry. Exemplars of online social networking, Facebook and Twitter have been often 
understood as revolutionary new media tools. My findings show that these social 
networks are taking on a logic of capitalist production and accumulation, calling into 
question their perceived revolutionary character. Evidence suggests that user-generated 
content are now being commodified and exchanged for profit.  
A critical discourse analysis of Facebook and Twitter’s privacy policy and terms 
of use reveals that these texts primarily function as work contracts rather than as treatises 
on privacy protection. Drawing on the work of Karl Marx, this study revisits his theory of 
value and develops an expanded form of variable capital model to demonstrate how 
social networkers fit into this new capitalist circuit of accumulation. This extension of the 
working day is problematic. Policy recommendations are offered in order to negate the 
commodification of user data.   
 
Keywords: digital labour, Marxist political economy, political economy of 
communication, Karl Marx, Norman Fairclough, Stuart Hall, Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies, critical discourse analysis, labour theory of value, Facebook, Twitter, 
social networking, employment, Internet privacy, privacy policies, terms of service, 
commodification, user-generated content, audience commodity. 
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Of critical importance ... and as the necessary ground for any effective transition, 
is sustained discussion and demonstration of the inherent transforming processes 
involved [in media]. The modes of ‘naturalization’ of these means of 
communicative production need to be repeatedly analysed and emphasised, for 
they are indeed so powerful, and new generations are becoming so habituated to 
them that here as strongly as anywhere, in the modern socio-economic process, 
the real activities and relations of men are hidden behind a reified form, a reified 
mode, a ‘modern medium’. 
– Raymond Williams, Means of Communication as Means of Production 
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PREFACE 
 
 
Shortly after Facebook made its services available to those beyond the walls of 
Harvard University, I, like many others, created an account. After months of usage, I 
serendipitously inquired into the terms and conditions to which Facebook users either 
knowingly or unknowingly agree at the time of registration. I was struck by a particular 
clause in an earlier version of their terms of use contract informing users that, while the 
latter retain ownership over their user-generated content, they must compulsorily grant 
Facebook,  
an irrevocable, perpetual, non-exclusive, transferable, fully paid, worldwide 
license ... to use, copy, publicly perform, publicly display, reformat, translate, 
excerpt ... and distribute such User Content for any purpose ... on or in connection 
with the Site or the promotion thereof, to prepare derivative works of, or 
incorporate into other works, such User Content. (Electronic Frontier Foundation 
2011) 
 
This passage was startling to me because it seemed to unhinge the notion of ownership 
from control in a rather subtle way. It also redefined in a novel manner the relationship 
between social media user and social media provider. What was equally surprising was 
the lack of awareness amongst social networkers of this particular social arrangement. 
These observations, combined with my interest in the political-economic writings of Karl 
Marx and his Western-, neo-, post-, and autonomist-Marxist successors led me to 
conclude two things: that I am effectively working for Facebook, and that this assertion 
requires elucidation beyond the restrictive space of a knee-jerk epiphany. In the space 
that is to follow, I attempt to address this conclusion beyond the rather confining space of 
spontaneous intuition. 
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Raymond Williams, who in the 1970s was writing about culture and the political 
economy of mass communication, argued that means of communication are always 
means of production (Williams 2010, 56). As paradoxical as this assertion may be, since 
it seemingly collapses Marx’s bifurcation of base (material production) and 
superstructure (communication) (Hebblewhite 2012), it suggests that communication, 
being a process of information exchange through which social relations are cemented and 
maintained, have not only an abstract, immaterial quality to them, evidenced by the use of 
grammatical rules, speech, syntax, and language, but that the perceived immateriality of 
communication necessarily relies on a physical, material base which, without it, makes 
the communicative process quite impossible. Communication relies on media through 
which content may pass. The physical condition of speech is the larynx, of phonemes the 
very air we breathe, of machine-readable code the magneto-resistance of the computer 
hard disk-drive, of thoughts the brain (Arendt 1998, 3), and of daily news all of the 
above. Communication, as a matter of information exchange, is just as much about form 
as it is about content. The former always implies the latter and vice versa. Williams’ 
thesis begins an interesting and fruitful discussion on communication and its relationship 
with the complex dialectical interplay between a society’s mode of production and its 
superstructural elements. It is this discussion, among others, that informs what is to 
follow. 
The importance of understanding the form that communication takes is central to 
a materialist critique of this process. Williams understood means of communication as 
means of production because he wanted to emphasize first and foremost that 
communication is a process, not a thing, between people, and that this process 
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presupposes historically determined social relations within which human labour capacity 
is exercised. That is to say, communication is made possible by the labour of individuals. 
Communication is thus a potential site of social struggle because the expression of this 
labour capacity often functions within capitalist relations of production, where 
exploitation of the kind Marx sought to explain exists, and where the question of power is 
ever present. Williams’ “Means of Communication as Means of Production” is a call not 
only for scholars to reconsider the relationship between base and superstructure 
(Hebblewhite 2012), but a call to re-politicize the terrain of human activity not normally 
seen as immediately, or even fundamentally, political. 
Writing nearly forty years ago, it would have been difficult for Williams to 
foresee with pinpoint precision the historical trajectory that communications systems 
would take in the years that followed; namely, their expansion from analog to digital 
form, and, with this change, the development of a “democratized” or many-to-many 
communications architecture over the earlier one-to-many communicative forms of mass 
society. The former, of course, has been facilitated by the recent development of the 
global Internet infrastructure, the World Wide Web, microprocessors, and other digital 
information-communication technologies (ICTs), making the process of communication 
and content production among media producers and media consumers highly interactive.  
These developments commonly signify a familiar transition from so-called old 
media to new media, where the latter are primarily identified in terms of their digital 
rather than analogue form, and where the rendering of these media is based on the 
creation and manipulation of numerical data (i.e., computer binary code) (Gane and Beer 
2008, 6). Despite Williams’ understandable lack of prognostic precision, however, he 
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would have agreed that repeated analysis and critical inquiry into these new media forms, 
regardless of their perceived “democratic” character, are still crucial, as they like older 
mass media communications are developed and function within a market economy 
frequently at odds with the public interest.  
Williams observed that media, such as television and radio, tend to become 
“naturalized” as they are used. Rather than seeing media as material processes involving 
(working) relationships between people, they are instead seen as thing-like, objectified, 
entities that exist extraneous to us without regard for their political or economic 
significance. Insofar as this is the case, they are taken for granted without a second 
thought to the ways in which these media are necessarily part of the social relations and 
social forces of production in capitalist society. Similarly today, the new media have in 
large part become naturalized, taken for granted, and understood to be simply part and 
parcel of a world of things with which we interact. The new media today are very much 
like Williams’ reified “modern medium” (Williams 2010, 69). In other words, they are 
commonly seen as mere technological instruments whose existence is seemingly 
unrelated to the realms of the political and the economic.  
However, because many new media organizations operate according to capitalist 
production processes, as the present study contends, they are just as political in character 
as they are useful or instrumental. Their reification, a process that effectively conceals the 
unequal “relations of men [sic]” (Williams 2010, 69), becomes an increasingly effective 
barrier that works against critical inquiry into their social situatedness as means toward 
the development of new, alternative modes of communication. The ideological pitfalls of 
seeing media as (a) purely instrumental (a means to an end); (b) either natural or 
5 
 
 
 
technological, but not both (face-to-face communication, speech, and utterances, or 
simply mechanical or digital devices, respectively); or (c) decidedly abstract rather than 
concrete in character, (mass communication vs. communications) (Williams 2010, 57–
60), all serve to obfuscate the complex, necessarily socio-political relationship forged 
between those who produce and consume media content and the media forms that allow 
for such creation. These three “ideological blocks” (Williams 2010, 57) lead to the 
reification of media processes because they play into the erroneous bifurcation between 
form and content, which are, in fact, a dialectical unity (Babe 2009, 161–174). The 
consequence, of course, is the development of a perceptual blind spot, which renders 
invisible the potential injustices, inequalities, and asymmetric social relations formed by 
capitalist accumulation and production. Such partial perspective distances media 
technologies from the productive forces and relations upon which they rely and within 
which they operate. Communicational forms do not simply operate themselves. They rely 
just as heavily on material production, a process facilitated by people; the converse also 
holds true. One reason for understanding means of communication as means of 
production, as Williams does, is to reassert the primacy – and inherently political nature – 
of the relationship between media, their content production, and their specifically social 
and subjective character in addition to their individual and objective character.  
Indeed, if we accept Williams’ thesis that means of communication are always 
means of production (i.e., inextricably linked), then an analysis of new media is 
necessary. This is especially so if one is critical about capitalist production processes yet 
amenable to finding alternative, non-exploitative social arrangements. The creation of a 
more socialized communications array whereby “the means and systems of the most 
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direct communication [are] under our own direct and general control” (Williams 2010, 
69) is thus an important objective towards this realization. This study agrees with 
Williams; not merely as “a matter of general theory” (Williams 2010, 56), but also as 
matters of both the public interest and the public good.   
The present study is influenced by the political imperatives of Williams’ cultural 
materialism which, in turn, is influenced by the work of Karl Marx. The following will be 
a critical interrogation of a form of new media as means toward highlighting its subtle 
and surreptitious characteristics. This is to say, it will work towards fleshing out the 
contradictions in, and highlighting the problematic nature of, these media – these social 
media. A source of such contradiction lies in the tension between what these media are 
doing in practice and how they are talked about, as evidenced in both popular and 
academic discourse. New media industries are well-cloaked in rhetoric that tend to 
project outwardly their novelty and usefulness (hence, legitimacy) as well as their so-
called democratizing (hence, unproblematic) power; yet, what remains hidden from view, 
relative to the overwhelming acceptance of these media, are their less savoury 
characteristics, such as privacy abuses for capital gains and relatively exploitative 
contractual arrangements.  
The present study takes as its object of inquiry two ubiquitous social media 
platforms: Facebook, the world’s most popular social networking site, and Twitter, the 
world’s most popular micro-blogging site. Facebook and Twitter were chosen because 
there has been a noticeable trend over the last several years indicative of an increased 
convergence and relatedness between them. Online businesses and other websites now 
include social media buttons that allow users to link directly to both Twitter and 
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Facebook from other websites, making user interaction with these media often a matter of 
interdependency. There is another noticeable trend where many businesses are migrating 
to Facebook in addition to, and sometimes instead of, constructing a dedicated website. 
Moreover, recent events show that both social media platforms are in the process of 
converging in other ways: Facebook has announced that their users are now able to 
update their Twitter feeds directly from within their Facebook profile (Burns 2011).  
These exemplary new media forms are seen, from a critical political economic 
perspective, as fundamentally problematic in their current form. Despite the ways in 
which popular discourses about these social media are bandied about, extolling the 
virtues of sharing information, connecting the world, and allowing people to engage with 
others in novel ways – yes, they do all of these – the fact is that they are embedded in a 
larger capitalist economy, one that relies upon the extraction of surplus value from a 
particular class of workers. They create and implicate a new “class in itself” (Marx 1963, 
173; Cleaver 1979, 83), who are effectively united by their common exploitation as they 
engage with these media: social net-workers. The conditions that organize them into such 
a class are, however, the very preconditions for change. The point then is to move from 
these objective conditions of exploitation toward a more equitable communications 
arrangement by insisting that social net-workers become a “class for itself” (Marx 1963, 
173); that is, to realize their power as a class and change these objective conditions. It is 
hopeful that what follows will work towards this end. 
The objective of the present study will be flesh out the contradiction between the 
common sense view of social media, as found in both popular and academic discourses 
on the subject, and their actually existing form. Admittedly, social media do provide 
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novel ways to communicate; however, because of their particular historical mode of 
development since the turn of the decade, it is more difficult to see them as revolutionary 
as some contend. The introductory comments herein will elucidate the discussion 
surrounding social media, focusing on Facebook specifically, and how it has primed 
subsequent discussions on the topic. Additionally, the introduction will provide a 
snapshot of global social media use in order to emphasize their embeddedness in, and 
hence their importance to, the global social fabric. The discussion of user data 
commodification will also begin here. 
Section two, a review of the literature on the political economy of social media, 
will frame the discussion of the economics of social networking, what this paper calls the 
social media peer-to-provider information flows. This section will work toward three 
ends: it will critically outline the significant extant research in the area of the political 
economy of online social networking, and it will identify a research lacuna in this area to 
situate the current study into the wider debate. Lastly, it will proffer a unique contribution 
to the developing field of the political economy of online social networking and new 
media. 
Once these objectives are achieved, section three will provide concrete evidence 
demonstrating empirically, through a critical discourse analysis, the commodification 
processes of which Facebook and Twitter now rely, and how this enforced yet implicit 
social arrangement perpetuates a class relation, though in a rather unorthodox manner. 
This section will show how social net-workers are, rather forcibly, implicated in 
commodification processes. A close, critical reading of Facebook and Twitter’s privacy 
policy and terms of use contracts – documents that are essential in defining the social 
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network user and social network provider relationship – will be conducted. It will be 
argued that both of these documents function together as a new species of work contract 
in the online digital context. Their primary function, rather than merely protecting user 
privacy, is to legally (re)produce and to sustain capitalist relations of production, i.e., the 
commodification of user generated data; an arrangement that works primarily, but not 
exclusively, in the material interests of capital. As the user accepts the data collection 
practices of these sites, whether they read the privacy policy or not, the user’s registration 
and subsequent usage of these sites marks the beginning of the production and 
commodification process. 
A significant goal of the present study is to demonstrate how Facebook and 
Twitter, as exemplary forms of “emancipatory” new media, have been effectively 
subsumed under capitalist production and accumulation processes. It will be necessary, 
therefore, to bolster theoretically the conclusions drawn in section three. Section four of 
this study will be a theoretical inquiry into the work of Marx and some of his 
contemporaries in order to link the former’s observations of nineteenth-century industrial 
capitalism with the observations made in this study. The aim will be to synthesize Marx’s 
work as it relates to the online digital context in order to anchor the conclusions drawn 
herein. Familiar concepts such as the commodity, exploitation, relative surplus value, and 
formal and real subsumption will be discussed in the context of online social networking. 
These concepts are crucial for a critical understanding of new media. A leading debate in 
Marxian circles has centred on the theoretical efficacy of Marx’s theory of value and his 
theory of rent as they relate to the current historical moment. This debate will be taken up 
in the context of online social networking. Is the social practice of online social 
10 
 
 
 
networking best understood as productive (does Marx’s labour theory of value apply 
here?) or, is it, as some argue, better explained the global rentier of the general intellect?  
Section five of this study will outline a positive critique of online social 
networking, outlining some policy recommendations that will serve to facilitate the 
discovery of a more directly controlled and socialized online social networking 
architecture; one that seeks to overcome the commodification processes common to both 
Facebook and Twitter. It is hopeful that the governance-centred recommendation 
proffered will redirect the common sense view of social media towards a broader 
understanding of the (unequal) relationship we often hold with digital media of this kind. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  
0.1. Social Media Discourse: Revolution and Democracy 
 
Strands of critical media research have in the past explored the political economic 
dimension of new media, positioning interactive, Web 2.0 environments like Facebook 
and Twitter as key players in the new online digital economy (Andrejevic 2010; Cohen 
2008; Coté and Pybus 2007; Fuchs 2011a; Terranova 2010; Terranova 2000). Yet, some 
of this research has not taken as their particular object of inquiry social network privacy 
and terms of use policies. Despite this research lacuna, analyses that have contributed to 
an elucidation of the processes by which economic benefits are gleaned from these 
environments, in particular, from their users, have helped counter some of the more 
grandiose, technologically deterministic claims forwarded by media gurus and business 
academics who, rather prematurely, proselytize the “revolutionary” potential of new 
ICTs. 
Discussions of this sort tend to downplay or outright ignore, among other things, 
the relatively exploitative nature of these technologies. They celebrate the supposed 
victory of collaborative “dot-communism” over capitalist enterprise (Van Dijck and 
Nieborg 2009, 856; Smith 2009). The assumption is, in many cases, that as participation 
in the creation of content shifts in favour of media consumers, so too does the potential of 
emancipation from older forms of economic subservience: 
You can participate in the economy as an equal, co-creating value with your peers 
and favourite companies to meet your very personal needs, to engage in fulfilling 
communities, to change the world or just to have fun! Prosumption comes full 
circle! (Tapscott and Williams 2006, 150) 
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The work of Alvin Toffler has been influential in priming discussions of the information 
age, in particular the revolutionary aspects of its media, without due regard for the 
economic base necessary for their production, distribution, and consumption. His views 
on what he calls the Third Wave prosumer (the electronic-age producer-consumer) are an 
example of his dubious optimism: 
The Third Wave will therefore produce history’s first “trans-market” civilization 
...With the basic construction task now virtually complete [i.e., global capital], the 
enormous energies poured into building the world market system become 
available for other human purposes. From this fact alone will flow a limitless 
array of civilizational changes. New religions will be born. Works of art on a 
hitherto unimagined scale. Fantastic scientific advances. And, above all, wholly 
new kinds of social and political institutions ... This, at its core, is what the rise of 
the prosumer is about. (Toffler 1981, 287–288) 
 
This species of celebratory rhetoric and techno-futuristic prognostication is misleading, 
but has, nonetheless, informed much of the way people think about the new media, 
including business intellectuals and so-called management gurus like Don Tapscott. It is 
misleading because prosumption media, such as social network sites, are so often 
understood as technologies of revolution, implying transcendence beyond the centuries 
old processes of capitalist accumulation and economics, and technologies that are 
supposedly “threatening to media conglomerates,” spaces that “seemingly [deliver] the 
long-held dream of media radicals for access from below” (McGuigan 2009, 84). 
Consider, for instance, Mark Zuckerberg’s promotional commentary about Facebook: 
That's just something that goes along with being revolutionary .... When we 
launched Newsfeed, someone made a group Students Against Newsfeed and 
people started joining it, and this trend was mounting. And every single person's 
Newsfeed had a story that said 'man, all these people are joining Students Against 
Newsfeed.' A lot of companies probably would have altered the code to block that 
from propagating, and we probably could have but we have this focus on 
openness so we felt like, no, that's not the right thing to do. It's kind of like 
journalistic integrity. (Kessler 2007) 
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In yet another example, Tom Smith, writing in the International Journal of Market 
Research, says that the “[shift] towards user-driven technologies such as blogs, social 
networks and video-sharing platforms ... have enabled a revolution” (2009, 559), but 
merely goes on to outline the changing ways in which users interact with one another and 
the Internet. While he is correct that social media is “reorientating the economy” (2009, 
560), it is certainly not transcending it, because, as people leave data trails behind them as 
they engage with these media, there is money to be made (2009, 561). 
Most problematic is the use of the term revolution in the context of the Arab 
Spring. Many have written on the importance of social media in sewing the social seeds 
of revolution in Egypt and elsewhere, and how such technology has played a key role: 
Social networks have achieved what years of western aid and support to 
democracy have failed to do; and they have done it in no more than seventeen 
days! These days have witnessed many trial and error models, but in the final 
analysis the Egyptian revolution has validated the powerful role of social media in 
the political arena. Indeed, Egypt is now pregnant with the first successful 
Facebook revolution. (Radwan 2011) 
 
While it is difficult to argue against the supporting role that social media has played in 
the events of the Arab Spring, it is important not to underestimate the historical, material 
conditions that led up to such political upheaval. It is true that much of Egyptian mass 
media such as television and radio were tightly controlled under Mubarak (Rugh 2011; 
Kandil 2011, 39), allowing social media to circumvent these channels. However, to 
overemphasize the role of technology and to frame the latter as revolutionary in a time of 
social struggle would be to commit to a crude technological determinism, marginalizing 
the importance of those who actually brought about political change in the first place. 
Mosco reminds us that the spaces of revolution are not Facebook, YouTube or Twitter, 
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but rather Tahrir Square, Syntagma Square, Puerta del Sol, Plaça Catalunya, and Zuccotti 
Park (Fuchs and Mosco 2012, 129). 
Interestingly, it has been observed that, “social network sites ... played a role in 
the preliminary stages [of Egyptian political mobilization] only. Once the snowball 
started rolling, their value depreciated in favour of more traditional media, such as 
television and radio” (Kandil 2011, 23). Kandil reminds us that the material force of 
Christians, Muslims, peasants, and people from all classes in Egypt who rallied together 
in the millions, striking and protesting against oppression felt by the middle-classes and 
exploitation in the lower classes, were key to overthrowing Mubarak’s regime (Kandil 
2011, 23–24).  
Douglas and Guback emphasize that there is often a conflation between two 
distinct understandings of the term revolution: It can refer to “movement around a central 
axis,” a metaphor explaining changes in the communication / information domain, in 
either superstructure or infrastructure; or, it can mean a rapid change or overthrow of an 
existing order, its product being a fundamental change in the structure of the political-
economic-social order (1984, 233–234). The problem with the former definition is 
obvious. It can, when properly deployed, have the emotive force of the latter, but 
completely conceal aspects of the status quo which remain unchanged, thereby stunting 
the momentum toward a fundamental revolution of the base and superstructure. Examples 
that prevent such revolutionary action from proceeding include the continued class 
ownership of the means of production, of which another class relies for survival; 
capitalist accumulation strategies; and monopoly and oligopoly capital, which subsume 
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into an existing economic and political fabric new technologies in order to guarantee 
concentration and centralized control over their use (1984, 235).  
What is important to remember is that the relations to production are not the same 
as the relations of production (Douglas and Guback 1984, 239). It is a mistake to 
understand any new technological development as reflective of a revolutionary change in 
the economic base. Capital’s “mode of development” (Castells 2007, 179) must be 
separated from that of its mode of production. The former, which could be interpreted 
here as informational-technological movement around the central axis of capitalism, often 
takes place within the purview of the latter. The so-called information revolution, sparked 
by the work of post-industrial society theorists Alan Touraine and Daniel Bell, does not 
replace the mode of production, but instead, as some have argued, speed it up (D. Harvey 
1989), pointing only to changes in the mode of development. This problematic mirrors 
Gramsci’s observation that a challenge in identifying any social transformation lies in 
acknowledging the dialectical tension between revolution and restoration (1971, 109–
114): When is a revolution a revolution, a restoration a restoration? More importantly, 
when does restoration mask itself as a revolution, and revolution as restoration? 
But the distinction between capital’s mode of development and its mode of 
production is little acknowledged in popular and academic discourse on social media, and 
are often conflated. The focus on information-processing since the 1960s has often been 
interpreted as a fundamental revolution in the political-economic-social order, when, in 
fact, there is abundant evidence to suggest the restorative qualities that these technologies 
have on social relations. For example, McChesney demonstrates persuasively that, when 
comparing economic productivity before and after information-technology investment 
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from the 1990s and early 2000s, “[IT] accounted for at most 6 percent of [US] GDP” 
(2008, 293), suggesting that only a quarter of total economic growth since 1995 can be 
attributed to this sector together with telecommunications (2008, 293). Moreover, only 
0.07 percent of a 1.33 percentage-point in the annual average rate of productivity growth 
in Unites States can be attributed to the use of computer technology and software 
(McChesney 2008, 296; Gordon 2000). So, despite the tendency of many to interpret 
information-processing as a trigger stimulating rapid and sustained economic growth 
across all sectors of the wider economy – and, hence, a concomitant sea-change in 
economic configuration – the facts suggest that what has taken place is, from an 
economic perspective, simply more of the same.  
Comor observes that a dominant view of the promise of new media technology 
has been that “if more people are engaged in ‘immaterial labor’ and ‘knowledge-based’ 
occupations surely ... corporations and states will ... lose control of established levers of 
power” (2010, 315). What is absent from this dominant viewpoint is that, assuming this is 
the case, individuals who have subverted these established levers of power are also those 
who have the potential to become the very levers of power they despise – media 
conglomerates and corporations. Van Dijck and Nieborg’s observations of the rhetoric of 
Web 2.0 discourses, found in such works as Christopher Locke’s A Cluetrain Manifesto: 
The End of Business as Usual, Tapscott and Williams’ Wikinomics: How Mass 
Collaboration Changes Everything, and Leadbeater’s We-Think: Why Mass Creativity Is 
the Next Big Thing, are exemplary of this line of thought: 
Ever since the early stages of the Internet, manifestos have announced the 
beginning of a new era in which the countercultural ideals of communalism, 
collaboration and creative sharing were prophesied to prevail over purely 
consumerist values; the resulting discourse yielded an odd combination of grass 
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roots values of commonality and hardcore capitalist values. (Van Dijck and 
Nieborg 2009, 858) 
 
That something can be revolutionary yet reproduce capitalist forms of production and 
accumulation, such as commodification and surplus value extraction, is counterintuitive. 
For as Werner Bonefeld writes, “the social reproduction of capital and [abstract] labour 
… acquires its livelihood in and through the negation of communism, a negation that the 
commodity-form presents .... This negation rests on the reproduction of human social 
practice in the mode of being denied; that is, as a commodified activity (Bonefeld 2002, 
79). Every instantiation of a regime of commodification is, invoking Althusser, to 
reproduce the relations of (capitalist) production (2001a, 85–90), and to thus contradict 
the very grassroots and revolutionary spirit upon which discussions of the so-called New 
Economy, the Third Wave, the prosumer society, the post-industrial society, etc., are 
predicated. This is partly due to one particular trait that they all share which, though 
commonly overlooked in these discourses, share affinities with earlier historical periods 
that we have supposedly transcended: namely, a regime of commodification, and as a 
result, exploitation, surplus-value generation, the perpetuation of the class relation, and a 
loss of control over the production process. 
The promise of new media’s interactivity is not a sufficient condition for a 
fundamental revolution in society, but it is a necessary one. Though, it may be true that 
the new media do allow for a more “interactive” (Andrejevic 2007a) and potentially 
subversive mode of communication, one should not discount the larger economic 
structures within which these novel forms of communication operate. Increased access to 
a technology does not necessarily translate into a qualitative change in one’s social 
position. Such thinking neglects the social processes within which these technologies 
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function. Indeed, “if, at the surface level, Facebook hearkens back to the pre-mass-society 
role of social networks as sources of news and information, it is hard to forget that it does 
so for distinctly commercial purposes” (Andrejevic 2010, 280).  
What can be concluded from these observations is that there is a noticeable 
disparity between the way in which new media is talked about in both academic and 
popular discourse and what these media are doing in practice. Because of this 
incongruity, it is necessary to move beyond social network mission statement promises 
and About-page guarantees of free expression that work to harness people’s desires to 
connect with others and share information. This in order to locate and isolate the new 
processes of information commodification so that it may ultimately be resisted.  
Moreover, it becomes necessary to move beyond research tending towards a 
strictly socio-cultural analysis of social networking, often failing to account for the 
imposition of the commodity-form upon user activity. Danah boyd and Nicole Ellison’s 
work on the cultural aspects of social networks, which have little to say on the subjects of 
power, media ownership, information privacy, the economics of participatory culture, and 
the pragmatic approaches to privacy in the legal field, are exemplary of this uncritical
1
 
line of inquiry, all of which have been cited widely and often (boyd, 2011; 
Grimmelmann, 2009; McCullagh, 2008; Solove, 2008; Strahilevitz, 2004).  
In more Marxian terms, any discussion of social media that centres solely on their 
use-value characteristics (connectivity, maintenance of one’s social capital, keeping 
people connected, novel strategies of marketing and advertising, creation of networked 
                                                 
1
 By uncritical I do not mean research that is anti-intellectual, of poor quality, or without rigour; rather, I 
mean that these lines of inquiry are too narrow in scope, are overly pragmatic in intent, or fail to take into 
account the economic factors and processes of commodification that have equal influence on the new social 
relations created within these communications environments. 
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publics, privacy, prosumption, etc.) concomitantly conceals the processes by which they 
have the capacity to realize the exchange-value of user activity. On this point section four 
will expand on the commodity-form as understood by Marx in order to demonstrate the 
contradictory nature of the commodity, and, from this, the contradictory nature that 
individuals, depending on their social position, as either worker or capitalist, embody; 
namely, as those who are either interested in the use-value of a thing or its exchange-
value. 
It is in Facebook and Twitter’s privacy policy and terms of use documents that we 
can see the use-value/exchange-value dynamic at play: there is a noticeable 
foregrounding of the use-value of both the service and of one’s interest or capacity to 
engage with it. Simultaneously, there is a near-complete backgrounding (by way of 
euphemism and deflection) of the potential exchangeability of a user’s free labour 
products provided by their continued participation in these online environments. Indeed, 
if the new digital economy is predicated on the desire for people to participate in the 
creation of culture, then it is also in capital’s interest to encourage people to participate 
(Lazzarato 1996, 134–137). This is why a critique of the political economy of online 
social networking is necessary. 
0.2. Facebook and Twitter: Mapping the Global Social Graph 
 
A recent report from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) on the Internet Economy shows that half of all OECD Internet 
users use some form of online social network service; and, in 2010, sixty-percent of the 
United States’ population was engaged in online social networking activity (OECD 2011, 
15). In Canada, the Internet penetration rate is high, with 79.2 percent of the total 
20 
 
 
 
population being connected to the Internet, with nearly 49 percent of them using 
Facebook (Internet World Stats 2011a). This proportion translates into approximately 
16.6 million Canadian Facebook users (Internet World Stats 2011b). In the United States, 
there are 245 million Internet users, and 48.4 percent of them have a Facebook account 
(Internet World Stats 2011b). This latter proportion represents approximately 151.4 
million Americans. The global penetration rate of Facebook alone, that is, the number of 
people who have a Facebook account worldwide, is 10.3 percent – slightly under one 
billion people (Facebook 2011; Internet World Stats 2011c). Figure one below, though 
excluding Canada, illustrates social media global usage among other OECD countries. 
Statistics on Twitter’s global penetration are limited; however, Alexa, a popular 
online web-analytics service, ranks the micro-blogging site as the ninth most visited 
website in the world, having a reach of 10 percent of the world’s Internet-connected 
population (Sherfesee et al. 2011a). Facebook comes in as the second most visited 
website in the world, followed by Google in first place (Sherfesee et al. 2011b).  
 
Figure 1 - Online Social Network Usage of OECD Internet Users by Country, 2010. Data by OECD 2011, 15. 
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As of March, 2011, Business Insider reports that Twitter contains approximately 
119 million active accounts (defined as any account with more than one other account 
linked to it) and 175 million accounts have been created since the service went live in 
2006 (Carlson 2011). It is no surprise, then, that 94 percent of businesses with 10 or more 
employees are also connected to the Internet (OECD 2011, 8). Clearly, there are, and 
have been for over a decade, online markets to corner, and online social networks are 
crucial for providing the necessary consumer data to feed market intelligence. 
0.3. Facebook and Twitter: New Media Commodities in the New Economy 
 
It is no secret that Mark Zuckerberg, CEO and founder of Facebook, believes that 
the age of privacy is over. The term privacy, commonly understood here in terms of the 
degree to which one has control over the distribution of their personal data, is a concept 
left ill-defined and underdeveloped in social media discourse, thus rendering the term 
rather vague. This vague and seemingly contradictory usage, however, is precisely how 
Zuckerberg deploys the term. It allows him to assert that privacy is somehow no longer a 
“social norm” (Johnson 2010). In an age of social networking and the proliferation of 
ICTs, to be private seems to commit oneself to a romantic yearning for a bygone era. This 
understanding of privacy-as-outmoded is very often criticized in terms of evidence that 
demonstrates to the contrary the willingness of people to share information with others so 
openly, to communicate, and to be public; these actions are misleadingly understood as 
the opposite of being private. The rather reductive and simplistic dichotomy between 
private and public, as is assumed above, has its roots in liberal-pluralist assumptions of 
the relationship between the individual and society (Bennett 2008), which at times are not 
at all very useful, especially in online contexts (Strahilevitz 2004).  
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Of course, it is no secret why Zuckerberg would treat privacy in this way and in 
such an anachronistic manner. By summarily positing the role of privacy as an outmoded 
protection against the abuse of others, by those who would otherwise want to connect and 
socialize with people, Zuckerberg can promote the use-values to be gleaned from his 
billion-dollar enterprise while at the same time concealing from view the very privacy 
rights upon which corporations, like Facebook, rely. Up until its recent initial public 
offering (Raice, Das, and Letzing 2012), Facebook was considered a private company 
and, as such, did not have to reveal its assets, revenues, salaries, and operating expenses 
to the public if it chose not to. The latter would only come about when a privately held 
company either chooses to “go public” or must, because of federal securities legislation, 
offer stock to those who are not already private investors of the company. Gane and Beer 
remind us that since 2007 Facebook began to generate revenues by developing 
advertising informed by user activities and preferences, thus rendering seemingly 
mundane data economically valuable (2008, 48).  
Privacy’s definition, at least in the confines of public discourse, must remain 
ambiguous in order for companies like Facebook and Twitter to benefit from corporate 
privacy protections afforded by law on the one hand, and, on the other, form a view of 
privacy, which strategically posits some of its (problematic) assumptions, that weakens 
another’s right to privacy in order to valorize their online activity. It is not difficult to see 
that these social networking sites have a direct economic interest in monetizing user 
activity. In order to do this, however, Zuckerberg and perhaps others in his position must 
first articulate a view of privacy that works in the company’s interest. If data are to be the 
new valuable commodity, then privacy must be relativized and rendered ambiguous in the 
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sense of a double-standard, which protects companies yet exposes consumers to privacy 
abuses by them for profitable gain. 
The recent work of David Kirkpatrick has shed important light on Facebook’s 
turn to targeted advertising and their commodification of user data as processes of 
revenue generation. His work also highlights the key figures responsible for Facebook’s 
user-based accumulation strategies. One of these key figures was Cheryl Sandberg, 
former Google vice-president for global online sales and operations. In 2008, she was 
hired by Zuckerberg as Facebook’s Chief Operations Officer (COO) (Auletta 2011; D. 
Kirkpatrick 2010, 251–252, 254). Prior to her time at Google, Sandberg also served as 
chief of staff to Larry Summers, secretary of the Treasury in the Clinton administration 
from 1999 to 2001 (D. Kirkpatrick 2010, 253). Summers, adhering to a decidedly 
neoliberal economic persuasion, was partly responsible for the 2008 economic crisis, as 
he was directly involved with the deregulation and subsequent consolidation of US 
financial markets, which would eventually lead to the illegality of regulating financial 
derivatives leading to millions of housing foreclosures across the United States (Ferguson 
2010). The relationship between Sandberg and Summers is strong: “Sandberg went to 
Harvard, where she majored in economics and took Lawrence Summers's class in Public 
Sector Economics .... She also served as a research assistant to Summers when, in 1991, 
he served as the World Bank’s chief economist (Auletta 2011), making Sandberg a 
protégé to one of the United States’ most important political-economic elites. 
Prior to Sandberg’s role as Facebook’s COO, the company developed a number of 
monetization strategies, all of which were subsequently supplanted by a new strategy for 
reasons of inefficiency, profitability, and decreased intrusiveness. Sandberg and 
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company’s “engagements ads” were seen as less intrusive than previous forms of 
advertising such as banner ads. These ads are messages from an advertiser sent to users’ 
homepages which invites the latter “to do something [directly] on the page,” (D. 
Kirkpatrick 2010, 260) such as comment on a video. This with the express purpose of 
connecting marketers to their consumers (D. Kirkpatrick 2010, 261), thus forging new 
business relationships among them. What Sandberg and her colleagues were concerned 
with at this juncture were (a) generating revenue to keep the company afloat; (b) 
collecting and archiving “organic information that people are producing on the site” (D. 
Kirkpatrick 2010, 261, emphasis mine); and (c) creating advertising processes that were 
integrated seamlessly into the Facebook experience, minimizing the disruptive nature of 
advertising on the site while maintaining a stable flow of income.  
Interestingly, there is little to no discussion from either Kirkpatrick or Facebook 
as to how users, who are essential to this advertising strategy, factor into this particular 
monetization process, beyond the assumption that they will participate and give consent 
to this arrangement. It would seem that Sandberg, et al. were not interested in knowing in 
any great detail how users felt about this new accumulation strategy. They quite simply 
could not afford to take the chance that some may find this new arrangement problematic, 
as Sandberg’s “biggest worry ... was financial” (Auletta 2011). 
Kirkpatrick observes that this new advertising strategy, which is primarily driven 
by the monetization of user data, took place when Zuckerberg was out of the country (D. 
Kirkpatrick 2010, 257, 260), suggesting that he played an indirect role in adopting 
Sandberg’s project. Others report too that Zuckerberg was “ultimately forced by 
circumstances” to adopt this strategy (D. Kirkpatrick 2010, 258). It would be somewhat 
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contradictory to conclude, however, that he could not have been “motivated by money” 
(M. Harvey 2008), when it is clear that generating revenue was a necessary and 
immediate condition of the business’s success. Moreover, despite Zuckerberg’s vehement 
claims to the contrary, money was, and is, the primary organizing principle of the 
enterprise, especially if one considers the fact that “Facebook needed the money,” as they 
quickly burned through the $375 million it had raised years ago from Microsoft and 
others (D. Kirkpatrick 2010, 256). If speculation about Facebook and Zuckerberg’s worth 
are correct, $83 billion and $13.5 billion respectively (Forbes 2011; Levy 2011; Weir et 
al. 2011), it is hard to believe that the company was never motivated by the accumulation 
of profit – it had to be. Moreover, Facebook’s ad revenue in 2010 alone was reported to 
be nearly two billion dollars (Horn 2011). It seems that capital’s coercive laws of 
competition have made themselves known to Zuckerberg and company early on, working 
against his idealist vision to make the world more connected so that everyone could be 
“financially rewarded” (M. Harvey 2008). 
We can see other examples of this user-centred accumulation strategy. A number 
of online companies that are specifically in the business of selling creative user-generated 
content (CUGC) – that is, “content that is voluntarily developed by an individual or a 
consortium and distributed through online platforms” (Trosow et al. 2010, 10) – are 
gaining popularity in the online marketing and advertising world. Infochimps, an online 
data marketplace, has as their business description the following: 
Whether you are building artificial intelligence, creating an app that finds coffee 
shops, or even researching what car to buy next, you inevitably have to start by 
finding data. People toil for hours on end collecting, formatting and sorting data in 
formats that are somewhat useful for these tasks. It is the opposite of fun .... 
Accessing valuable data shouldn't be so difficult, especially if it's data someone 
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else has used before. Infochimps is a place to find, sell and share data with others. 
(Bansal et al. 2011) 
 
One of their main datasets for purchase and/or download comes from Twitter, the popular 
micro-blogging site currently valued at $4 billion (Parr 2011). One can download for free 
tweets about cheese or can purchase the conversation metrics of 35 million users for one 
one thousand dollars. The data to be consumed from these online menus clearly suggest 
that social network CUGC are treated like information commodities, to be bought and 
sold in the marketplace as if they were discrete, material objects. 
Gnip is another data marketplace that aggregates social media data into a single 
API, or application program interface. This service is particularly important for Twitter 
because in November 2010, Gnip became the first authorized reseller of Twitter data 
(Valeski et al. 2011a). Their business description is as follows: 
Gnip provides social media data to businesses that build realtime social media 
integrations into their business and consumer applications. Receiving your social 
data from Gnip enables easy integration of massive quantities of realtime social 
data into your product, legally and reliably. Many of the largest social media 
monitoring companies in the world rely on Gnip to provide them with data from 
Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and dozens more sources. Whether you want 
keyword-specific data, username-specific data, or a full or partial firehose stream 
of data, Gnip can be your social media data provider. (Valeski et al. 2011b) 
 
Since 2008, Gnip has offered access to Twitter’s data streams and dozens of other social 
media feeds. It was reported in November, 2010, the same time that they became an 
authorized dealer of Twitter information, that the company began selling tweets to Gnip 
for $360,000 per year (M. Kirkpatrick 2010). Other data sources offered by Gnip include 
YouTube, Facebook, Delicious, Google Plus, Myspace, Tumblr, and Wordpress. 
In 2005, News Corporation, currently chaired by Rupert Murdoch, purchased 
Myspace for $580 million, beating out Viacom as a bidder. Myspace as a social media 
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environment and brand was less important in Newscorps’ decision to buy it than the 
aggregate data generated by its users, informing its owners about the cultural tastes and 
activities of users (Coté and Pybus 2007).  
Datasift is another company involved in the retailing of social media user-
generated content. Like Infochimps, their model is essentially “a platform to help 
companies manage social media and capitalise on the insights to be found within the 
data” (Halstead et al. 2012). Further, Datasift “loves helping organizations get a better 
understanding of how social media data can be used to achieve business objectives.” 
(Halstead et al. 2012).  
Pricing options for access to these data, of which Facebook and Twitter are but 
two sources among many, is based on what they call Data Processing Units or DPUs. The 
more data companies require on any given topic, the greater the expenditure of DPUs, 
and, as a result, the more costly the access to that data. Presumably this is due in part to 
the increased volume of data requested by these companies and, subsequently, the more 
computational effort needed to fulfill the request. Datasift offers the potential buyer 
access packages ranging from three-thousand dollars per month up to fifteen thousand 
dollars a month, with options to purchase credit before committing to a package as well 
as licensing options to access real-time feeds on a batch-cost basis (e.g., ten cents per one 
thousand tweets). 
Similar to Gnip and Infochimps, Datasift’s access costs are partially determined 
by the content itself. In other words, the price varies according to the complexity of the 
actual information requested, among other factors. Datasift has on their webpage sample 
streams that the public may test free of charge. These streams are classified into three 
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categories: low, medium, and high. The cost associated with each stream along with the 
number of DPUs needed for each tier runs equally from low to high, but so too does the 
information complexity of the search. An example of a low stream, which uses fewer 
DPUs in the process, is a search query on “Starbucks,” whereas an example of a high 
stream, using a greater number of DPUs in the process, is a search query on “Presidential 
Elections.” Though beyond the scope of the current study, the question as to how the 
semantic complexity of these queries – and the data granularity of the source datasets – 
factor into the access cost remain somewhat unclear at this point; however, these 
observations warrant further inquiry elsewhere.  
There is indeed strong evidence to suggest that users’ online activity is a form of 
productive (profitable) work, as evidenced by social network sites’ legally binding terms 
of use and privacy policies. These documents implicitly treat one’s online data as 
economically valuable (cf. section 3.2). What is clear from this is that social networking 
in the twenty-first century is as political a social practice as it is a cultural one. This is 
partly because users are, in a manner of speaking, voluntarily forced to accept the 
conditions of what is arguably their own exploitation (if they are to acquire the social 
capital from participating in these environments) – there is no opt-out privacy control. 
Consider the following clause in Twitter’s terms of use policy: “Such additional uses by 
Twitter ... may be made with no compensation paid to you with respect to the Content 
that you submit, post, transmit or otherwise make available through the Services” 
(Twitter 2011a). Yet the very data that is produced by social media users are being 
monetized elsewhere and, consequently, so too are the financial rewards. What this 
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means is the socialization of risk (the weakening of privacy), the outsourcing of labour, 
and the privatization (concentration) of the social wealth. 
What the above observations point to, among other things, is that online social 
networking is and has been for over a decade embedding itself into the fabric of the wider 
global economy, especially as more of these companies behave increasingly like 
capitalist firms, i.e., the profit motive as central organizing principle, initial public 
offerings, production of commodities, etc. As such, it is necessary to increasingly see 
these spaces as subjects of political economic inquiry, and to entertain questions centring 
on labour, commodification, value, ideology, and class. The next section will review 
some of the extant literature already addressing these concerns and which have been 
germinal in the ongoing conversations over digital labour and the political economy of 
new media. It will contextualize and situate the current study into these larger discussions 
whilst emphasizing why it is important to not only analyze but to develop and deploy 
theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches that may most productively 
contribute to a critical political economic analysis of online social networking. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
1.1. The Political Economy of Online Social Networks 
 
Extant research on the political economy of online social networks suggests that 
they now serve a fundamental role in the so-called information economy. There is an 
increasing economic significance to these organizations as more of them adopt 
monetization strategies that hinge on the participation of users and the creation of user-
generated content. Given the relative newness of the online social network phenomenon, 
the scarcity of research that explores them from a critical political economic perspective 
is high compared to the more prolific, administrative research that tends to focus solely 
on the cultural dynamics, or user-to-user interactions, of these networks. While research 
focusing on what this study calls peer-to-peer information flows is important in 
understanding and mapping the terrain of online communication generally, it considers in 
far less detail the peer-to-provider information flows of these online environments. 
Research of the first kind (peer-to-peer) is often though not exclusively found in 
the administrative communications research paradigm, which tends to deploy quantitative 
methodologies and tools from the social sciences such as statistical analyses and 
questionnaires that measure the internal and external validity of both the research design 
and its resultant conclusions, how variables relate to one another, etc. Media uses and 
gratifications research, for example, has been concerned with identifying the factors that 
go into one’s decision to engage with various media, such as television and the Internet, 
and the qualities that make them enjoyable (Katz, Haas, and Gurevitch 1973; LaRose 
2010; Papacharissi and Rubin 2000; Rubin 1984; Ruggiero 2000). However, inasmuch as 
this kind of research is useful – especially for media companies and corporations – it also 
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demonstrates the rather apolitical nature of this scientifically-oriented research paradigm. 
There is little to no consideration of the economic, moral, and/or political implications of 
user interaction with media of various kinds, only a description, usually through factor 
analysis, of why people use them. The scope of this research is therefore rather narrow 
from a political economic point of view, but such research can be useful in understanding 
larger social patterns of Internet usage, and how this usage marks changing patterns of 
communication.  
 Research on the cultural dynamics of online social networks is also found in the 
cultural studies paradigm, a field exploring themes like network culture, identity, 
subjectivity, publicity, and branding (Papacharissi 2011), all of which feed into other 
lines of inquiry, not the least of which being political economic analyses. One of the most 
highly cited and widely known scholars in this area has been danah boyd, Senior 
Researcher at Microsoft Research (boyd and Ellison 2008; boyd 2011). She and her 
research colleagues have been key contributors in the areas of publicity on the Internet, 
teen culture, privacy, identity, and online user interaction. What is noticeably and 
commonly absent from their work, however, is an analysis of the social networks 
themselves and how users are positioned within them. Of their work, there is little to no 
consideration of how these networks operate, the role that surveillance plays, how social 
network sites collect data and why, the legal framework within which they work, or an 
analysis of user activity as the basis for profit generation.  
Beer has noted that, “by focusing solely upon the user, which is what boyd and 
Ellison’s [research suggests], we are overlooking ... the capitalist organisations, the 
marketing and advertising rhetoric, the construction of these phenomena in various 
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rhetorical agendas ... and the role, access and conduct of third parties” (2008, 523). In 
short, boyd and company have little to say on the subjects of power, media ownership, 
information privacy, and the economics of participatory culture, placing them squarely in 
the peer-to-peer information flows research paradigm. Though it is clear that much of the 
time cultural studies and political economy share their respective disciplinary biases, the 
disciplinary boundaries of the former are still quite present. Beer’s identification of these 
research lacunae are important steps in steering the social media conversation toward a 
less explored but arguably more important generalized line of inquiry, one which takes 
into account the social totality (cf. section two). 
The focus of this section will be on those areas of the political economy of social 
networking that have contributed most significantly to its conceptual contours and 
discoursal directions. Though this area has much room for development, and that there is 
without doubt more to be said, there have been a number of significant contributions and 
germinal debates in this area that have influenced the current study. These contributions 
have mostly centred on surveillance, digital labour, class, commodification, privacy 
abuses, and legal rights issues as they relate to the digital, online context. They have been 
concerned with not only elaborating on these themes, but demonstrating how each of 
them are not so much isolated phenomena as intricately connected: how surveillance 
feeds into the economic imperatives of online media owners, how this surveillance 
challenges and, in some cases, erodes individual privacy, how commodification is a 
product not only of one’s labour, but also of the surveillance capacity embodied in online 
media, etc.  
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What follows therefore is a critical review of the literature on the political 
economy of social media, more particularly, the political economy of online social 
networking, which, to the authors knowledge, is not nearly as prolific an area of inquiry 
as the more meso- and macro-level analyses of social media generally. Because the 
current study takes as its object of study social networking, as a particular form of social 
media, the contributions included in this review are meant to situate the current study in 
the context of critical social networking research and to highlight those contributions that 
have influenced the direction of critical political economic media studies research. 
Despite the research gaps identified above, investigations that have centred on the 
political economy of social networking do exist, but are few in number relative to the 
plethora of studies that focus on peer-to-peer dynamics in these environments. Studies 
that do exist are heterogeneous in approach, focus, and theoretical orientation. The 
general conclusion is that, despite the limited quantity, the majority of research in this 
area lacks a thorough historical analysis of both Facebook and Twitter; in particular, the 
events leading up to their decision to commodify user content. Even fewer studies, 
beyond the legal literature, have focused with a critical eye on the importance of the 
privacy policy and terms of use document, which are essential to these capitalist firms in 
their pursuit for profitable gains. On this point, section three and four will clarify the 
relationship between user-generated content commodification and the privacy policy and 
terms of use.  
Coté and Pybus engage in an analysis of Myspace and the events surrounding 
Newscorp’s purchase of their dataset (2007). They persuasively demonstrate the reasons 
why more than a half-billion dollars was spent acquiring it. They conclude that the 
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aggregate dataset generated by Myspace users was an economically valuable resource of 
consumer-demographic data, informing marketers of the tastes and desires of hundreds of 
millions of potential consumers, perhaps the first instance of the social media audience 
commodity. The authors propose a new framework in which to understand social network 
user activity. Drawing from Maurizio Lazzarato’s influential, yet highly contested, 
concept of immaterial labour (1996), Coté and Pybus develop the concept of immaterial 
labour 2.0. This concept combines Lazzarato’s definition of immaterial labour (those 
who produce the cultural and informational aspects of commodities) with what Terranova 
calls “free labour,” the latter being unremunerated labour in online environments, such as 
building websites, programming, reading, participation in mailing lists, etc. (2000, 33). 
Here, free labour is the “2.0” aspect of the concept. Though the authors draw heavily 
from autonomist-Marxist thought, their piece primarily centres on social networking user 
subjectivity bolstered by a historico-structural analysis of the Myspace network. As such, 
they focus on notions of subjectivity, Foucauldian concepts of biopower and biopolitics, 
and Deleuze’s notion of becoming. Coté and Pybus’ piece is informative as it sheds light 
on the wider problematic of online social networks – namely, their monetization 
strategies based on the free labour of their users. It also provides strong evidence to 
support the idea that online social networks are quite willing to enter into market relations 
without much regard for users’ opinions on the matter.  
Though their piece offers an informative re-interpretation of labour in online 
environments, invoking Dallas Smythe’s concept of the audience commodity (Smythe 
1981), it does not focus on the structural components of other, more popular online social 
networks such as Facebook and Twitter. Further, there is no discussion about the role that 
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social network privacy policies or terms of use documents play in the information 
commodification process. Their use of Marx’s work on the commodity and other 
categories drawn from classical economics are also lacking. Thus, their research is 
considerably narrow in scope and it sufficiently diverges in focus from the present study. 
Nicole S. Cohen addresses the surveillance potential embedded in online social 
networking infrastructures, from the placement of cookies which track online behaviour 
to Facebook’s reliance on the surveilling of others for success (through reading one’s 
profile, linking to them, searching for others, “Liking” something, etc.) (2008). Her work 
persuasively “outlines a political-economy of Facebook in an attempt to draw attention to 
the underlying economic relations that structure the website, and the way in which [it] fits 
into larger patterns of contemporary capitalism” (2008, 5). Cohen argues that Facebook’s 
entire model is centred on what she calls the “valorization of surveillance,” or, the prime 
organizational and structural principle of Facebook, irrespective of whether such 
surveillant activity is carried out between peers or between users and Facebook. This is to 
say that what allows for the monetization of user-generated data are precisely the 
unavoidable surveillance capacities of Facebook, and, indeed, the entire Internet client-
database model of computer data exchange and communication. 
Cohen’s research comes much closer to the objectives of this project than Coté 
and Pybus’ work in that the former focuses specifically on how the work of Facebook 
users produces value through the site’s containment and channelling of what Marx called 
the general intellect (very loosely interpreted here as user-generated content). This 
collective intelligence, according to Cohen and others, is what fuels the Web 2.0 
economy in general and Facebook in particular. This is done by essentially privatizing 
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that which is held in common – relationships, culture, sociality, the ability to 
communicate, language, and the like. Without the active participation of individuals, the 
success of sites like Facebook would fail, and the circulation of online informational 
capital would cease, causing a crisis.  
Drawing from the work of Coté and Pybus, Cohen invokes Terranova’s notion of 
free labour as a process through which the general intellect is brought into existence. 
Here she succeeds in emphasizing the economy’s shift towards relying on free labour and 
how this shift actually coincides with a rise in layoffs in the media industries (Cohen 
2008, 9) – a kind of consumer outsourcing of labour. She argues that the active role of the 
user represents a move away from the passive role once played by those who produce / 
are the mass society audience commodity. This move way from user passivity 
(consumption) signals a shift tending towards recognition of the active role of the media 
consumer in determining the success or failure of these websites. These “subjects of 
communication” (Lazzarato 1996, 135) are what perpetuates the process of valorization, 
or profit-generation, in the online economy. 
Apart from briefly engaging in a discussion on the general intellect, she does not 
go into any considerable detail with the work of Marx, his ontology of the commodity, 
surplus value, or how the organic composition of capital, i.e., the relationship between 
constant capital (an organization’s tools and machinery) and variable capital (the wage 
paid to workers) is changed under contemporary capitalist processes. It is useful to bring 
Marx into any discussion of these concepts, something that Cohen fails to do. Section 
four of this study will engage in such a discussion and will attempt to link the work of 
Marx with that of the current historical moment as regards online social networking.  
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In a similar vein to Cohen, and her emphasis on the active role of media subjects, 
Marc Andrejevic has contributed much to research on the digital economy, one that he 
calls the “interactive economy” (2004; 2007a; 2009a; 2010). This new paradigm, echoing 
the active consumer argument forwarded by Cohen above, emphasizes a process of 
“interactivity” (Andrejevic 2007a, 5–8) between producers of media and consumers of 
media as integral to its success. An example of this interaction can be found in the reality 
television show Big Brother and its official website. Big Brother fans will consume this 
show by watching it online or on television, but they will also contribute to the show’s 
progress by participating on online forums, which are owned by the production 
companies who then engage in discussions with fans about the show’s characters, the 
weekly challenges to which contestants submit themselves, and other aspects of the show 
deemed relevant. The interactivity between television consumer and television producer 
turns the former into the latter, the latter into the former. The show’s outcome becomes 
contingent not only on the media production staff, but equally on the fans of the show. 
Andrejevic’s work gets closer to not only an updated version of Smythe’s 
audience commodity, but to Alvin Toffler’s notion of the prosumer (Toffler 1981), both 
of which are constituted by and constitutive of the interactive nature of new media social 
relations. The concept of the prosumer is an important one because it significantly alters 
the notion of a class of workers, augmenting their role from mere producers of things 
separated from the creative process to a class that is directly involved in it, once the 
purview of a corporation’s upper echelon. The fusing of both production and 
consumption has a number of consequences. Perhaps the most obvious consequence is 
that, if individuals beyond the employ of production companies are more and more 
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involved with the production of media, then they necessarily take on a new labouring 
subjectivity that directly implicates them in economic relations of production, and, 
potentially, exploitation.  
Further, a contradiction emerges: as media owners attempt to expand this 
interactivity to audiences who are technically beyond their direct and immediate control, 
they risk losing control over the production process even though their role as owners and 
producers imply control and ownership. The move toward productive inclusion is at once 
a loss of control while remaining in control. Andrejevic’s focus on interactivity is an 
important trajectory, because it highlights the ways in which media users, either willingly 
or unwillingly, become implicated in working relationships with media corporations that 
give little to no remuneration to these workers. It further challenges older assumptions of 
the relationship between media consumer and media producer, challenging scholars and 
researchers to reconsider many of the theoretical models and assumptions used to 
understand the larger media ecology. 
Prosumption suggests that the cycle of production and consumption become fused 
at the point of the individual and they therefore become inseparable as they engage with 
these prosumption media. This being characteristic of post-Fordist capitalism and its 
emphasis on customization and just-in-time production techniques, which all depend on 
large quantities of information from consumers (D. Harvey 1989). Keeping in mind that 
Marx was writing in a time of industrial capitalism, a period largely understood to be a 
society of passive producers, Andrejevic’s work also reflects the work of Paolo Virno 
(2004) who, in his book  A Grammar of the Multitude, addresses questions pertaining to 
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the new ontology of workers under the post-Fordist paradigm, a period marked by the 
hyper-interactivity and media prosumption of users.  
Though Andrejevic highlights some of the ways in which a Marxist understanding 
of labour is problematized in networked environments, much of his work is primarily 
focused on reality television, and, like Cohen’s work, the surveillance mechanisms of 
these new media that are harnessed by capital to render the work of online users 
productive. His work on the political economy of YouTube is most intriguing (2009b); 
however, though commonly understood as a new media platform, YouTube strays 
somewhat from the structural dynamics of Facebook and Twitter and how users interact 
in these environments. It is not a social network in the same way as Facebook and 
Twitter, but is similar to them in that it is a platform of prosumption. His recent work, 
however, calls for a critical understanding of exploitation and alienation in the online 
economy, social media included (Andrejevic 2010). One of his presuppositions is that the 
mode of development of capitalist accumulation of the past twenty to thirty years has 
changed significantly and, as such, our understanding of even the most basic categories of 
Marxist political economy must change too. His insight here is useful because, of course, 
questions of alienation and exploitation remain vital to any Marxist critique of capitalist 
society, especially in terms of the now contradictory and inverse relationship that these 
two concepts share in the digital context, i.e., how “less alienation creates more 
exploitation” (Fisher 2012); but they are also categories applied not without difficulty vis-
à-vis the new media landscape. Despite Andrejevic’s persuasive account of the 
persistence of exploitation, privatization, and the enclosure of the digital commons 
(2010), his analysis falls short as it too does not draw upon the work of Marx and his 
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understanding of exploitation and alienation in any great detail. This is by no means a 
flaw, but merely a yet to be explored trajectory in the ongoing conversation of new media 
political economy.  
As influential as danah boyd’s research is in the cultural studies field, which 
focuses on peer-to-peer informational flows in social media, so Christian Fuchs’ research 
is exemplary of the critical political economy of social media research, which focuses on 
the peer-to-provider informational flows of these media. His work is perhaps most closely 
aligned with the current study in approach, assumptions, theoretical orientation, focus, 
and method. Two particular pieces of research stand out as representative of Fuchs’ area 
of research.  
In an article on Web 2.0, prosumption, and surveillance, Fuchs makes an 
interesting case for the relevance of Marx’s understanding of exploitation, value, labour, 
and the commodity. As well, he demonstrates rather convincingly the way in which these 
Marxian concepts apply to the current period of informational capitalism (Fuchs 2011a, 
294–298). For example, he effectively reinterprets Marx’s analysis of the accumulation of 
capital by taking into consideration informational capital’s new organic composition, i.e., 
the relationship between capital and labour, expressed as fixed capital (machinery, tools, 
etc.) and variable capital (workers’ wages). Marx understood variable capital, from the 
point of view of the capitalist, as a cost incurred in the process of changing capital’s value 
into labour-power, i.e., the wage given to workers (1977, 1:317). Fuchs augments this 
formula to include unpaid prosumer labour such that labour power now no longer only 
involves formally employed workers, but social network users as well (2011a, 297–298; 
2011b, 153). Thus, in online prosumption environments, variable capital now consists of 
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two components that make up the totality of an online social network’s labour-power (cf. 
section 4.3). 
The augmenting of variable capital into two parts of the same whole demonstrates 
how capitalist organizations take advantage of user activity online while simultaneously 
keeping capital investment costs at a minimum, thereby significantly widening their 
profit margin. This is because v
2
 (or the wage of social network users) stays at 0, but is, 
from the abstract perspective of the capitalist, qualitatively no different than v
1
. It is 
therefore equally as valuable a source of productive labour as formally employed labour. 
Fuchs’ remodelling of capitalist accumulation demonstrates how sites like Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube, take advantage of quite literally a knowledge reserve army of 
labour at no cost to them. Fuchs is perhaps the first to demonstrate the threads that weave 
together the shared fabric of nineteenth century capitalist accumulation and the new 
accumulation strategies of the current historical period, thus calling into question the 
revolutionary frame often deployed when describing any qualitative change in society’s 
mode of production. 
 A second strength of this particular study is found in Fuchs’ linking of the 
increase in online prosumption labour with that of advertising revenue, thus 
demonstrating the direct relationship between the two. The more users are engaging in 
free labour, and the more populated prosumption sites like online social networks get, the 
greater the advertising revenues generated (Fuchs 2011a, 301). This is because sites with 
higher participation rates can charge a larger sum to prospective internet marketers for 
access to these data than sites whose source data is thin and less informative because of 
lower participation rates and communicative interactivity.  
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 Despite the usefulness of Fuchs’ article, there is only the briefest mention of the 
role that privacy policies play in Web 2.0 environments, and there is no focus on the 
terms of use documents. As useful as Fuchs’ work is, it does not go into a sustained 
analysis of these documents, which is an important consideration for any political 
economic analysis of new media. However, Fuchs has elsewhere expanded on the role of 
the privacy policy and the way in which it frames our understanding of online privacy. 
In “An Alternative View of Privacy on Facebook,” Fuchs argues against what he 
calls liberal privacy philosophy, which tends to “mask socio-economic inequality [while 
concomitantly] protecting capital and the rich from public accountability” (2011b, 140). 
He argues for a socialist view of privacy which, in contradistinction to the insufficient 
liberal, bourgeois view, “tries to strengthen the protection of consumers and citizens from 
corporate surveillance” (Fuchs 2011b, 144). The current discussion about privacy on 
Facebook is situated within the liberal paradigm where privacy is attributed to “universal 
positive values”; these values tend not to engage with the negative effects of privacy and 
the relationship of modern privacy to private property, capital accumulation, and social 
inequality (Fuchs 2011b, 145).  
The liberal view of privacy is embedded within Facebook’s privacy policy, and, 
from Fuchs’ perspective, succumbs to a privacy fetishism, or a partial, limited, and 
potentially dangerous view of privacy that does not treat it as historically contingent, 
socially constructed, and intimately connected to capitalist accumulation (Fuchs 2011b, 
145).  Fuchs goes onto to conduct a critical discourse analysis of Facebook’s privacy 
policy, but he concentrates only on its aspects that refer to advertising, unlike the present 
study which takes into consideration the entirety of Facebook and Twitter’s privacy 
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policy, their historical progression, as well as their terms of use document. Despite 
adopting the same methodology as this study, the mode of critical discourse analysis 
Fuchs employs, and his conclusions derived therefrom, diverge from, but in no way 
contradict, those found in section three. Further, his adoption of what is a highly complex 
mode of critical discourse analysis, i.e., the socio-cognitive approach to understanding 
discourse and society, as developed by Teun van Dijk, is not well contextualized into 
Fuchs’ study. It is unclear how van Dijk’s model of critical discourse analysis is the 
optimal one for a political economic analysis of Facebook. Rather, Norman Fairclough’s 
framework, whose dialectical-relational model, is a better frame with which to analyze 
Fuchs’ object of inquiry, and so, it ought to have been considered. 
Van Dijk’s paradigm stresses the importance of the subjective elements of social 
actors in society and how their cognitive capacities influence theirs and others’ 
worldviews. Van Dijk emphasizes an understanding of cognitive mediation between 
discourse structures and social structures (Van Dijk 2009, 64; Wodak and Meyer 2009, 
14). For van Dijk, there is no one-to-one relationship between a text or discourse and 
one’s experience or interaction with them. Such experience and interaction are mediated 
through one’s cognitive capacities which, in turn, are influenced by a host of shared 
contextual variables called “social representations” (Wodak and Meyer 2009, 25). These 
representations of the social world are properties of communicative situations that 
influence text and talk (Wodak and Meyer 2009, 14).  
Though there are a host of reasons that demonstrate the suitability of Fairclough’s 
method to political economic analyses of media over van Dijk’s, they are beyond the 
scope of the current discussion. However, one major reason in support of this assertion 
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lies in the conceptual assumptions in each critical discourse analysis paradigm. On the 
one hand, Wodak and Meyer illustrate that van Dijk’s concern with cognition places him 
on the agency end of the structure/agency dialectic, thus emphasizing the active 
subjectivity of individuals who as such have a direct influence on the outcome of a social 
event and, based on shared social representations of reality, its discursive component 
(2009, 20). In other words, van Dijk interprets the reader as an active element in 
(re)constructing textual meaning, and so the focal relationship is between the individual 
and text. 
Fairclough, on the other hand, is concerned primarily though not exclusively with 
the objective, structural dimensions of discoursal and textual production, thus 
emphasizing the objective conditions that allow for and constrain one’s interpretation of 
them and, consequently, social reality. Moreover, “Fairclough focuses upon social 
conflict in the Marxian tradition and tries to detect its linguistic manifestations in 
discourses, in specific elements of dominance, difference and resistance” (Wodak and 
Meyer 2009, 27). Even Fairclough states that theoretical developments led to the 
“dialectical-relational approach within ‘cultural political economy’” (2009, 166).  
There is a markedly Marxian bent to Fairclough’s model in that it internalizes 
many of the concepts found in the critical Marxist paradigm, including Hegelian 
dialectical thought, mediation, class conflict, ideology, and capitalist relations and forces 
of production, whereas van Dijk, although concerned about social structures and its 
influences on the individual (2009, 65), is less concerned about the adoption into his 
socio-cognitive model these formal Marxian concepts. Thus, the Fairclough model of 
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critical discourse analysis is far more amenable to a critical political economic analysis 
than van Dijk’s model, which is why the former is used in the current study. 
Despite Fuchs’ lack of contextualizing his chosen methodology, and his lack of 
historicizing the development of the privacy policy and terms of use documents – the 
contribution of the present study – his work on Facebook and privacy is an important 
contribution to political economic research on social networking. It critically negates the 
liberal assumptions of privacy embedded in Facebook’s privacy policy, engages directly 
with Marx and his work on exploitation, and develops a number of progressive and 
radical measures by which to follow as first steps toward negating and correcting the 
asymmetric power relation between social media users and social media providers. 
One of the foremost contributors to the question of labour in online environments 
has been Tiziana Terranova. She has been closely associated with Italian currents of 
autonomist Marxism (Wright 2002). Her influential work on labour in online 
environments has led to a number of scholars to include in their analysis Terranova’s 
notion of free labour (2000; 2004; 2010). Originally published as an article, it eventually 
became a chapter in her book entitled Network Culture: Politics for the Information Age. 
Here, Terranova observes a fundamental shift in labour relations in and around the 1990s 
when the Internet became a household ware. She writes: “Free labour ... includes the 
activity of building websites, modifying software packages, reading and participating in 
mailing lists, and building virtual spaces [...] I argue that [free] labor is not exclusive to 
the so-called knowledge workers, but is a passive feature of the postindustrial economy” 
(2000, 33, 35). Terranova is most important here because she links her analysis of labour 
to the autonomist concept of the social factory, originally developed by Mario Tronti, 
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where “the relationship between capitalists [sic] production and bourgeois society, 
between the factory and society, between society and the state, become more and more 
organic” (Cleaver 1992, 137); that is, the reach of capital seeps into all spheres of life, no 
longer relegating itself to conventional workplaces like the office or factory. 
Though heavily cited in the literature, the concept of free labour and, indeed, 
much of the work on digital labour from an autonomist Marxist perspective, has been 
scrutinized. David Hesmondhalgh has been a notable figure in providing a sustained 
critique against the common pairing of free labour and exploitation (Hesmondhalgh 
2010), a pairing that the current study utilizes. He argues that this conceptual framework 
is incoherent, and he questions the value of understanding any activity carried outside the 
workplace as labour. He also questions the political value of this view (2010, 267).  Here, 
he echoes Andrejevic’s concern about exploitation where the unjust equalization of the 
qualitative differences among certain exploitative forms of labour occurs. Andrejevic 
cautions that when arguing for exploitation in online contexts critical analyses often 
(presumably unintentionally) transposes, through the invocation of exploitation, existing 
forms of highly exploitative and sometimes brutal labour conditions (factories, 
sweatshops, etc.) into a realm of relative affluence and prosperity (social networking, 
creative work, etc.), thereby rendering equal the clearly unequal qualitative, material 
working conditions between these two realms (Andrejevic 2010, 282–283). Working in a 
clothing factory in Phnom Penh for ten dollars a month is not the same as adding a friend 
to Facebook, clearly. To suggest otherwise would be absurd. 
Hesmondhalgh provides a persuasive critique against expanding the concept of 
labour beyond the formal employment relation; however, he underestimates the 
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importance of the political imperative to seek out and identify the reach of twenty-first 
century capital so that it can be exposed and ultimately resisted; this tendency has been a 
particular strength of autonomist Marxist currents. Hesmondhalgh also oversimplifies the 
notion of exploitation. He does not see exploitation as existing along a line of intensity: if 
working conditions are not such that Marx had described in Capital, as a “hated toil” 
(Fromm 1961) and as immiserating, then it is not exploitation. This is at best an 
insufficient reading of Marx (and of what Marx meant by exploitation). Harry Cleaver 
reminds us that we must always read Marx politically; to never prioritize capital’s 
domination over the working class to the detriment of the latter’s capacity to resist 
(1979). In other words, one must always read Capital as a weapon against capitalist logic 
and to remember the capital/labour dialectic in any Marxist analysis. This entails a more 
open and elastic reading of Marx than Hesmondhalgh allows. 
Further, there is no mention in this particular piece by Hesmondhalgh of what 
Marx actually meant by exploitation, only appeals to secondary sources whose authors 
interpret the concept abstractly rather than in a concrete and charitable manner. Despite 
this, Hesmondhalgh does acknowledge that the various disputes over the term have to do 
with a persistent lack of delimiting, defining, and operationalizing it in one’s analysis. 
Though Marx clearly operationalized it as a mathematical proportion between necessary 
labour time and surplus labour time, thus rendering all capitalist labour relations 
exploitative, it may just as well have carried the implication that exploitation as a process 
is ultimately detrimental to one’s health and is, therefore, morally reprehensible. While 
admittedly this interpretation takes a decidedly orthodox view of exploitation, it is 
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necessary, lest one risks stretching the conceptual efficacy of exploitation and other 
Marxian concepts too thin to be of any use. 
Exploitation, then, becomes necessary to locate for class struggle. If exploitation, 
under the conditions of assembly-line production, was located within the disparity 
between socially necessary labour time and surplus (free) labour, it was because Marx 
needed to locate it there in order for the working class to begin resisting the estrangement 
and alienation of their Gattungswesen, or species-being (i.e., self-determination of the 
species). Terranova’s analysis of free labour (pure surplus value) is a re-articulation of 
the labour theory of value which allows one to locate exploitation under the conditions of 
online prosumption beyond assembly-line factory production. This line of inquiry, as has 
been shown, has been further developed by Fuchs. Like other work in this review, 
Terranova does not offer a sustained analysis of social network privacy policies or their 
terms of use, though her provocative and important attempt at expanding the definition of 
labour to include forms beyond the walls of the formal employment relation has 
influenced the current study.  
 To conclude, it is clear that the literature reviewed herein, as but a sample of the 
political economy of online social networking research, has demonstrated the economic 
importance of prosumption media in the twenty-first century. These researchers have 
touched on issues of labour in the online context, subjectivity, exploitation, interactivity, 
prosumption, surveillance, and value creation. There is, however, much left to be said. 
Fuchs’ work scratches the surface of a relatively new and nascent area of inquiry, 
namely, critical analyses of the privacy policies and terms of use documents of Facebook, 
Twitter, and perhaps other online social networks. The current study will make a unique 
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contribution to the field by extending Fuchs’ analysis. Drawing from many of the 
concepts reviewed in this section, such as free labour, exploitation, value, and the social 
factory, it will also stress, as a necessary component of critical political economic 
research, the importance of appealing to the work of Marx, whose work has unfortunately 
been neglected in much of the literature. Lastly, the current study will also provide an 
historical analysis of the privacy policies and terms of use documents, demonstrating how 
they have changed over time concurrent with the managerial changes of both Facebook 
and Twitter, which have led to their reorientation as organizations driven by the profit 
motive. The key element of success for these websites, in terms of their current 
monetization strategy, lies buried within these documents.  
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CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
COMMUNICATION: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 
 
 
This study takes an integrative approach to social research. It combines elements 
of critical discourse analysis with the theoretical and conceptual foundations of critical 
political economy of communication in order to analyze the dynamics of online social 
networking. Though the former can be seen as a method and the latter a theoretical 
position, these modes of inquiry internalize what could be called a methodological 
dialectic: they are programs that combine theory and method, each constituted by and 
constitutive of the other.  
For instance, critical political economy, though certainly theoretically oriented, 
deploys dialectical thinking as a form of critical inquiry in order to flesh out the 
contradictions in established knowledge formations, to expose these epistemes’ 
underlying value assumptions, and to upset their ontological and epistemological 
certainties in the face of the changing dynamics of social processes. This is most evident 
in the pages of Marx and his ongoing critical argument against the assumptions of 
classical political economy, and how they come to bear on his own moral-philosophical 
analysis of society. Another method of critical political economy is its tendency towards 
historical analyses of the social totality. This method is meant to reintroduce the temporal 
component back into areas of social reality that have been hypostatized by other modes of 
inquiry. Often times the historical approach is deployed as a corrective to the more 
empirical and positivistic methodological applications to social processes commonly 
borrowed from the natural sciences, which tend to isolate variables and abstract away 
from the context in which they are found. Historical analysis emphasizes the importance 
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of continuity and context, and promotes a diachronic rather than a synchronic 
understanding of society, which positions the latter not as a static abstraction, but as a 
relatively stable, yet dynamic set of mutually constitutive processes. To abstract away 
from the context of these processes is to risk missing out on a more complex 
understanding and explanation of particular social phenomena. 
Likewise, critical discourse analysis, as the name implies, is a method of social 
inquiry that internalizes various theoretical concepts that partially determine its approach 
to knowledge. For instance, all critical discourse analytic methods focus on to a greater or 
lesser extent both the form and content of communication – texts and meaning, 
respectively – and how these relate to larger social formations and social processes. 
However, they differ in the motives that compel researchers towards analysing discourse, 
which, in turn, affects the method by which such analyses are conducted. Wodak and 
Meyer present six of the more influential modes of critical discourse analysis, each 
slightly different in intent and register. These modes range from agency-centred discourse 
analytic techniques (the socio-cognitive approach developed by Teun van Dijk) to 
structure-centred techniques (the dialectical-relational model developed by Norman 
Fairclough). 
This study understands theory (critical political economy of communication) and 
method (critical discourse analysis) as dialectically constitutive. This is to say, theory and 
method are inseparable from one another, as they mutually inform and internalize the 
tendencies of the other. One cannot have a method without adhering to certain 
ontological and epistemological assumptions and propositions; likewise, one cannot 
theorize without some way of determining first the horizons of their object of inquiry. 
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Method informs theory and theory informs method. This constitutive unraveling is itself 
an ongoing historical process driven not only by such dialectical interplay, but by the 
historical content in which the researcher and theory-methodology used are found. Since 
the relationship between discourse and political economic analyses of society may not be 
immediately clear, the challenge of this chapter, therefore, will be to demonstrate this 
relationship, and how the one may come to bear on the other in order to bolster the 
theoretical and methodological efficacy of each. 
Moreover, these paradigms are seen as complimentary and commensurate modes 
of social inquiry, as they both share common epistemological, ontological, and 
methodological assumptions. As will be shown, critical discourse analysis, often focusing 
on the concrete, micro level of analysis (policy analysis, textual criticism, etc.) can feed 
back into the wider focus of critical political economy of communication, often focused 
on the abstract, macro level of analysis (the economy, law, governance, culture, etc.), and 
vice versa. Norman Fairclough’s paradigm is perhaps most explicit in drawing this 
connection between macro- and micro-analysis, that is, between structure and text, thus 
making it most amenable to critical political economic analysis of communication. 
On the one hand, notwithstanding legal analysis, political economy has sometimes 
failed to account for, at the concrete level, the power relations embedded within language 
and documents, which can serve the interests of one class at the expense of another class. 
This is primarily because it has often taken as its unit of analysis institutions, individuals, 
and markets without due regard to the documents these actors produce, which are, quite 
simply, one form of media through which power – as the fundamental kernel of political 
economic analyses – gets communicated, enacted, and enforced. In short, power is coded 
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not only in what Althusser called Repressive State Apparatuses, i.e., the threat of violence 
(2001b), but in language and texts, i.e., moral and legal codes, beliefs, etc. Textual 
production is often motivated by power and, in turn, power is embodied in the text 
produced; therefore, understanding the behaviour of language and texts (as technologies 
of power and influence) are equally important in any political economic analysis of social 
processes, since the latter is interested in understanding power under the rubric of the 
“social totality” (Mosco 2009, 28–31).  
On the other hand, traditional methods of discourse analysis have often been 
charged with failing to account for the ways in which societal power structures are 
enacted in discourse, and how the former not only partially determine how language is 
deployed and used but how it plays an active role in sustaining unequal relations of power 
among classes in society, whether on the ideological or material level. Insofar as this is 
the case, deploying both critical discourse analysis and critical political economic 
analysis can serve as a powerful critique of the status quo.  
In order to demonstrate the commensurability of critical discourse analysis and 
critical political economy of communication, it will be necessary to map out how these 
prima facie disparate modes of inquiry can come to bear on each other. What follows is 
an elucidation on what is meant by political economy, how it can, and has been, extended 
to the field of communication, and finally, how these particular paradigms relate to and 
have influenced Norman Fairclough’s  model of critical discourse analysis.  
2.1. Political Economy 
 
Derived from the ancient Greek words oikos, meaning household, and nomos 
meaning law, economics, Mosco reminds us, originally referred to household 
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management (1996, 24); but the use of the term political economy widened after its 
definition – coined by an early mercantilist by the name of Montchrétien – caught the 
attention of James Stueart, an early classical political economist (Deane and Kuper 1988, 
296). Montchrétien wrote that economics was, “the science of wealth acquisition 
common to both the state and the family,” hence the adjective political (Deane and Kuper 
1988, 296; Mosco 1996, 24).  
 Of the various definitions that shape the contours of political economy, most have 
centred on questions of power, the distribution of wealth across society, and the latter’s 
constitutive social relations. For instance, it has been said that political economy is “the 
study of the social relations, particularly the power relations, that mutually constitute the 
production, distribution, and consumption of resources” (Mosco 2009, 24). Political 
economy “concentrates on a specific set of social relations organized around power, or 
the ability to control others, processes, and things, even in the face of resistance” (Mosco 
1996, 25). Further, “political economists look to a host of factors, particularly law and 
social relations, to explain market outcomes” (Babe 2011, 53). Reflective of its ambitious 
disposition, political economy makes use of theoretical principles, practical policies, 
scientific proofs, and political advocacies in an effort to explain social phenomenon, 
combining elements of science, art, and philosophy (Deane and Kuper 1988, 296).  
In its attempt to address all of the above, political economy has over time 
developed a number of variegated approaches; it is by no means a unified, homogenous 
research program. Two critical currents have developed, both positioned against the 
classical and neoclassical paradigm, otherwise known as mainstream economics: the 
radical critique and the conservative critique (Mosco 1996, 39–47).  Within each, there 
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exist a number of different “schools” which further variegates the field, from 
neoconservative public choice theory and the rational expectations school on the right to 
the more socialist institutional, Marxist, feminist, and environmentalist approaches to the 
left (Mosco 2009, 50–63).  
Despite these differences, however, Mosco identifies four common-thread 
features of political economy (1996, 27–38), features that not so much delimit as shape 
the rather amorphous and dynamic contours of this heterogeneous field: (1) it gives 
priority to social change and historical transformation with an eye towards examining 
short term patterns of growth and contraction as well as long-term fundamental changes. 
This necessarily entails a historical, diachronic approach to understanding society; (2) it 
is rooted in an analysis of the social totality in that it should “span the range of problems 
that tend to be situated in the compartments of several academic disciplines” (Mosco 
1996, 29). This necessitates an interdisciplinary approach, not the least of which entails 
an understanding of the relationship between the political and the economic, drawing 
from disciplines such as philosophy, social science, economics, cultural studies, art, and 
history; (3) Moral philosophy is the third component of political economy. It is used to 
refer to “social values (wants about wants) and to conceptions of appropriate social 
practices” (Mosco 1996, 34). This necessitates a view to not only describing how the 
world may be at any given time, but proffering an explication of how it ought to be 
different, if need be. Political economy considers normative thinking as means toward 
correcting perceived injustices; (4) Praxis refers to “human activity and specifically to 
free and creative activity by which people produce and change the world and themselves” 
(Mosco 1996, 37). Praxis, Mosco writes, guides a theory of knowledge to view knowing 
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as the ongoing product of theory and practice. In short, true knowledge can come only 
from thought and action, not merely one or the other (1996, 38).  
These four features or presuppositions of political economy combine to form a 
powerful research programme, one focused on analyzing issues from a variety of 
perspectives with an appreciation of the complexity of social processes and sensitivity 
towards the just attainment of human needs, rights, and wants. Again, however, there is 
no consensus on how this may be achieved, leaving the field of political economy active 
and dynamic. It is clear that political economy is an ambitious research programme, as 
evidenced by the rather general and all-encompassing definitions provided herein. 
Because of this, it is necessary to move from the general to the specific in order to 
demonstrate the relationship between political economy of communication and critical 
discourse analysis. 
2.2. Political Economy – Classical and Critical 
  
The classical paradigm, writes Mosco, was grounded in Enlightenment values: 
rationality and empiricism (1996, 39). As such, it sought to “extend the principles of 
Galilean and Newtonian mechanics to the world of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
capitalism” (Mosco 1996, 39). It eventually followed, in the form of neoclassical 
economics, “a reductionist trajectory of identifying economic ‘laws’ or formulae to 
explain the relationship between individuals and markets, in isolation from broader 
historical and socio-political contexts” (Barrett 1995, 186). This meant that there was 
very little room left for a consideration of morality, human needs beyond what the market 
provided, and human relations beyond that of commodity exchange relations, which is to 
say, nothing more than a view towards things rather than people (Babe 2011, 45). The 
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contributions of classical political economy have been many, but it has been met with 
substantial critique because of the reductionist trajectory it took, not the least of such 
resistance emanating from the work of Marx.  
Whereas classical political economy sees capitalism as the established social 
order, and as such confronts it a priori and without question as to its historical 
contingency, it focuses on explaining it through the use of scientific proofs expressed in 
mathematical language (Mosco 2009). Critical political economy, however, questions the 
immutability of this established social order (Deane and Kuper 1988, 296), and attempts 
to upset many of the ontological and conceptual assumptions of both classical political 
economy and its progeny, neoclassical economics; most notably are the assertion that 
capitalism is a natural process, and is, therefore, immutable; the high level of abstraction 
at which classical political economy and neoclassical economics operate; their 
hypostatization of social processes (structures over relationships); their reification of 
markets (Babe 2011, 45); and, from a Marxian perspective, their failure to include 
history, labour, and class into their analysis of society (i.e., the moral component). 
Perhaps one of the more significant contributions of Marx, in the face of the massive 
historical injustices and unrest sparked by the shift from agriculture to industrial 
capitalism, has been his attempt to reintegrate back into political economic analysis 
questions of equality, democracy, labour, and class, and, in so doing, resurrect the 
humanistic, moral-philosophical component that once characterized political economy.  
Critical political economy, or Marxist political economy, can be defined as “the 
study of the social relations, particularly the power relations, that mutually constitute the 
production, distribution, and consumption of resources” (Mosco 2009, 24), whilst 
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emphasizing the “limitations, contradictions, and problems of the capitalist economy” 
(Fuchs 2011a, 289). Not only is it concerned with the dynamics of capitalist 
accumulation, it is also concerned with demonstrating the inherently political nature of 
this particular mode of production (i.e., the social totality). This is largely achieved by 
emphasizing that “value in commodity exchange is grounded on exploitation of 
production” (Deane and Kuper 1988, 246) where one class, by historical consequence, 
forces another to sell their labour so that the latter may survive. Those who do not own 
the means of production but only their labour are coerced into their own exploitation.  
Mosco reminds us that political economy is much more interested in examining 
the social whole, or the totality of social relations, that make up economic, political, 
social, and cultural areas of life (2009, 3–4). The fundamental flaw with economics, as a 
nomothetic discipline, is that it artificially isolates the political and the moral from the 
processes of resource production, distribution, and exchange when, in fact, such a split is 
neither possible nor helpful in fully grasping social processes in order to improve upon 
them. The latter, unfortunately, being limited to market functionality and the fulfilment of 
human wants without sensitivity towards environmental and other concerns. Its tendency 
towards analysis of the general laws of production, distribution, and circulation of goods 
has led to a number of blind spots in the discipline, rendering invisible the social 
inequalities produced by these processes, reducing issues of power and inequality to that 
of market deficiency or failure, and explaining social change only incrementally (Mosco 
1996, 48, 49, 56, 63). Ruggles’ summation of this critique vividly captures the spirit of 
political economy as a moral, practical mode of inquiry: 
To point to the general normative thinness of positive economics is nothing new. 
It is far from intuitively evident that in the real world, all are made better-off by 
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the operations of the marketplace, that there are no losers, no victims, no one who 
needs an extra helping hand, in laissez-faire market societies. Mainstream 
economists, however, think of their idealized model of a complete set of perfectly 
competitive markets only as a theoretical standard toward which the pursuit of 
social welfare ... should be directed, as a template to which measures to correct 
for market failure can be designed. (2005, 37) 
 
Marxian political economy has contributed greatly to the analysis of labour, and its 
relation to the social totality, well beyond the more limited bourgeois interpretations of 
labour as a mere factor of production; something that merely exists as an incurred cost of 
production, as dead labour rather living labour in Marxian terms.  
 This study, concerned with labour, class, and the production of value in the digital 
context, squarely situates itself within the paradigm of Marxist or critical political 
economy.  It attempts to map new circuits of accumulation, and how this circuit partially 
determines and cements new social relations on the Internet. Moreover, it goes beyond 
description to advocate and include into its analysis policy recommendations in order to 
address the perceived asymmetries of the economic social relationship established 
between social network producer and social network provider. In the spirit of 
interdisciplinarity and with a view toward the social totality, focusing on the question of 
power as it is embedded in the texts of Facebook and Twitter’s privacy policy and terms 
of use will emphasize how language and contract law factor into cementing this new 
economic relationship. This study is also situated within the paradigm of communication 
research, focusing on a particular medium through which communication takes place. 
The next section will draw the connection between (Marxist) political economy and 
communication. 
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2.3. Critical Political Economy of Communication 
 
With Mosco’s definition of political economy in mind – that it is the study of the 
social/power relations that mutually constitute the production, distribution, and 
consumption of resources – one can see how amenable this definition is to the 
communication paradigm, as the latter relies on the very material substrate of which 
political economy is most concerned: 
From this vantage point the products of communication, such as newspapers, 
books, videos, films, and audiences, are the primary resources .... This 
formulation ... calls attention to fundamental forces and processes at work in the 
marketplace. It emphasizes the institutional circuit of communication that links, 
for example, a chain of primary producers to wholesalers, retailers, and 
consumers, whose purchases, rentals, and attention are fed back into the new 
processes of production. (Mosco 2009, 25) 
 
There is another interesting perspective on how political economic analysis can come to 
bear on communication. While satisfying its fundamental presuppositions, Babe argues 
that the virtue of using political economy over other modes of inquiry, as an explanatory 
and prescriptive paradigm, is that it pays considerable attention to not just the material, 
but also to the symbolic (2011, 44). This includes both an analysis of market transactions 
and the directly observable, and an analysis of belief systems, knowledge, myth, custom, 
and ideology, which all contribute to the economic exchange of goods (Babe 2011, 53). 
Not only do communications contribute to the exchange of economic goods, they 
themselves are economic goods to be exchanged. As Babe suggests above, the beliefs, 
knowledge, myths, and customs of people manifest themselves in the form of various 
media containers that circulate throughout society. This study focuses on the media 
containing the consumption patterns, likes, dislikes, and beliefs of audiences as they are 
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embedded in the social network information commodity: what Dallas Smythe has called 
the “audience commodity” (1981). 
Political economy goes well beyond neoclassical economics and administrative 
communication research, the latter denoting research carried out in the service of some 
administrative agency of public or private character (Babe 2011, 55), precisely because it 
is critical; it stresses understanding the social totality, not necessarily one or a handful of 
particular variables. It is this presupposition that bridges political economy with that of 
communication. Since the latter is a process partially determined by market forces, it is 
implicated in the social totality constitutive of and constituted by economic, social, 
cultural, and political forces. A question arises out of the above observation: if 
communication is part of the purview of political economic analysis, then what is its 
focus? One answer is that it concentrates on the production, distribution, and exchange of 
communication resources and commodities with an eye towards the actors involved in 
these processes. This means that it centres on questions of media ownership and control 
(private interests, owners of the means of communicative production and dissemination) , 
processes of consolidation (monopoly), diversification (investment), commercialization 
(commodification), internationalization (accumulation), the workings of the profit motive 
(competition), and the consequences of media content and practices (production, 
consumption, meaning making) (Barrett 1995, 186). 
Because this study is situated at the intersection of political economy, class, 
power, discourse, and communication, it is appropriate to extend the definition of critical 
political economy to that of critical political economy of communication. Mosco defines 
the latter as a “social process of exchange whose outcome is the measure or mark of a 
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social relationship” (2009, 67). This definition, as wide as it is, allows for the extension 
of the production, exchange, and circulation of economic resources to that of the 
production, exchange, and circulation of informational resources used in the process of 
meaning making. These can include objects such as books, radio, television, audiences, 
and other information commodities. This definition implies that the outcomes of 
communication and media production, i.e., meaning and informational commodities, 
often are produced, exchanged, and circulate like economic resources. The political 
economy of communication, recognizing that media industries operate according to 
market logic and, therefore, with a profit motive, takes the view that media outlets do not 
simply reflect reality or transmit information, but actively contribute to constructing 
social reality according to particular power interests. To the extent that this is the case, 
the media industries are, therefore, political sites of struggle that internalize and 
perpetuate particular ideologies as well as the ever-present asymmetric social relations 
common to capitalist societies in order to serve certain interests over others. And to the 
extent that these informational resources behave like economic resources, it is necessary 
to widen the understanding of the relationship between economy (resources) and culture 
(meaning) as mutually constitutive, rather than the former causally determining the latter 
(Marx 1970, 20–21): 
It is important to resist seeing the political economic as the realm of structure, 
institution, and material activity while communication occupies culture, meaning, 
and subjectivity. Both political economy and communication are mutually 
constituted out of social and cultural practices. Both refer to processes of 
exchange which differ, but which are also multiply determined by shared social 
and cultural practices. (Mosco 2009, 68) 
 
As Babe has argued, the bridge between economics and communication is political 
economy (2011, 43). Both essentially do political economy in the sense that they focus on 
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areas of social reality that are the marks of the wider social totality, albeit in varying 
scope, depth, and focus. What political economy does, in its all-encompassing 
disposition, is to meld the symbolic (communication) and the material (communications) 
together. Both are linked by the questions of power and influence. Just as the political 
economist focuses on the control over production, so the communications political 
economist focuses on the control over cultural production (Babe 2011, 53–55). The 
questions of control and power are not limited to Institutions and Markets; rather, they 
extend to all actors that constitute and are constituted by these institutions and markets. A 
consideration of the linguistic component of social relations is necessary precisely 
because communication, as language in motion, is essential to the workings of power, 
control, and influence. 
2.4. CPE of Communication and Critical Discourse Analysis 
There is affinity between Mosco and Babe’s understanding of the mutually 
constitutive relationship between culture and economy and Norman Fairclough’s 
understanding of how discourse behaves in class society: in each case, culture and 
economy are constitutive of and constituted by one another. Since economic systems are 
fundamentally communicative, questions of power are unavoidable, despite the 
assumptions of mainstream economics and administrative communication research (Babe 
2011, 20, 33–34). To communicate is to exert influence, the latter often being the 
realization of power, and power being central to political economic analysis. One cannot 
divorce questions of power and influence when understanding communication. 
Combining critical political economy of communication with critical discourse 
analysis allows researchers to develop a more robust and granular analysis of social 
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phenomena, more so than if they merely deployed one mode over the other. In the context 
of this study, critical discourse analysis will be a method of analysis deployed at the 
concrete, molar level of the social (Facebook and Twitter’s privacy policy and terms of 
use documents). It can be viewed as one entry point of many into the wider analysis of 
society. Critical political economy of communication, often deployed at the abstract or 
macro level of the social (capitalist society, the legal system, media industries, etc.) will 
inform the conclusions of the discourse analysis conducted and provide clues into the 
developing social relations between social network user and social network provider as 
well as the linguistic formations common to capitalist flows of power. 
2.4.1. Articulating the Bridge: The Birmingham School of Cultural Studies, 
Political Economy, and Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
The link between political economy and discourse analysis does not start with 
Norman Fairclough. The lineage of his research program, seeking to “meld the material 
with the symbolic” (Babe 2011, 44), can be traced back to an intellectual current of 1960s 
British cultural studies. The theories and praxis of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies (CCCS) at the University of Birmingham marked a significant change in 
trajectory in what was understood as cultural studies, and, indeed, Marxist inquiry, at that 
time. What we see in Fairclough’s work are the intellectual leitmotifs found in the 
intellectual ensemble of the CCCS, particularly in the work of Stuart Hall. Thus, the 
bridge that connects discourse and political economy can be clarified with a brief 
consideration of what the CCCS sought in their analysis of culture and society, and the 
tools they used to work towards these ends.  
The work of E.P. Thompson, Raymond Williams, and Richard Hoggart marked 
an important detour in direction of twentieth-century British cultural analysis. The CCCS 
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initially began, in the 1960s, as an “interdisciplinary endeavour,” which “attacked the 
narrowness of the way English literature was being taught in Great Britain” (Schulman 
1993, 1). In particular, Hoggart, Thompson, and Williams exposed and critiqued the 
perceived cultural elitism found in the work of literary figures such as F.R. Leavis and 
T.S. Eliot (Schulman 1993, 2). One of the CCCS’s aims was to “affirm working class 
culture against onslaughts of mass culture produced by the culture industries” (Kellner 
2009, 1). Later, it would eventually blossom into a “project that would continue their 
critique of modern culture, [seeking] forms of resistance to capitalist modernization” 
(2009, 2). Stuart Hall, who became acting director of the CCCS in 1969 (Gorman 1985, 
197), was inspired by Hoggart, Williams, and Thompson’s work, but he had his doubts 
regarding their class-centred epistemology (Gorman 1985, 198). This doubt propelled 
Hall toward a slightly different theoretical and practical trajectory, which would later be 
picked up by Fairclough and his work on capitalism, neoliberalism, and discourse. This 
will be touched on later in this section. 
In their expanding and enduring mandate to critique modern culture, the CCCS, as 
envisioned by Hoggart, Thompson, and Williams, internalized and sought to transcend 
the cultural pessimism, theoreticism, and negativity of the Frankfurt School by insisting 
on the capacity and the ability of the working class to resist hegemonic forms of culture 
and meaning while simultaneously carrying on the former’s critical tradition (Kellner 
2009). Later, as seen in Hall’s work and the Centre’s exposure to new ideas imported 
from Europe, the CCCS also worked towards a renewed consideration and expansion of 
Marxian theory, a critical interrogation of the relationship between base and 
superstructure, and, most importantly, the politics of signification, ideology, and the role 
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of language in culture and society. Thus, the CCCS could be viewed as one of the first 
systematic and coordinated attempts to address a persistent lacuna in Western Marxism – 
a theorization of the superstructure of comparable complexity to extant theories of the 
economic base. 
This renewed consideration and gradual broadening of Marxist praxis was 
facilitated by the proliferation of previously unavailable Marxist-inspired texts in and 
around the time the CCCS was founded (Schulman 1993, 5). Key texts that contributed to 
the CCCS’s “neo-Marxist” approach to social inquiry included Marx’s Grundrisse, 
Althusser’s structural Marxism, and Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks (Schulman 
1993, 5). These texts were used, in part, to challenge the established orthodoxies of the 
Old Left, especially the latter’s tendency towards an economic reductionism that reduced 
other non-economic aspects of society to mere epiphenomena or effects determined by 
the base. The established Left also lacked a robust theory of the superstructure, and how 
it related to larger political and economic structures. Gorman reminds us that the Old 
Left’s failure was its rigid adherence to an “orthodox dialectical materialism [being] true 
only when preserving and expanding upon the power of Communist Party officials. Its 
reductionist materialism purposively immobilizes workers and reinforces the Party’s 
privileged social, political, and economic niches” (1982, 254). This was surely a political 
program incommensurate with the CCCS’s task to affirm the subjectivity of the British 
working class (Gorman 1985, 197) – indeed, anyone who was not a card carrying 
member of the Communist Party. 
Schulman lists four defining qualities that gave the CCCS its unique intellectual 
contour. These features are what differentiated it from the kind of cultural inquiry 
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conducted prior to its founding (1993, 3). In attempting to affirm working class culture 
against 1950s and 1960s British cultural hegemony and, later, to critique capitalist 
modernization, the CCCS (1) broke from behaviourist paradigms of previous research 
that saw media influence as a direct stimulus-response mechanism, leading to a view of 
media as pervasive social and political forces that had subtle, indirect, and imperceptible 
influences; (2) challenged the notion that media texts are transparent bearers of meaning, 
and worked towards the active, structuring potential of these media vis-à-vis social 
relations; (3) moved beyond the traditional understanding of audiences as passive 
recipients of media messages and towards a consideration of how they are actively 
engaged in communicative processes, as decoders and potential resisters of those 
messages; and (4) adopted a view of mass media as circulating and cementing dominant 
ideological definitions and representations of social life.  
What is important to note is that these four presuppositions are also found 
throughout Fairclough’s theory and method of critical discourse analysis (cf. section 2.5). 
The very idea of critically interrogating discourse and media texts, as Fairclough does, 
presupposes all of the above. Namely, that (1) texts must be understood as being created 
in a network of social relations under a wider social totality, (2) texts, as semiotic 
representations of social practices produced within a network of power relations, 
obfuscate these practices just as much as they clarify them, (3) that textual meaning is 
never closed to interpretation (critique) or resistance, but (reasonably) open to them, and, 
finally, (4) that they actively internalize ideological forms that work to sustain hegemonic 
relations in society, and are, therefore, not only carriers of meaning but of (class) power. 
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The connection between Fairclough’s work and the CCCS can be illustrated by 
considering their theoretical affinities – Althusser and Gramsci. 
It was in the writings of Louis Althusser and Antonio Gramsci that the CCCS, 
under the direction of Stuart Hall, found a renewed relevance in Marx; this time, 
however, with a consideration of language as a crucial locus of inquiry and site of 
struggle, and how it may feed back into questions originally pertaining to politics and 
economy.  These Marxist thinkers brought to the CCCS the theoretical arsenal required to 
move away from the debates that occupied much of their thinking at the time – namely, 
the debates centring on culturalism and structuralism (Hall 1980) – and towards more 
immediate concerns. Procter notes that the adoption of Antonio Gramsci’s work enabled 
Hall to approach this theoretical antinomy by articulating them together in order to 
resolve their contradictions, and to expose the inadequacy of each of these paradigms 
when taken in isolation (2004, 49). 
The ongoing assessment and interrogation of the base-superstructure metaphor, 
most notably taken up by Williams (1977), guided much of the Birmingham school’s 
thinking as well. It led to a focused critique and extended analysis of the relationship 
between culture (superstructure) and economy (base), a line of inquiry previously implied 
by the work of Antonio Gramsci and his work on the relation between state and civil 
society (1971, 210–276). It also provided the conceptual frame in which to expand on the 
cultural and ideological component of Marx’s understanding of the social totality. The 
importance the CCCS placed on the role of ideology and its discoursal manifestations in 
cementing societal power relations is reflected in its publication On Ideology, a series of 
essays published in one volume in 1977 (Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 
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University of Birmingham 1980). Contained within these pages is Stuart Hall and others’ 
critical reading of Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony and common sense, as well as 
Althusser’s interpellation and Ideological State Apparatuses (Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham 1980). These two intellectual currents were 
essential to the Hallian-inflected version of the CCCS – and to Norman Fairclough’s 
critical discourse analysis paradigm – as their work represented one of the first substantial 
endeavours into the nature of the superstructure, which went well beyond Marx’s scarce 
assessment of it in his writing. The adoption of Althusser and Gramsci – and Marxism 
generally – prevented the legacy of the CCCS from remaining a “residue of interest in 
analyzing (British) popular culture and [led to] a greater understanding of the politics of 
representation” (Schulman 1993, 8). It went beyond a mere descriptive disposition to take 
on a critical one, especially with Hall’s attempt to articulate a more open Marxism, one 
“without guarantees” (1996, 44), which was amenable to questions concerning language 
and power. 
Althusser viewed ideology as the “representation of the imaginary relationship of 
individuals to their real conditions of existence” (Althusser 2001a, 109). For Althusser, 
there is a substantial difference between actually existing reality and an individual’s lived 
experience of that reality; there is no one-to-one correspondence between them. Instead, 
the relationship between the real and an individual’s experience of it is always mediated, 
not the least of which through language and power. Another important component to 
Althusser’s theory is that ideology, working to interpellate people into subjects of 
ideology, has a material substrate. Reality is expressed through Ideological State 
Apparatuses (ISAs), or distinct and specialized institutions like churches and schools 
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(Althusser 2001a, 96). Though linked with Repressive State Apparatuses and State 
Power, such as the politico-legal apparatus, police, army, and courts, all of which 
function through repression and force, ISAs predominantly function through ideology, 
world views that “reproduce the relations of production” (Althusser 2001a, 97–98). The 
result is that these seemingly disparate apparatuses are unified in that they operate 
beneath a ruling ideology (read: hegemony) and interpellate individuals into subjects 
(Althusser 2001a, 117), rendering them mere effects of structural power.  
Althusser’s view of ideology is much more pervasive and diffuse than Marx’s 
definition – that the ruling ideas of a society are those of the ruling class (1998, 67) – 
such that it penetrates, permeates, and is inscribed in the very institutions with which 
individuals interact and to which they are subjected. In so far as this is the case, the work 
of ideology is not easily recognizable and is, therefore, difficult to resist; more so than if 
it were merely a set of propositional and epistemological claims expounded from on high 
by a recognizable, homogenous elite. If the latter were the case, then being able to 
recognize ideology in order step outside of it (Althusser 2001a, 118) would be less 
daunting a task. The idea of ideology as structured representations manifested in and 
produced by Ideological State Apparatuses means that sites of (political) struggle are no 
longer confined to the domain of politics, since these apparatuses are also located in the 
private sphere and elsewhere; struggle thus exists in all social relations (Gramsci 1971, 
326), not just political ones. Ideology for Althusser was not simply a top-down decree of 
the beliefs, values, and truth-claims of an identifiable class of rulers, something that the 
awakening of a class consciousness could readily shed. It was, for him “subtle, indirect, 
and imperceptible” (Schulman 1993, 3).  
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The problem, however, is that his totalizing view of the ideological effects on 
individuals occludes the valorization of the latter’s capacity to resist hegemonic processes 
and ideological forms – something that the CCCS and Stuart Hall were adamant on 
emphasizing. If all experiences are effects of structural power, then there can be no 
resistance, as the latter would merely be valorized by the former, i.e., resistance being 
reduced to an unauthentic product of ideology. Althusser’s totalizing theory effectively 
destroys (or ignores) subjectivity under the weight of structural power. This is where he 
departs from Gramsci, as the latter understands ideology or “conceptions of the world” as 
operating within a nexus of struggle rather than as a boot descending on the faces of the 
masses:  
Critical understanding of self takes place therefore through a struggle of political 
“hegemonies” and of opposing directions, first in the ethical field and then in that 
of politics proper, in order to arrive at the working out at a higher level of one’s 
own conception of reality. Consciousness of being part of a particular hegemonic 
force ... is the first stage towards a further progressive self-consciousness. (1971, 
333) 
 
Further, as Hall and others point out, though the connection between Althusser 
and Gramsci is strong in that the former was influenced by the latter (Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham 1980, 64), Althusser 
appropriated Gramsci’s nuanced theory of the social totality in a way that universalized, 
and thereby, flattened it into an undifferentiated and homogenous structural-functionalist 
complex, whose role is to merely reproduce the relations of production without it taking 
into account forms of potential struggle. It would be seen by some as not having the 
theoretical efficacy and granularity found in other social theories. It is well known that 
the structuralism of Althusser has been criticized as overly deterministic. It is one that 
does not allow agents to partially determine social processes, resist them, or struggle 
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against them; nor does it account for the structuring of social practices by agents, say, in 
the same way that Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration does (1984). This was quite 
problematic for Hall and other CCCS intellectuals who placed great importance on the 
theme of resistance. This is one of the reasons Hall adopted a Gramscian framework of 
analysis in his work. Nevertheless, Althusser’s structural Marxism remains an important 
influence for both the CCCS and Fairclough (1999, 23–24) because of its account of 
ideology as representations. It is this that brings it squarely into the domain of language 
and power, the objects of inquiry of Fairclough’s research. 
The adoption of Gramsci’s work by Hall and others provided a more nuanced 
account of the relationship between power and ideology, one which emphasized the 
spaces and processes through which the meanings of cultural practices and texts come to 
be fought over: “The concept of hegemony has helped Centre scholars out of the impasse 
the structuralist Marxism of Althusser created: making notions of agency appear futile in 
the face of what was theorized to be the inevitable ideological position of the individual 
by the apparatus of the State and its agencies” (Schulman 1993, 9). Ultimately, the use of 
Gramsci was vital to a political project that sought to articulate an unexplored area of 
Marxist theory, and to get beyond the economic reductionism that informed much 
Marxist praxis up until the 1960s: 
Hegemony theory thus involved both analysis of current forces of domination and 
the ways that distinctive political forces achieved hegemonic power ... and the 
delineation of counterhegemonic forces, groups, and ideas that could contest and 
overthrow the existing hegemony. Hegemony theory thus requires historically 
specific socio-cultural analysis of particular conjunctures and forces, with cultural 
studies highlighting how culture serves broader social and political ends. (Kellner 
2009, 3) 
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In effect, the adoption of a Gramscian-inspired Marxism, like Althusser’s work, opened 
the terrain of struggle to all areas of society once considered unimportant by classical 
Marxists. But Gramsci’s work went one step further by carving out a complex description 
of the process of ongoing struggle between social blocs that take place without the latter 
appealing to violence and repression. Two crucial intellectual advances that facilitated 
this dialectic of incorporation and resistance (struggle) was (a) a wider view of ideology 
as not just thematic, but formal, and (b) its connection with discourse and language, the 
latter two as both carrier and mediator of the social world.  
The work of Gramsci and Althusser appropriated by the CCCS and Stuart Hall set 
the stage for an empirical mapping of the struggle over meaning and, ultimately, the 
obtainment of what Gramsci referred to as ethico-political power. This is to say, they 
allowed for the mapping of the processes by which political leadership obtains and 
maintains power through winning the consent of individuals non-violently. Moreover, for 
those like Fairclough, a systematic, critical-political research agenda focused on exposing 
the subtleties of ideological work and its linguistic manifestations in communication 
could now be developed and theoretically situated. Taken together, Althusser’s notions of 
ideology and interpellation, and Gramsci’s notion of hegemony articulate together to 
provide a sophisticated view of societal power flows. They developed a view of ideology 
and power that, as mentioned above, challenged traditional behaviourist notions of 
power, largely because the latter operated empirically and, thereby, had great difficulty 
understanding power as something not directly observable and measureable (Lukes 
2005). Finally, they allowed those like Stuart Hall to elucidate a theory of power that 
included an appreciation of how dominant ideologies or meanings come to bear on 
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individuals’ world views and how these conceptions  may contribute either to a 
fragmented and incoherent “common sense” (domination) or a structured, self-reflective, 
and valorizing “good sense” (resistance) (Gramsci 1971, 323–326). 
Norman Fairclough internalizes many of the theoretical and methodological 
underpinnings initially taken on and developed by the CCCS. For instance, his notion of 
ideology is strikingly similar to that of Althusser’s: “Ideologies are representations of 
aspects of the world which are shown to contribute to establishing, maintaining, and 
changing the social relations of power, domination and exploitation” (2003, 9; emphasis 
added); however, he goes beyond this definition to also emphasize, like Gramsci, the 
process by which ideologies are manifested and perpetuated in society: “The ideological 
work of texts is connected to what I said earlier about hegemony and universalization. 
Seeking hegemony is a matter of seeking to universalize particular meanings in the 
service of achieving and maintaining dominance, and this is ideological work” (2003, 
58).  Fairclough has noted elsewhere that an advantage of this view of ideology is that” it 
retains its focus on forms of domination (as opposed to 'neutral' definitions of ideology 
which cut the concept off from domination ...) while ceasing to be exclusively tied to 
social class domination” (1999, 27). At the linguistic level, the hegemonic process often 
manifests itself in texts of all kinds; particularly, as hidden value assertions and epistemic 
assumptions in clauses, among other linguistic techniques attempting  to universalize or 
naturalize particular meanings in order to render them immutable and “common-sensical” 
(Gramsci 1971, 323–326).  
Moreover, Fairclough sees hegemony not only as a political process conducted by 
political forces, but also as partly a contention over the claims of their visions and 
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representations of the world to having universal status (2003, 45). This assertion echoes 
the CCCS’ notion of the active reader, which is found more fully elaborated in Stuart 
Hall’s encoding/decoding model of communication (2007): A struggle over meaning can 
only occur if recipients of media messages actively engage in the process of decoding 
received messages. They cannot be passively subjected to ideological forms and 
simultaneously possess the ability to resist those forms. Similarly, Fairclough, in 
elaborating on the increased reliance for individuals to construct their identities using 
what he calls mediated quasi-interactions (various media types like magazines and the 
Internet), they are not 
simply subjected within these [practices], for they intersect with conversational 
discourse. We may say they are 'recontextualised' within conversation ... and this 
implies that they can be appropriated and transformed in diverse and 
unpredictable ways, and undesirable ways from the perspective of those who are 
selling the commodities. It also implies ... a certain colonisation of conversation 
by mediated quasi-interaction (and of lifeworld by systems) (1999, 44–45). 
 
Here Fairclough is operating most explicitly under Hall’s encoding/decoding model of 
communication (2007) in the sense that the decoding of messages will never reflect 
perfectly the sender’s original meaning. It is this “lack of fit” (Hall 2007, 480) between 
sender and receiver that is one of the preconditions for struggle and resistance against 
dominant modes of meaning. Fairclough moves from an Althusserian concept of ideology 
right into Gramsci’s concept of hegemonic struggle as a process involving ideology, 
which includes resistance. This is important for Fairclough’s concept of social practices, 
which he says are  
habitualised ways, tied to particular times and places, in which people apply 
resources (material or symbolic) to act together in the world. Practices are 
constituted throughout social life - in the specialised domains of the economy and 
politics ... but also in the domain of culture, including everyday life .... The 
advantage of focusing upon practices is that they constitute a point of connection 
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between abstract structures and their mechanisms, and concrete events - between 
'society' and people living their lives. (1999, 21) 
 
Social practices, like teaching, jurisprudence, research, prayer, investing, etc., are what 
mediate between larger social structures like the legal system and concrete events like 
acts, statutes, and bylaws, to take but one example (cf. figure two below). Practices, 
however, give the impression that they are events or actions carried out over time, not 
semiotic representations. So how does language fit in to social practices? These practices, 
Fairclough writes, are partly discursive: they are talked about, and they are written about. 
They are also discursively represented through such acts of communication (1999, 37–
38). In so far as these practices sustain relations of domination, they are ideological 
(1999, 37). The ways in which these practices are described can often become sites of 
struggle that are connected to larger social forces, such as the economy, governance, and 
the law. 
Elsewhere, Fairclough notes that   
Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony' is helpful in analysing relations of power as 
domination. Hegemony is relations of domination based upon consent rather than 
coercion, involving the naturalisation of practices and their social relations as well 
as relations between practices, as matters of common sense - hence the concept of 
hegemony emphasises the importance of ideology in achieving and maintaining 
relations of domination. (1999, 24) 
 
So, in framing ideology within the context of a process of struggle over representation 
and meaning, critical discourse analysis can be seen as a method that allows researchers 
to chart the trajectory of a given hegemonic struggle as it may be manifested in semiotic 
or discoursal forms, i.e., discursively represented. This is precisely the intent of Stuart 
Hall’s work (1999).  By situating orders of discourse within a larger context of social 
practices which are themselves constitutive of and constituted by power relations and 
hegemonic processes, the complex and highly-mediated dialectical relationship between 
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superstructural areas of society – as sites of struggle over meaning, values, and beliefs – 
and a society’s economic base is strengthened thereby. This is because most social 
practices come to be discursively represented and/or are themselves discursive. Such a 
dialectical view between base and superstructure is in line with Mosco’s comments on the 
social totality as an important ontological presupposition of political economic analysis. 
The writing of both the CCCS and Fairclough suggests that this presupposition guides 
their thinking. Both are effectively doing political economy in that they are attempting to 
operationalize and articulate a critical praxis that internalizes the social totality by 
recognizing the dialectical relationship between politics, culture, and economy, more so 
than classical Marxism or early discourse studies. 
On this point, we find Fairclough repeatedly insisting on a relational (process-
oriented) and dialectical (critical) approach to understanding the complexity of society. In 
this he echoes yet again Gramsci and Althusser in the sense of their attempt to transcend 
the vulgar causal determinism that has been associated with Marxist orthodoxy, 
A target for many theorists has been [historical materialism’s] tendency towards 
economic reductionism - to see other parts of society as ... epiphenomena. 
Theorists have moved towards the more dialectical views of society which are 
also part of the Marxist tradition, partly in response to changes in capitalism 
which have enhanced the effects of other parts of society on the economy. These 
approaches have produced accounts of the state, of culture and of social 
interaction which are richer than those to be found in classical historical 
materialism, and have attributed greater autonomy to them in the constitution and 
evolution of social formations. The centring of language within reconstructions of 
historical materialism is tied in with this critique of economism in particular; 
versions of classical materialism which centre culture and social interaction 
thereby also centre language. There is in this respect a broad tendency within and 
around Marxism ... which includes also Gramsci [and] Althusser. (1999, 74–75) 
 
Fairclough also sees his project as a transdisciplinary one: “CDA can figure 
within properly 'transdisciplinary' (as opposed to merely 'interdisciplinary') research, 
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involving a dialogue (or 'conversation') between theories in which the logic of one theory 
is 'put to work' within another without the latter being reduced to the former” (1999, 2, 
75). This is what Stuart Hall referred to as articulation (Procter 2004, 48) – a process that 
combines seemingly unrelated parts in order to avoid myopic reductionism or 
essentialism. As Kellner has noted, the CCCS was similarly oriented in terms of their 
theory and practice (2009, 3). The Birmingham school combined “social theory, cultural 
analysis and critique, and politics in a project aimed at a comprehensive criticism of the 
present configuration of culture and society” (2009, 3). Though it combined multiple 
theoretical orientations, it never sought to reduce their theoretical and practical 
polyphony to one particular melody (Procter 2004, 50–51). Articulation is directly taken 
up by Fairclough in another way as well. His understanding of social practices suggests 
that they do not happen in isolation. They instead are networked: 
Articulation refers to a relationship of 'overdetermination' ... between practices 
within such a network ... in the sense that each practice is simultaneously 
determined by others without being reducible to any of them, [and ] in the sense 
that each practice can simultaneously articulate together with many others from 
multiple social positions and with diverse social effects. This moves us away from 
the ... determination of classical Marxism. (1999, 23–24) 
 
Further, 
 
Networks of practices are held in place by social relations of power, and shifting 
articulations of practices within and across networks are linked to the shifting 
dynamics of power and struggles over power. In this sense, the 'permanences' we 
referred to above are an effect of power over networks of practice, and the 
tensions within events between permanences (boundaries) and flows are struggles 
over power. These relations of power at the level of networks are relations of 
domination and include not only capitalist relations ... but also patriarchal gender 
relations [and] racial and colonial relations, which are diffused across the diverse 
practices of a society. (1999, 23–24) 
 
The similarities shared between the CCCS and Fairclough’s critical discourse 
analysis are many. It would not be unreasonable to conclude that based on the above 
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observations the latter is directly influenced by the former, even though the Birmingham 
school of cultural studies and Stuart Hall are rarely explicitly mentioned in Fairclough’s 
work. They are linked by a common tendency to reflexively internalize and synthesize a 
number of intellectual currents to create a richer, historically informed and politically 
charged praxis. Just as Hall used Gramsci to transcend the culturalism/structuralism 
divide, so too is Fairclough inspired by Hall to achieve similar interdisciplinary 
objectives in his theory and method of social inquiry that includes elaboration of a 
Marxism without guarantees. 
All of the above points to a yet to be articulated assertion regarding the scope and 
contribution of neo-Marxist inquiry: that communication practices matter in any analysis 
of society. What one sees with Althusser, Gramsci, the Birmingham school, and 
Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis is a move towards an analysis of communicational 
processes, and how they play a decisive role in either maintaining or challenging the 
status quo. All social practices, economic or otherwise, are communicational. It is this 
that articulates them together, and it is the social totality that gives them expression as 
social relations. Even though it has been argued that Marx wrote little on the role of 
communication – even using the term interchangeably with transportation, thus – contra 
Williams (2010, 56–70) – making it a relation of production rather than a means of 
production (Hebblewhite 2012) – what is clear is that communication, and, at times, its 
resultant commodities and social relations, are essential to social (i.e., political economic) 
analysis.  
So, what the Birmingham school of cultural studies has attempted to do is develop 
a novel theory of communication using the lens of a revised and open Marxism. It can be 
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seen as a project that attempts to meld the material with the symbolic (Babe 2011, 44) to 
emphasize the dialectical relationship between economic processes (capitalist logic, 
exploitation, domination, class stratification) and cultural sites of struggle over meanings 
(read: communication) that either resist or perpetuate, in the current historical 
conjuncture, these capitalist class relations. This is precisely the concern of critical 
political economy of communication. Marx reminds us that the realm of the 
superstructure is where individuals become conscious of conflict and fight it out (Marx 
1970, 21). Norman Fairclough’s method of critical discourse analysis is a direct 
descendent of the CCCS paradigm, and through it, the political economy of 
communication. He internalizes notions of ideology as representations of the real, 
hegemony and the politics of signification, articulation as the mechanisms involved in 
hegemonic struggle between the dominant and the marginalized, Marxist structuralism, 
commodification, dialectics, and class analysis. It is worth noting that his method of 
critical discourse analysis is also unique in that it is the only one to explicitly operate 
under a Marxian framework (Wodak and Meyer 2009), giving it the same intellectual and 
conceptual lineage that defined Hall and the CCCS’s style of Marxist cultural analysis. 
The next section will more fully elaborate on Fairclough’s mode of critical discourse 
analysis. It is hopeful that what will come out of this elaboration are the affinities and 
common threads linking critical political economy of communication and critical 
discourse analysis together in order to give more clarity to the above observations. 
2.5. The Dialectical-Relational Model of Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Critical discourse analysis is an effective tool with which to identify and analyze 
the use of language under capitalism so as to identify the latent meaning, or workings of 
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power, that lie beneath the manifest elements of texts. The primary tool used to analyze 
the texts in section three is Norman Fairclough’s Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis 
for Social Research (2003). This comprehensive manual provides the conceptual tools 
and concepts crucial for a critical analysis of the linguistic components of Facebook and 
Twitter’s privacy policies and terms of use. Secondary texts that provide the ontological 
and theoretical foundations of  Fairclough’s style of critical discourse analysis can be 
found in Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis 
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999).  
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is “fundamentally interested in analysing the 
opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, 
power, and control, as manifested in language .... CDA aims to investigate critically 
social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, [and] legitimized ... by language use” 
(Wodak and Meyer 2009, 10). It is important to note that CDA does not refer or adhere to 
a single method or a single set of assumptions. Instead, the phrase critical discourse 
analysis is a catchall referring to a multiplicity of approaches to critical textual analysis 
and social critique, linked only by a common research agenda (Wodak and Meyer 2009). 
This does not mean, however, that CDA is without methodological rigour. It just means 
that it will be necessary to outline the particular discourse-analytic framework in which 
this study is situated. 
Influenced heavily by the scholarship of critical linguist Michael Halliday and his 
work on systemic functional linguistics, as well as the critical realist ontology of Roy 
Bhaskar (Fairclough 2005), Norman Fairclough offers the dialectical-relational approach 
to analyzing discourse (2003; 2009). He begins from the assumption that texts and social 
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practices (such as governing, teaching, educating, interviewing, writing, studying, etc.) 
are in a dialectical relationship with one another: texts constitute and are constitutive of 
social reality (Fairclough 2003) (cf. figure two). This means that, contrary to certain 
strands of postmodern scholarship as well as radical social constructivism, not all of 
reality is purely semiotic or phenomenological, but is only partially so. This is important 
to note, because as Fairclough explains, 
Although we should analyse political institutions or business organizations as 
partly semiotic, it would be a mistake to treat them as purely semiotic, because 
then we couldn’t ask the key question: what is the relationship between semiotic 
and other elements [of social reality]? CDA focuses not just upon semiosis 
[meaning making] as such, but on the relations between semiotic and other social 
elements .... [This relationship] needs to be established through analysis. 
(Fairclough 2009, 163, emphasis original) 
 
Fairclough’s critical realist ontology, as a dialectical middle-ground between radical 
social constructivism and logical positivism, or, more abstractly, idealism and realism, 
allows researchers not only to trace the relations between semiotic and non-semiotic 
aspects of life, but to also trace the degree to which language corresponds or “alludes” 
(Althusser 2001a, 109–110) to objective events in reality, thus making it a critical-
materialist theory of language aligned with the work of Valentin Voloshinov (1973) as 
well as critical political economy (Mosco 1996, 2) . Language, for Fairclough, remains 
partially referential to material reality to the extent that it may with relative accuracy refer 
to some aspect of it. This is not to say, however, that language and discourse operate at 
high fidelity: “[t]here are no societies whose logic and dynamic, including how semiosis 
figures within them, are fully transparent to all: all forms in which they appear to people 
are often partial and in part misleading” (Fairclough 2009, 163–164). Perhaps the most 
fundamental to remember of Fairclough’s ontological commitments is this: “The key 
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debate here is relativism versus realism .... We argue ... that although epistemic relativism 
must be accepted – that all discourses are socially constructed relative to the social 
positions people are in – this does not entail accepting judgmental relativism – that all 
discourses are equally good” (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 8). Thus, Fairclough 
negates the Lyotardian judgemental relativism common in more radical post-structuralist 
discourses by observing the “relative permanences” of structures, practices, and 
discourses. The relative permanence of things (such as economy, law, dialects, traditions, 
policies, etc.) is the measure against which epistemological claims are validated or 
invalidated:  
Critical theoretical practice needs to transcend the unproductive divide between 
structure and action by developing an epistemology which is a 'constructivist 
structuralism' ... though with due emphasis on the constitutive function of 
discourse ... It is structuralist in that it is oriented to relational systems which 
constitute relative permanences within practices, it is constructivist in that it is 
concerned to explicate how those systems are produced and transformed in social 
action. (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 32) 
 
2.5.1. Social Events, Social Practices, and Social Structures 
 
Given the dialectical nature between semiosis (i.e., producing texts, etc.) and 
other non-linguistic elements of the social process, Fairclough reminds us that we should 
give context to the texts chosen for textual analysis. The social process (that is, of 
creating and understanding reality) is separated analytically into three spheres, each 
signifying a domain of social reality that is dialectically related to other domains. Thus, 
analysis can take place at three possible levels: social events (concrete), social structures 
(abstract), and social practices (mediator between structures and events). We can see 
from figure two below that there is no straight line or direct causality between structures 
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and events; meaning making is always mediated by social practices (Fairclough 2003, 
23). 
 
 
 
The analysis of online social network policy can begin either at the abstract level 
(social structures: economic, post-Fordist capitalism, etc.) or at the concrete level (social 
events: documents, textual analysis, clausal relations, grammatical relations, etc.), as long 
as the overall analysis “oscillates” between them (Fairclough 2009, 164–165). In other 
words, the task is to incorporate an analysis of a particular social practice (i.e., social 
networking as related to capitalist relations of production) with an analysis of the chosen 
texts, touching upon three possible levels of meaning within them: texts act a certain way 
(genre analysis), they represent or relate to larger social practices (discourse analysis), 
and/or they identify actors (style analysis) (Fairclough 2003, chap. 2). The current study 
is interested in how the selected texts act and in what way they relate to larger social 
structures. Beyond textuality, however, an extra-textual analysis is necessary. This is 
Figure 2 - Norman Fairclough's Ontology of Social Reality 
 
Table 2. Norman Fairclough's ontology of social reality 
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where the critical political economy of communication comes into play. Premised on the 
assertion that texts are mere semiotic moments within a social process related to other 
moments of reality, and not simply universal things-in-themselves, CDA is not solely 
concerned with textuality. It is a project that links text and language to the material 
processes and agents that produce and inform them. The relationship between texts and 
social reality is, therefore, dialectical (mutually constitutive) and relational (process-
oriented). 
Critical discourse analysis is seen primarily, though not exclusively, as a 
qualitative approach to understanding social reality. Wodak and Meyer remind us that (a) 
because there is no one way of carrying out this kind of research there is no one way of 
correctly collecting or gathering data either, and (b) CDA places its methodologies in the 
hermeneutic rather than analytical-deductive tradition (Wodak and Meyer 2009, 27–28). 
Thus, it strays from the more positivistic or social-scientific content analysis paradigms 
developed in the past (Krippendorff 2003; Berelson 1971; Holsti 1969). A focus on deep 
reading, rich description, and theoretical development are central to critical discourse 
analysis, though this does not preclude any consideration of quantitative methods to 
improve upon the external validity of the conclusions drawn.  In particular, the 
dialectical-relational model focuses on the relationships between texts and everyday 
social practices within social structures (Fairclough 2003). One could say that latent 
meaning is given priority over manifest content, even though such prioritization is also 
accompanied by the problems and difficulties associated with mapping, decoding, and 
determining cultural meaning. For this reason, Chouliaraki and Fairclough stress the 
openness of textual interpretation, that claims made are not universal or closed but 
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tentative and open, given the dialectical back-and-forth between structures and agents – 
what Giddens calls structuration (1984) – regarding the processes of meaning making 
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 46–52). 
Despite the tentativeness of critical discourse analysis in terms of its 
methodological approach, each critical discourse analytic paradigm has its own approach 
to constructing a research project. Wodak and Meyer outline the various methodologies 
of critical discourse analysis, including Fairclough’s dialectical-relational model (Wodak 
and Meyer 2009). One way of approaching a Fairclough-style critical discourse analysis 
is outlined below: 
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       Table 1 - Conducting a Dialectical-Relational Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Important to remember, in following these steps, is that it is not a linear process, 
sequentially proceeding from the first step through to the last. Rather, it is viewed as a 
recursive process whereby the researcher may revisit steps throughout the analysis in 
order to reconstruct the object of research (Fairclough 2009, 167) and increase the 
explanatory power of the study. We can see that this methodology allows the researcher 
to start his or her inquiry from a social issue involving a linguistic element (stage 1), 
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proceeding to an extra-textual analysis (Stage 2(a)), moving to textual analysis (stage 
2(c)), followed by addressing questions of ideology (stage 3), and ending with a remedy 
or positive critique of the social wrong (stage 4).  
This study follows each stage but in varying degrees of specificity and depth. For 
instance, stage 1(a) is outlined in the opening sections of the current study, setting up the 
subsequent textual analysis and theoretical elucidation; stage 1(b) is mentioned in the 
beginning of this study, but elaborated on in section four. Stage 2 largely takes place in 
section three, as it presents an analysis of Facebook and Twitter’s privacy policy and 
terms of use documents. Stage 3, although not directly taken up herein, as it lies well 
beyond the scope of this current study, is acknowledged in the introductory section, 
specifically on the popular discourses that frame the role of online social networking 
within the current historical moment. Stage 4 takes place in the concluding section of this 
study. It outlines a governance-centred policy recommendation in favour of correcting, as 
this study contends, the asymmetric social relation developing between social network 
user and social network provider, insofar as Facebook and Twitter are concerned. 
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TEXTUAL ANALYSIS: CONSENTING TO THE EXTENSION OF THE WORKING 
DAY 
 
 
The introductory section identified the processes by which Facebook and Twitter 
valorize the free labour products of its users. The purpose of this section is to criticize the 
mechanisms by which they legitimize the process of commodification and how they 
realize what Terranova calls “pure surplus value” (Terranova 2004), that quantity of 
value realized as profit when the wage paid to workers is effectively zero. The exertion of 
this power to commodify is the condition that makes possible the valorization process 
[verwertung] (Marx 1977, 1:252, 255), i.e., means by which profit is realized.  
The argument of this section is that the privacy policies and terms of use 
documents of Facebook and Twitter function together as work contracts. Beyond 
outlining the roles and responsibilities of actors, and establishing a frame of privacy that 
foregrounds user-to-user connections, these documents also legitimate through contract 
relations the commodification and subsequent realization of profit from the work of their 
users. Whether or not one reads these texts before registering, the moment they begin 
interacting with these sites is the moment that they consent to and enter into a capitalist 
circuit of accumulation. It is this “take-it-or-leave it” arrangement which emphasizes 
most clearly Fuchs’ recommendation of a more refined and socialist view of privacy that 
can bring balance back to the relationship between social network user and social 
network provider. In other words, what is needed is a sense of privacy that does not base 
itself on universal, ahistorical abstract qualities devoid of historical contingency, but on 
historically contextualized and economically sensitive definitions that take into account 
economic inequality. 
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Consider the following clause in Twitter’s terms of use policy: “Such additional 
uses by Twitter ... may be made with no compensation paid to you with respect to the 
Content that you submit, post, transmit or otherwise make available through the Services” 
(Twitter 2011a). This is one of a number of clauses embedded in these documents which 
point to the new economic social relation forged between user and provider in the Web 
2.0 paradigm. What is clear is that social networking in the twenty-first century is as 
political a social practice as it is a cultural one, partly because users are, in a loose sense, 
“voluntarily forced” to accept the conditions of their own exploitation, if they are to 
increase their social capital by participating in these environments; there is no data 
collection opt-out option available to users, nor is there any effective legal remedy which 
may yet provide a corrective to this particular working relationship.  
3.1. Canadian Contract Law: The Legal Perspective 
Though legal jurisprudence has not defined a contract consistently, nor has it 
appealed to a common source for its definition, what is generally agreed upon is that 
contracts are an “agreement giving rise to obligations which are enforced or recognized 
by law” (Peel 2011, 1). The operative terms in this definition are agreement and 
enforceability, both of which will be discussed below. In the Canadian context, the law of 
contract follows common law practice, the latter relying on the guidance of case law 
decisions rather than top-down legislation in the form of acts or statutes. As such, the law 
of contracts rely less on objective factors (i.e., statutes, acts, and policies) and more on 
the laws of precedent (Fridman 2006, 1) and the past decisions of judges (Swan 2006, 1). 
So, the process of interpreting the enforceability of contracts is not a wholly uniform and 
streamlined process, but instead proceeds on a case-by-case basis. Thus, there is 
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considerable difficulty in establishing certain fundamental principles of contract law in 
Canada and elsewhere (Swan 2006, 15). Additionally, Swan reminds us of problems 
associated with Canadian courts legislating, when necessary, over matters of Internet 
contracts, much to the detriment of those who might need protection against ill-crafted, 
illegal, or decidedly biased contracts:  
This reluctance reflects the difficulties in enacting legislation to govern a very 
rapidly developing area of commerce, particularly one where, by its very nature, 
there will often be parties in jurisdictions far beyond the reach of any provincial 
legislature or Parliament” (2006, 209)  
 
Indeed, the transnational character of the Internet infrastructure has challenged legal 
jurisdictions over matters such as contract law and legislation in online contexts, making 
it difficult to protect consumers. The difficulty in decisively establishing contract law 
principles, due in part to hindsight common law procedures and the transnational 
character of the Internet, leave much to be done in terms of addressing uneven contractual 
relations. Despite this known difficulty, there are three doctrines that have been 
acknowledged by legal jurisprudence to be central in determining whether or not a 
contract is legally binding and, therefore, enforceable: offer and acceptance, both of 
which form agreement, and consideration. All three must be established by the 
contracting parties before a contract is created and binding. 
3.1.1. Offer 
An offer is a “complete statement of the terms on which one party is prepared to 
deal, made with the intention that it be open for acceptance by the person ... to whom it is 
addressed” (Swan 2006, 184). The form in which an offer may present itself is varied, but 
so long as all the terms are stated and that the offeror’s intentions are clear, i.e., that he or 
she offers to contract with another in good faith, the offer will be recognized as sound 
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(Swan 2006, 184–193; Fridman 2006, 26–27). It is evident that, in contexts where 
bargaining does not take place, such as in online environments, offer and acceptance are 
established without much trouble (Swan 2006, 184). This is because so many of these 
online contracts are on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Such is the case with sites like 
Facebook and Twitter; one cannot negotiate the terms of site usage. They may only 
accept them or refuse them in toto. The terms are stated in whole, albeit not prominently, 
and acceptance is usually obtained as users navigate the site, create an account, etc. This 
latter point is seen as quite problematic and will be discussed below. 
3.1.2. Acceptance 
Acceptance is the willingness of one party to enter into contract with another on 
the terms offered by the latter (Fridman 2006, 45). In cases where there is no express 
mode of acceptance, the latter is implied from the “nature of the offer” and the 
“surrounding circumstances” (Fridman 2006, 50). This means that acceptance can also 
take on a variety of forms, not all of which are equally apparent. With paper contracts, a 
signature is usually the mode of acceptance; in online agreements, clicking an “I Agree” 
button, or, more subtly, staying on a webpage can be enough to signify acceptance. 
Acceptance must be absolute, meaning that in order for it to be realized, the offeree must 
agree to all terms stated; otherwise, no agreement can be reached, and no contract can be 
formed (Swan 2006, 197). Acceptance must also be communicated to the offeror in a way 
that signals to him or her acceptance by the offeree (Fridman 2006, 65). Communicating 
one’s acceptance in the case of Facebook and Twitter can be construed as using the 
service by registering with it. For instance, “by continuing to access or use the Services ... 
you agree to be bound by the ... Privacy Policy” (Twitter 2011b); and, “by accessing or 
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using the Services you agree to be bound by these Terms” (Twitter 2011c). The subtlety 
of user interaction as acceptance of terms is problematic. As will be discussed below, 
users may not always realize that assent to terms is obtained in this way. 
3.1.3. Consideration 
Consideration is an exchange between parties such that “each side receives 
something from the other” (Fridman 2006, 82). In more formal terms, consideration is 
“some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the one party or some forbearance, 
detriment, loss or responsibility, given, suffered, or undertaken by the other” (Fridman 
2006, 83). It is extra guarantee, beyond agreement (offer and acceptance), that establishes 
the validity of a contract. One could say that consideration is motivation behind the desire 
for parties to contract. Without this exchange between offeror and offeree, there is no 
contract, but merely “gratuitous promises” which are not legally enforceable (Fridman 
2006, 81). What is exchanged does not always have to be quantified monetarily, but it 
must possess some use, value, or benefit (Fridman 2006, 84).  
Consideration, in the context of Facebook and Twitter, could be understood in the 
following manner. The provider of the service receives user-generated content from their 
users; users receive free use and access to the service so that they can connect with others 
and link to important streams of information. However, understanding consideration in 
this way renders the exchange itself asymmetric. The consideration given to these sites by 
users is initially immaterial, but is later transformed into wealth in the commodification 
process; the consideration given to users is completely immaterial: free access to a 
service without financial remuneration. As problematic as this arrangement is from a 
critical political economic perspective, it is quite reasonable and valid from a legal one, 
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so long as the law recognizes that offer, acceptance, and consideration were established 
without finding any confounding factors that would nullify the contractual relation.  
When we turn to Facebook and Twitter, the terms of contract are stated in whole; 
the acceptance of the terms, if it is obtained at the point of registration, is clearly 
communicated to the provider, as the latter obtains a record of account for each registrant; 
and consideration is up front and clearly understood before users even agree to their 
terms and conditions. The provider provides a free service to people that is generally 
recognized as useful and perhaps even necessary, and the provider, in exchange, receives 
information about users who sign up. That data is collected, stored, and distributed on the 
provider’s terms. The user cannot bargain with these terms, and so can only take it or 
leave it.  
So it would seem that all three doctrines are realized as users sign up for these 
social networking sites, thus forming a legally binding contract. Of course, when 
determining enforceability, there are numerous additional factors to take into account 
beyond offer, acceptance, and consideration. There are other variables that can render a 
contract void such as one’s state of mind, their age, the notion of mistake, etc. However, 
it is generally agreed that these three doctrines, when found to be validly established, 
form a legally-binding contract (Fridman 2006; Swan 2006; Peel 2011). The introduction 
of the Children’s Online Protection of Privacy Act in 1998 prevents websites from 
collecting data about children under thirteen years of age. The introduction of this clause 
into the terms and privacy policies of most online social networks is evidence of not only 
compliance with federal law, but in ensuring that these contracts remain binding over 
time.  
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Interestingly, case law has shown that the enforceability of a contract online is not 
affected by whether or not a user reads the terms: “a contract need not be read to be 
effective; people who accept take the risk that the unread terms may in retrospect prove 
unwelcome” (Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.). In this regard, a contract can be formed 
without one’s knowledge of their entry into one. It would seem that this would work in 
the interests of the offeror more so than the offeree, especially if the latter were to decide 
to file a complaint against the former. They would have little recourse in seeking 
damages on the grounds of the enforceability of the contract. 
3.2. Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Perspective 
Though the process of commodification begins with one’s participation in these 
environments, it is enforced and legitimated by these legally binding contracts in subtle 
ways. Further, to the extent that they are contractual, they are also fetish constructs. This 
is to say their discursive character conceals or mystifies the commodification process 
through the use of legalese and carefully worded clauses. They draw one’s attention away 
from the process and realization of surplus-value generation and towards discourses that 
centre on what Christian Fuchs has called liberal or bourgeois notions of privacy (Fuchs 
2011b); something primarily a matter of peer-to-peer information flow rather than peer-
to-provider information flow – though the latter is present in these documents.  It is a 
notion of privacy that can “mask socio-economic inequality and protect capital and the 
rich from public accountability” (Fuchs 2011b, 140).  
That these documents frame the social network provider as responsible custodians 
or mediators of data between users would seem to work in the interests of capital and 
should be construed as a capitalist strategy, reinforcing the protection of Facebook and 
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Twitter’s ability to exploit user labour, rather than as a socialist strategy, which tries to 
not only advocate for one’s choice to opt-in or to opt-out of the commodification of their 
labour, but to strengthen the protection of consumers and citizens from corporate 
surveillance (Fuchs 2011b, 144): “Privacy in capitalism can best be characterized as an 
antagonistic value that is, on the one side, upheld as a universal value for protecting 
private property, but is at the same time permanently undermined by corporate 
surveillance into the lives of humans for profit purposes” (Fuchs 2011b, 144).  
If the regime of commodification is guaranteed by these texts which, by their 
legally binding nature, act upon subjects in a way that serves the interests of capital, then 
it becomes necessary for any critical theory of social networking to understand how these 
texts are operating. Focusing on the discoursal aspects of “social practices” (Fairclough 
2003) (here, social networking) is important, because “the language of mass media is 
scrutinized as a site of power, of struggle, and also as a site where language is often 
apparently transparent (Wodak and Meyer 2009, 12, emphasis original). That services 
such as Facebook and Twitter now form a new capitalist circuit of accumulation, an 
analysis of these new media as novel sites of power and of struggle must now be 
considered.  
The conclusions drawn herein are echoed by Christian Fuchs’ critical discourse 
analysis of Facebook’s privacy policy (2011b). There, Fuchs demonstrates the 
problematic nature of these texts and how they frame privacy in a way that protects the 
interests of Facebook at the expense of its users. He demonstrates quite persuasively the 
asymmetric relationship between social media user and social media provider established 
by these documents. These texts, according to Fuchs, contribute to the continued 
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commodification of user data (2011b, 150), and this study, in also conducting a critical 
discourse analysis, but of Facebook and Twitter’s privacy policy, finds his conclusions 
persuasive and correct. It also comes to similar conclusions. 
Where the current study differs from Fuchs’, however, is primarily in the 
methodology deployed. As mentioned in the review of the literature, Fuchs uses a 
particular mode of critical discourse analysis that makes its suitability as a research tool 
unclear with respect to the political economy of capitalism. He uses van Dijk’s socio-
cognitive approach to analyzing discourse. Van Dijk’s paradigm stresses the importance 
of the subjective elements of social actors in society and how their cognitive capacities 
influence theirs and others’ worldviews. Fairclough’s model is more sensitive towards a 
structuration-based approach to the relationship between discourses, actors, and 
structures, or the balanced consideration of the subjective and objective factors that 
mutually constitute social reality. In this regard, the latter model is seen as more 
commensurate with the presuppositions and objectives of a critical political economy of 
communication than is Van Dijk’s model. 
Secondly, the current study differs in Fuchs’ research in terms of scope. Whereas 
he looks specifically at Facebook’s privacy policy at a particular time, this study looks at 
the privacy policies and terms of use documents of both Facebook and Twitter over time. 
It considers how not just the privacy policy but also the terms of use have changed over 
time, and links those changes to larger changes in the political economy of new media, 
thereby bolstering the conclusions that Fuchs draws. In sum, this study should be viewed 
as an extension of Fuchs’ work in the interests of forwarding a critical interpretation of 
online social networking. 
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Assumptions regarding the transparency of language are troubling and 
complicated when we turn toward social network site privacy policies and terms of use 
contracts. Consider recent events: Facebook’s privacy policy, for example, has been in 
the past couple of years rewritten in a supposedly clearer manner,
2
 conforming to what 
legal circles refer to as “plain language” (Freedman 2007). The assumption here is that 
the simpler the language and readability of these documents, the greater the likelihood 
people will read and understand these policies before using the service in question, thus 
immunizing social network site providers against any lawful action brought forth by 
claimants on the grounds of misinterpretation of terms. This assumption is problematic 
because it does not necessarily follow that an aesthetic change in documentation leads to 
a change in user behaviour regarding contract comprehension. The efficacy of this 
strategy is thus limited to the very small percentage of those who tend to read these 
documents (HarrisDecima 2011, 2–3, 36). Even if we assume that people are aware of 
what they sign up for, as Moringiello argues, people perceive paper and electronic 
communications [involving contracts] differently (Moringiello 2005, 1309). A change in 
a document’s text does not necessarily ameliorate the problems associated with social 
networking exploitation, information use, and the like. The ways in which, say, consent is 
obtained is markedly different between paper and electronic contracts. Consent in the 
former is usually indicated by one’s written signature in face-to-face circumstances 
(though not always); consent in the latter, however, is obtained more subtly and implicitly 
in what has been called “browse-wrap” and “click-wrap” environments. Contracts that 
                                                 
2
 See, for instance, the historical evolution of Facebook’s privacy policies: 
http://www.tosback.org/policy.php?pid=39  
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are formed in click- and browse-wrap environments work on obtaining assent to terms of 
use in ways that people are not always aware: 
In the electronic context, consent can be given in many different ways. One 
common method is what is often referred to as the “shrinkwrap” agreement. This 
neologism refers to an increasingly widespread practice in which consumers 
accept a series of contractual clauses as soon as they remove the cellophane from 
a newly purchased software program...This same method has now been adapted to 
e-contracts with “clickwrap” (which involves clicking on an icon) or 
“browsewrap” (where there is generally a hyperlink to the terms of the contract at 
the bottom of a page) contracts. These are similar concepts which have certain 
differences. These practices have been the subject of much jurisprudential debate, 
mostly in the United States, which is undeniably relevant to our case. The debate 
mainly concerns the adequacy of these procedures as means of demonstrating 
one’s will and of allowing the offeree to be properly informed. (Gautrais 2004, 
201) 
 
Though part of the problem associated with online social network policy may be located 
in the form that contracts take, i.e., the machine-user interface, website design, hyperlink 
placement, etc., this does not mean that the content of them is any less significant as 
moments of ambiguity, subtly, and manipulation. Indeed, that the notion of consent is 
problematized in electronic environments is only reinforced by the fact that consent itself 
is not a clearly defined concept deployed in these documents. In the case of Facebook’s 
terms of use, consent is only alluded to in the context of data collection: “We do not give 
your content or information to advertisers without your consent” (Facebook, Inc. 2010b). 
But what is meant by consent here? Is it written notice, verbal agreement, the creation of 
an account, serendipitous surfing on a newly-discovered homepage?  
In Twitter’s privacy policy, consent is somewhat clearer, indicating that use of the 
site is a form of consent: “When using any of our Services you consent to the collection, 
transfer, manipulation, storage, disclosure and other uses of your information as 
described in this Privacy Policy” (Twitter 2010). Again, though this definition is clearer, 
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it remains virtually unknown to those who do not carefully read the policy in any great 
detail. The problem with these policies is thus a matter of both form and content. 
Though much of the language contained within these documents is now said to be 
more accessible or transparent than past iterations (Electronic Frontier Foundation 2011), 
they nonetheless continue to present serious problems with respect to data collection, 
informed consent (Kerr et al. 2009; Pollach 2005; Gautrais 2004), and surveillance 
(Fuchs 2011a; Cohen 2008). It is here that critical discourse analysis is key to 
understanding how these documents are acting, what they are saying, and, most 
importantly, what they are not saying, since this methodological  paradigm is largely 
concerned with uncovering in a nuanced manner the incongruity between what is and 
what is said (Wodak and Meyer 2009, chap. 1). This is a crucial distinction to remember 
when engaging in an analysis of power and ideology as they are manifested in texts. 
This chapter takes as its point of entry the manifest content of Facebook and 
Twitter’s privacy policies with a consideration of their terms of use. The objective is to 
map the linguistic behaviour of these documents and to show how they facilitate an 
unequal power relation between user and provider. Therefore, two core research 
questions guide the textual analysis: 
What dominant linguistic features characterize the privacy policies of Facebook 
and Twitter? How are these documents acting linguistically, i.e., what are they 
backgrounding, foregrounding, obfuscating, clarifying, etc.? 
 
It should be made clear that limiting the analysis of these documents to a closed-reading 
or strict discourse analysis is inadequate if the goal is to critically address the above 
research questions. Given the ontological and theoretical basis of the particular mode of 
critical discourse analysis deployed in this chapter (cf. section 3.2.1), texts must not be 
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understood as existing beyond the cultural, historical, social, legal, economic, and 
political contexts in which they are created, but rather as semiotic moments intimately 
linked to these larger social structures that constitute social reality. Therefore, it is 
requisite that the linguistic analysis be extended beyond the text and related to elements 
of social reality applicable to the current discussion (i.e., social networking and capitalist 
relations of production). Section four of this study, in conjunction with the current 
chapter, will attempt to link these texts to the larger economic structure in which they are 
implicated. It should be borne in mind that as the textual analysis is presented, one should 
be aware of this meronymic relationship between text and structure. 
3.2.1. Facebook and Twitter’s Privacy Policies 
 
The two privacy policies varied somewhat in terms of word length, sentence 
length and construction, detail, font weight, font size, font type, and choice and order of 
headings (Facebook, Inc., 2010a; Twitter, 2010). The entire corpus came in at 7,278 
words: Facebook’s privacy policy was the longest at 5,983 words, Twitter’s, 1,295 
words. The length of Facebook’s policy is not surprising, given the privacy backlash from 
users ever since Facebook’s controversial structural changeover in 2009. This changeover 
made publicly available to an unprecedented degree certain elements of a users’ profile 
data (O’Neill 2010); it was a move tending toward a “disclose everything” position 
(Oreskovic 2009; Denham 2009) whereby internet users did not have to logon to 
Facebook to see portions of people’s profiles. Facebook’s policy is perhaps the most 
detailed with a plethora of additive and elaborate clauses specifying with a high degree of 
accuracy the actions taken by Facebook as regards data collection and user responsibility 
– much more so than Twitter’s policy. 
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3.2.1.1. Modality 
Fairclough outlines two species of modality which are important to identify in 
order to map the actors in texts. The style of a text, indicative of an actor’s role or even 
identity, Fairclough writes, can be realized phonologically, beyond a written text 
(intonation, stress, rhythm, etc.), and in vocabulary and metaphorical usage. These 
indicators may give off clues as to one’s social class and one’s personality (Fairclough 
2003, 162). The interest in identifying modality is that it is also indicative of what actors 
in a text commit to or assert. Fairclough goes on to stress the importance of the 
contingency of identity on the social structures/practices under which they may operate 
(Fairclough 2003, 161–162). This last point is important, because without an 
understanding of the conditions under which actors act or how they are positioned within 
a text, answering the questions “to what extent do people address each other dialogically 
(i.e., to what extent is difference tolerated or bracketed), and to what extent is mutuality 
and symmetry established between social actors?” may be difficult (Fairclough 2003, 
162). This relates directly to questions of social class interaction. 
Pertinent to the current discussion are epistemic modality and deontic modality. 
The first type refers to the degree to which one commits to truths about the world. The 
second type refers to the degree to which one commits to an action or obligation. 
Modality is, as it were, a mode of expressing, or identifying with, what is or what is not, 
and/or what is done or what is not done. Fairclough calls these two modalities knowledge 
exchanges (statements and questions) and activity exchanges (demands and offers), 
respectively (Fairclough 2003, 166–168). Each exchange exhibits particular grammatical 
and semantic elements that identify them as such. What was revealing about both privacy 
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policies was that they all expressed, with a considerably high degree of frequency, 
deontic modalities throughout. Markers of modality include adverbials and phrases such 
as the following: “may”, “can”, “might be”, “reasonably”, “possibly”, “strongly”, 
“entirely”, “should”, and “could”. Most interesting was the use of the word “may” 
(Facebook, n=63; Twitter, n=20). 
The word “may” appeared most frequently in the context of Twitter and 
Facebook’s data collection and data sharing activities. In terms of level of commitment to 
an action, the word “may” functions to obfuscate the frequency at which an action takes 
place, in this case data collection, dissemination, and “secondary use” (Solove, 2008, 
chap. 5). As Pollach, in her study of ethics and the readability of e-commerce privacy 
policies, writes, “the use of may in combination with [verbs such as disclose, collect, 
share, use] makes it impossible for users to judge how often a company engages in these 
practices. All it tells readers is: “Sometimes we do, sometimes we don’t”.... This reduces 
the information value of these propositions” (Pollach 2005, 228). A consequence of what 
Pollach observes as a strategic use of modality in these policies is that the notion of 
informed consent is problematized – a concept fundamental to contract law (Gautrais 
2004, 194; Kerr et al. 2009, 12). Indeed, how can one make a reasonable decision to join 
an online social network based on the recorded (in)actions of the provider, especially if 
the user is concerned about privacy at the time of registration?  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word “may” in the following ways: 
Commonly used to denote a discretion .... Permissive and empowering and 
confers an ‘area of discretion’ .... Should not be construed as imperative unless the 
intention that it should be so is clear from the context. (2009, 771) 
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Given the extent to which these policies discuss the conditions under which user-
generated content is collected, shared (i.e., sold), and distributed, especially in 
Facebook’s terms of use policy which, interestingly, begins with a high-affinity epistemic 
assertion that “Your privacy is very important to us [underline added],” (Facebook, Inc. 
2010a), but then goes on to outline the conditions of data collection and distribution as it 
pertains to third parties, it is clear from the context of both policies in fact that we ought 
to interpret may as always. In other words, we must construe as imperative the fact that 
Facebook and Twitter always collects, shares, and distributes user-generated content. As 
evidenced by Kirkpatrick’s (2010) work in the previous chapter, as well as data 
aggregation companies like Gnip, Infochimps, and Datasift, there is strong indication to 
suggest that these media environments have an ongoing interest in keeping the flow of 
information steady, so long as there is economic benefit to be gleaned. 
It is also clear from the context that these documents are acting legally and are a 
part of a legalistic discourse evidenced by phrases such as “You may use the Services 
only if you can form a binding contract with Twitter”, “These Terms, the Twitter Rules 
and our Privacy Policy are the entire and exclusive agreement between Twitter and you” 
(Twitter 2010); and, “We may disclose information pursuant to subpoenas, court orders, 
or other requests (including criminal and civil matters) if we have a good faith belief that 
the response is required by law”, etc. (Facebook, Inc. 2010b). Further, each policy 
included an entry for data collection practices for persons under the age of thirteen, in 
order to comply with the United States’ Federal Trade Commission’s COPPA legislation 
(Children’s Online Protection of Privacy Act). Interestingly, each privacy policy did not 
modalize their sentences here, but asserted their position clearly with the proscriptive 
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assertion that “We do not knowingly collect personal information from children under 
13” (Twitter 2010, emphasis added). The modality of both privacy policies is not 
accidental but strategic: these documents position social network providers as responsible 
law abiders with the use of assertive, non-modalized statements and, at the same time, 
they downplay the frequency of their data collection activities with highly modalized 
sentences that obfuscate how often they share and collect data. Such obfuscation 
problematizes the notion of a user’s informed consent to use these services. Interestingly, 
there was synonymy between “consent” and interaction throughout these policies in 
varying degrees of clarity. This is cause for concern, because without an explicit 
definition of what consent may mean, users who interact with these sites may interpret it 
quite differently from the provider (Kerr et al. 2009). 
For instance, the problem associated with parties not reading transactional 
boilerplate contracts (Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, and Trossen 2009) during such processes 
has enticed  legal circles to consider alternatives that are directed towards reconciling 
one’s online privacy and informed consent with business interests. Hartzog proposes that 
user interaction on a particular website should be considered “enforceable promises” and 
that the website interface itself ought to be constructed in such a way that consent is 
generated as users navigate within them (2011). The problem, of course, is that by linking 
consent to one’s online behaviour or website navigation, the rather subtle and implicit 
nature of this consent obtainment does not necessarily improve upon one’s awareness 
that, by merely browsing a page, they are actually consenting to a plethora of conditions 
usually tucked behind a homepage hyperlink labelled terms and/or privacy. Secondly, one 
must question how this particular strategy benefits the user. If this strategy is meant to 
106 
 
 
 
diversify the means by which consent is obtained, thereby strengthening the legally 
binding nature of the contract to which it refers, to include actions not normally 
associated with giving consent (web-browsing over signing a contract), then this is 
clearly a technique favouring the service provider and not the consumer. The extent to 
which the latter is informed of the terms of usage under this particular arrangement seems 
quite limited.  
3.2.1.2. Nominalization 
Nominalization refers to the objectification or reification of a process: it “involves 
the loss of certain semantic elements of clauses – both tense ... and modality ... are lost” 
(Fairclough 2003, 141).  Examples include: “collection”, “globalization”, 
“nominalization”, “mobilization”, “information”, etc. Rather than universal, static things 
in and of themselves, they are actually words describing processes involving actors and 
agents. Billig offers a more nuanced account of nominalization as it has been used in 
critical discourse analysis. Perhaps the most important parameter in the arsenal of the 
CDA paradigm, nominalization is essentially the process of turning verbs into nouns: 
“Choosing noun phrases over verbs and the passive voice over the active voice [is] often 
ideologically charged” (Billig 2008, 785).  
The implication here is that nominalization, although sometimes occurring 
without the knowledge of the writer, can be consciously and strategically deployed in 
texts in order to generalise and abstract away from particular events and processes ... with 
the result of suppressing difference, obfuscating agency, responsibility, and social 
divisions (Fairclough 2003, 144). Similar to the propositional value of which Pollach 
wrote regarding the ambiguity of highly modalized sentences, nominalization 
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problematizes the notion of accountability and responsibility of agents precisely because 
agency (or action) is reified into things (objects) which, on their own, do not necessarily 
have an ability to act without requiring a subject or acting body.  
The consequences of nominalization become clear when we consider how actors 
are represented in a text. Nominalization was a frequently occurring phenomenon in these 
policies; they gave otherwise inanimate things a degree of autonomy and animation that 
had the effect of backgrounding people actually involved in the maintenance of these 
sites. For instance, in Twitter alone, seventeen instances of nominalised action occurred. 
This is significant because they occurred within a much shorter policy in terms of word 
count than Facebook’s, whose longer policy contained fewer instances of nominalization. 
Twitter’s nominalised language most frequently occurred in the context of data 
collection, data sharing, and policy amendment, thus placing the technology itself front 
and centre as doing the acting: “Twitter may keep track”, “our servers record”, Twitter 
may use, “these services may collect”, third parties...perform functions” etc. (Twitter 
2010). What this means is that the actors involved in the creation and maintenance of the 
service are backgrounded, their roles unclear to the user in the sense of who may be 
responsible for what activity. Interestingly, nominalization did not occur whenever the 
policy addressed the activity of prospective users who add or otherwise modify their 
information, foregrounding them as agents explicitly accountable for their own 
information creation and use: “Most of the information you provide” rather than “the 
information provided”, and, “Your public information is” rather than “public information 
is”, etc. 
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What this means in terms of agential responsibility is twofold: a deflection away 
from who is collecting, sharing, and mining data to the technology itself doing these 
things, thus obfuscating the accountability and responsibility of the site’s creators for the 
acts of data collection and distribution. There is also a simultaneous foregrounding of the 
responsibility of online social network users who, as agents who (inter)act with the 
service, are locatable and accountable for information creation and use online. Such 
foregrounding of user responsibility may also imply that whatever the user does 
subsequent to reading or not reading the policy justifies the provider’s data handling 
policies, regardless of how they are expressed in these policies.  
Imparting a sense of autonomy to a technological thing gives the impression of an 
unchangeable situation, a ‘that’s the way it is’ scenario. It distances users and leaves them 
with a feeling of alienation, if not helplessness, in terms of the communicative process 
such that they would be less likely to feel that they are in a position to change the 
situation. It is the effective reification of what is, in practice, a process (Lukacs 1971, 
chap. 1). Thus, at the semantic level of discourse, we find a real abstraction taking place 
in these texts; that is, what are being described are real, concrete processes (data 
collection, dissemination, storage, commodification, etc.) without a concrete specificity 
as to how these processes actually work and the agents involved in making these 
processes possible. All processes are seemingly described as mediated solely through a 
technological object. 
3.2.1.3. Conversationalization 
Commodification is to a significant extent also a linguistic and discursive process 
(Fairclough 1994). This process is described as conversationalization. It is “a process 
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which involves the generalization of the communicative function of promotion (of goods, 
services, institutions or people) into other discursive arenas (Fairclough 1994); it can be 
understood as a process of “colonization/appropriation” of a particular discursive practice 
into another such as market discourse (advertising) with, for example, public discourse, 
as found in politics, public services, and the arts (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 93–
94; Fairclough 1994). Essentially, conversationalisation is a de/recontextualization of 
discursive practice, a move away from high-context language to low-context language, a 
move toward using language as a means to a specific end in a way that is comprehensible 
to the greatest number of people. Facebook’s policies have gone in this direction (Bosker 
2011) and this is most readily apparent in their latest “data use policy” (Facebook, Inc. 
2011).  
Interestingly, when, in late 2009, Facebook decided to augment users’ default 
privacy settings such that users’ networks, gender, pictures, names, likes, friends, 
wallpaper, photos, and other profile data were made visible to the entirety of the World 
Wide Web, there was a respective augmentation in the privacy policy as well. More 
particularly, there was an addition to it. The elaborative clauses and deontic sentential 
modalization of this addition suggested that it was operating in a promotional register: 
Facebook is designed to make it easy for you to share your information with 
anyone you want. [ELABORATION] You decide how much information you feel 
comfortable sharing on Facebook and you control how it is distributed through 
your privacy settings. You should review the default privacy settings and change 
them if necessary to reflect your preferences. You should also consider your 
settings whenever you share information. 
Facebook is not just a website. [ELABORATION] It is also a service for 
sharing your information on Facebook-enhanced applications and websites. You 
can control how you share information with those third-party applications and 
websites through your application settings and you can learn more about how 
information is shared with them on our About Platform page. You can also limit 
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how your friends share your information with applications through your privacy 
settings. (Facebook, Inc. 2009)  
 
It would seem that a fundamental tenet of this passage is that, despite the controversial, 
unilateral decision by Facebook to extend to the Web additional features of users’ 
profiles, the controlling and managing of profile information is, as it presumably always 
had been in the past, the onus of the user – irrespective of the changes made by the 
provider. Further, the above passage reads like a sales pitch, indicating to the consumer 
all the possibilities to be gleaned from the use of the service, as if the service itself was a 
product. There is a strong link between control and desirability in this passage, suggesting 
that so long as Facebook gives informational control to its users (at least in terms of peer-
to-peer information flows) then any unilateral decision by Facebook with respect to data 
handling is warranted.  
Another implication is that control is a thing to be valued and is, therefore, to be 
respected. Value assumptions, says Fairclough, are implicitly connected to larger orders 
of discourse (Fairclough 2003, 58) and that the notion of individual control over one’s 
goods and assets, i.e., control and information, would seem to be in line with a larger 
libertarian value system in which possessive individualism and the priority of the 
individual is a guiding principle (Macpherson 1964; Locke 1980). What is less explicit is 
that in the act of giving someone control the giver must also have a degree of power over 
the recipient in order that such control is readily distributed in the first place. Thus, any 
claim to giving one control without an explication of the associated costs is highly 
suspect. 
The passage above is exemplary of a conversationalization process; that is, the 
augmenting of a legalistic discourse deploying boilerplate legalese to bring into its fold 
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promotional patterns of language written in “plain language” (Freedman 2007), the kind 
commonly found in advertising. The efficacy of this process, however, is again limited to 
those who read privacy and terms of use policies. Further, there is no guarantee that such 
a shift in discursive convention will persuade those who are unsure about the treatment of 
their information. The question then becomes: to what extent is this process of 
conversationalization useful and effective? Does it give an adequate degree of 
reassurance to users as regards control over their online activity (i.e., control over the 
means of distribution of the information they create), especially if we consider that the 
terms of use have not changed but only its aesthetic? The obvious answer is possibly – 
but not necessarily. Despite the difficulty associated with determining the efficacy of 
persuasive techniques in media, conversationalization is, nonetheless, a useful index by 
which to measure the level of penetrability of market discourses in spaces where such 
discourses would normally be in absentia. What we can conclude from the preceding is 
that the overall aesthetic of the privacy policies of both Facebook and Twitter follow 
what Fairclough calls a “logic of appearances” (Fairclough 2003, 94). 
3.2.1.4. Logic of Appearances 
The semantic relations between sentences and clauses as well as the grammatical 
relations within clauses point to the disparity between the manifest elements of a text (the 
words and sentences used) and the overall logic of the message. A document is said to 
contain a logic of appearances when the overall message is descriptive rather than 
explanatory. Key markers of descriptive texts are conjunctions and phrases such as “and”, 
“also”, “such as”, “moreover”, “for example”, etc. When we turn to Facebook’s privacy 
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policy, we can see that much of its content elaborates and adds information after some 
instance of a statement or demand. For instance, 
We keep track of some of the actions you take on Facebook [STATEMENT], 
such as {adding connections} (including joining a group or adding a friend), 
{creating a photo album}, {sending a gift}, {poking another user}, {indicating 
you “like” a post, attending an event}, or {connecting with an application}. In 
some cases you are also taking an action when you provide information or content 
to us. For example, if you share a video, in addition to storing the actual content 
you uploaded, we might log the fact that you shared it. (Facebook, Inc. 2010c) 
 
Though this paragraph is elaborative (it does not make explicit use of the conjunction 
“and”), it does not explain why Facebook keeps track of the actions users take – arguably, 
a much more interesting and important question to ask. Note as well the modalization 
“might” in the last sentence, again obfuscating the frequency at which user data is 
captured and stored. 
Turning to the grammatical relations within clauses, certain indicators that give 
clues as to whether a document is explanatory or descriptive is based largely on the 
semantic relations between sentences (whether they are causal, additive, elaborative, 
etc.). If a clause is explanatory, its grammatical relations would be predominantly 
hypotactic meaning that one clause is subordinate to another and usually joined with the 
conjunction “because”. Usually, the marker “because” indicates an attempt to explain, 
though not always. However, in both privacy policies, the grammatical relations are 
paratactic, or equivalent, because the semantic relations are mostly elaborative and 
additive throughout. Clauses are joined laterally with markers such as “such as”, “also”, 
and “in addition”: 
When you create or reconfigure a Twitter account, you provide some personal 
information, [ADDITIVE] such as your name, username, password, and email 
address. Some of this information, [ADDITIVE] for example, your name and 
username, is listed publicly on our Services, [ADDITIVE] including on your 
113 
 
 
 
profile page and in search results. Some Services, [ADDITIVE] such as search, 
public user profiles and viewing lists, do not require registration. (Twitter 2010) 
 
And in Facebook’s privacy policy: 
When you sign up for Facebook you provide us with your name, email, gender, 
and birth date. During the registration process we give you the opportunity to 
connect with your friends, schools, and employers. [ADDITIVE] You will also be 
able to add a picture of yourself. [ELABORATIVE] In some cases we may ask 
for additional information for security reasons or to provide specific services to 
you. Once you register you can provide other information about yourself by 
connecting with, [ADDITIVE] for example, your current city, hometown, family, 
relationships, networks, activities, interests, and places. [ELABORATIVE] You 
can also provide personal information about yourself, such as your political and 
religious views. (Facebook, Inc. 2010b) 
 
Based on both the semantic and grammatical relations dominant within these documents, 
it is clear from the analysis that these documents contain a logic of appearances, 
documents that are predominantly descriptive and operate at a level of abstraction 
(through its use of nominalization) such that it problematizes a user’s ability to determine 
with any degree of concreteness the agents involved in maintaining social network 
processes. That these policies, acting as both legal contracts as well as adverts, contain a 
predominantly descriptive rather than explanatory character renders null and void any 
inquiry into why data is being collected beyond the obvious and limited justifications to 
“improve the quality of advertisements” (Facebook, Inc. 2010b), “help improve our 
service” (Twitter 2010), and to share information (Facebook, Inc. 2010b; Twitter 2010). 
Though one cannot expect these documents to function as elucidations on how these 
social networks operate, it should be made clear by them who are doing the collecting, 
why (beyond operational justifications), and the extent to which user data is collected, 
stored, disseminated, and otherwise made available to others. If user control is valued, 
then it behoves both Facebook and Twitter to make the necessary information available to 
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its users so that they may be adequately informed as to what they are agreeing to (and 
what they are giving up) at the time of registration. 
3.2.1.5. Legitimation (Authorization) 
There are several processes through which an agent or institution may legitimize 
the claims they make or the activities that they carry out: authorization, rationalization, 
moral evaluation, and mythopoesis (establishing authority by way of a narrative or story) 
(Fairclough 2003, 98). It is interesting to note that, of the policies analyzed, the only one 
to explicitly appeal to an external authority as a validation of their actions was Facebook. 
Twitter made no explicit appeal to any external regulating body in order to establish 
credibility in their data handling practices. In fact, the opening section of Facebook’s 
policy attempts to legitimize everything that follows by way of their appeal to the 
TRUSTe program (and the visual prominence of the organization’s logo in the policy). 
The TRUSTe program is often associated with the European Union Safe Harbor 
initiative, which is an agreement between the European Commission and the United 
States Department of Commerce that enables organizations to join a Safe Harbor List to 
demonstrate their compliance with the European Data Protection Directive
3
 (Connolly 
2008, 4). The TRUSTe program is a privacy seal program that gives “added assurance 
that a website is abiding by its posted privacy statement. [TRUSTe] offer[s] third-party 
verification and monitoring of the information practices of websites. [They are] an 
independent, non-profit initiative working to build consumer trust and confidence on the 
Internet” (Jasper 2008, 80). 
It has been observed that privacy seal programs have been known to break with 
their implied impartiality as third-party arbiters, and TRUSTe in particular has in the past 
                                                 
3
 See, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML  
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failed to punish those companies that breach their own privacy policy (Pollach 2005, 224; 
Electronic Privacy Information Center 2011). Connolly has observed that companies that 
use the TRUSTe seal in their privacy policies, as a way to legitimate their data handling 
practices, often include false claims regarding the jurisdictional power of TRUSTe:  
The Safe Harbor is a self-certification scheme, and most organizations reflect this 
in the text of their privacy policies. However, great care needs to be taken 
regarding claims that US organizations have been ‘certified by the Department of 
Commerce’ or even ‘certified by the EU’. There are also some references to the 
‘Safe Harbor Act’ that may mislead consumers, as the Safe Harbor is not a 
legislative regime. (Connolly 2008, 9) 
 
What we see in Facebook’s privacy policy is the following: 
Facebook has been awarded TRUSTe's Privacy Seal signifying that this privacy 
policy and practices have been reviewed by TRUSTe for compliance with 
TRUSTe's program requirements... Facebook also complies with the EU Safe 
Harbor framework as set forth by the Department of Commerce .... To view our 
certification, visit the U.S. Department of Commerce's Safe Harbor Web site. 
(Facebook, Inc. 2010b, emphasis added) 
 
The implication here is that TRUSTe’s break with impartiality calls into question its 
legitimacy as a bona fide privacy watchdog. It also potentially renders fallacious 
Facebook’s appeal to them as a body that endorses Facebook’s data handling activities: 
“There has been little improvement in either compliance or data quality since the negative 
2002 and 2004 EU reviews of the Safe Harbor .... The growing number of false claims 
made by organisations regarding the Safe Harbor represent [sic] a new and significant 
privacy risk to consumers” (Connolly 2008, 16). The continued presence of the TRUSTe 
seal in Facebook’s privacy policy, since 2006, supports an overall logic of appearances 
inherent in this document; however, despite the serious concerns with TRUSTe’s 
performance, its presence still implies that it is an “authority” and is “certified by the 
Department of Commerce”. That the logos themselves have been known to be 
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counterfeited by some companies that choose to include it in their privacy policies further 
weakens claims in support of proper data handling and their continued appeal to TRUSTe 
as a guarantor of dataflow responsibility (Connolly 2008, 10). 
Why is an analysis of legitimation relevant in our case? Although TRUSTe may 
function as a signifier of accountability, authority, and responsibility in terms of data 
handling, it is also a fetish construct. It mystifies the actually existing data practices of 
Facebook. The TRUSTe service implicitly frames the principal problematic plaguing 
online social networks that choose to use them as one of enforcing individualistic, 
bourgeois notions of privacy, which does nothing to negate or challenge the 
commodification of user data in these digital spaces, let alone bring this issue to the fore. 
3.2.2. Facebook and Twitter’s Terms of Service 
The central thesis of this chapter is that both the privacy policy – as strategically 
concealing the commodification process through framing the ongoing problem with 
interactive online social networks as primarily a matter of peer-to-peer information flow 
and privacy – and the terms of use are effectively deployed together as work contracts. 
What is it about these texts that make this the case? When we turn to the historical 
development of the terms of use of both Facebook and Twitter, we see an overall picture 
of a refinement and augmentation of clauses as well as a problematization or increased 
complication of user control over their data.  
Twitter has crafted five versions of their terms of use policy (Twitter 2011a). The 
first version was posted prior to 10 September 2009 and exhibited rather scarce and 
boilerplate-like characteristics, frequently drawing upon contract law discourse without 
much regard to readability. In fact, a footnote of this version suggests that it was quoted 
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from or “inspired by” Flickr, a photo-sharing social media site (Twitter 2011a). 
Interestingly, version one of the policy states, 
We [Twitter] claim no intellectual property rights over the material you provide to 
the Twitter service. Your profile and materials uploaded remain yours. You can 
remove your profile at any time by deleting your account. This will also remove 
any text and images you have stored in the system ... [and that] We encourage 
users to contribute their creations to the public domain or consider progressive 
licensing terms. (Twitter 2011a) 
 
This passage suggests that Twitter was not overly concerned about the content that users 
produced on their site. Elsewhere in the first version, there is no explicit indication that 
would lead one to believe that Twitter was also a broker of user content. Neither did it in 
any way position the service as being interested in commodifying such content. All of 
this changed rather explicitly with the introduction in September, 2009 of the second and 
subsequent versions of the terms of use, (i.e., versions three through five, the latter being 
the most current version at the time of writing): 
By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you 
grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to 
sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, 
display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods 
(now known or later developed). You agree that this license includes the right for 
Twitter to make such Content available to other companies, organizations or 
individuals who partner with Twitter for the syndication, broadcast, distribution or 
publication of such Content on other media and services, subject to our terms and 
conditions for such Content use. (Twitter 2011a) 
 
Even more striking is the following clause, also found in versions two through five: 
Such additional uses by Twitter, or other companies, organizations or individuals 
who partner with Twitter, may be made with no compensation paid to you with 
respect to the Content that you submit, post, transmit or otherwise make available 
through the Services. (Twitter 2011a, emphasis added) 
 
It is unlikely it is mere coincidence that these clauses were added to the terms of use at 
the same time that Twitter began talks with Microsoft and Google regarding a new data-
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mining initiative. This initiative allowed the latter to draw user-generated content from 
the former: “Microsoft and Google would license a full feed from the microblogging 
service that could then be integrated into the results of their competing search engines” 
(Swisher 2009). This multi-million dollar initiative, which immediately gave Twitter a $1 
billion valuation, has since expanded, as it was a deal that remained non-exclusive. In 
2010, it was reported that Twitter again sold its user data, this time to Gnip, the social 
media aggregator. Gnip offered fifty percent of all the messages posted to Twitter for 
$360,000 per year, or five percent of all messages for $60,000 per year (Dumbill 2011). 
On Gnip’s homepage, we see the logos of both Twitter and Facebook as two of its main 
data sources (Valeski et al. 2011b). 
Similarly, we see in Facebook’s terms of use similar clauses, which extend to the 
provider the distributional powers over user-generated content. Take, for instance, 
version one of Facebook’s terms of use: 
By posting User Content to any part of the Site, you automatically grant, and you 
represent and warrant that you have the right to grant, to the Company an 
irrevocable, perpetual, non-exclusive, transferable, fully paid, worldwide license 
(with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, publicly perform, publicly display, 
reformat, translate, excerpt (in whole or in part) and distribute such User Content 
for any purpose, commercial, advertising, or otherwise, on or in connection with 
the Site or the promotion thereof, to prepare derivative works of, or incorporate 
into other works, such User Content, and to grant and authorize sublicenses of the 
foregoing. You may remove your User Content from the Site at any time. If you 
choose to remove your User Content, the license granted above will automatically 
expire, however you acknowledge that the Company may retain archived copies 
of your User Content (TOSBack 2011). 
 
Further, 
Company shall own exclusive rights [to user submissions such as questions, 
comments, suggestions, ideas, feedback or other information about the Site or the 
Service], including all intellectual property rights, and shall be entitled to the 
unrestricted use and dissemination of these Submissions for any purpose, 
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commercial or otherwise, without acknowledgment or compensation to you 
(TOSBack 2011, emphasis added) 
 
Although we see a progressive change in the textural register of Facebook’s twenty-six 
versions of its terms of use, as well as Twitter’s four latest versions of the same, much of 
this change is merely aesthetic in that what remains consistent throughout all versions is 
the preservation of the rights granted to both service providers to valorize user-generated 
content. It is this persistent characteristic that guarantees the transformation of “pure 
surplus value” (Terranova 2004) from user-generated content into profit; it is also 
evidence suggesting that there indeed exists a working relation between social network 
user and social network provider. Thus, to the extent that users produce value for these 
social network sites, it is not difficult to construe both the privacy policy and terms of use 
as work contracts. Through the imposition of these clauses, social network sites 
effectively render the work of the user “productive” (Marx 2000, 1:–3:153–304) at all 
times, as users cannot opt out of their own exploitation as they engage with them. 
Consider, for instance, assertions made in these policies (all versions) which state 
that both privacy and control are matters of extreme importance: “Your privacy is very 
important to us” (TOSBack 2011); “You own all of the content and information you post 
on Facebook, and you can control how it is shared through your privacy and application 
settings” (Facebook, Inc. 2010b). In the case of Facebook’s terms of use, these statements 
are followed by what is arguably an entire document’s worth of conditional statements 
that render problematic the meaning and assumptions of privacy, control, and consent. 
Immediately following these assertions is a list of conditions that actually de-privatize, 
or, rather, open up new communication flows between the user and the social network 
provider, thereby rendering distributable, transferable, and commercially valuable user 
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data, irrespective of whether or not Facebook and Twitter give users control, as they 
claim.  
Assumptions regarding the degree of control a user has are problematized the 
moment they begin interacting with these sites. Indeed, what is meant by control here? 
Certainly, users are not under any ongoing obligation to interact with these sites and as 
such have the choice not to participate. They do not, however, have the option to both 
participate and control their information to the extent that these sites claim. The question 
of control, as one’s ability to regulate the flow of data, then, is effectively a red-herring; 
what is often not explicit, either within these documents or in the larger debate over 
privacy and, say, Facebook privacy settings, is the unavoidable shift of control over data 
flow to the provider. This shift is simultaneously a broadening or, at worst, a weakening 
of one’s control over their data. 
 
 
The above analysis was meant to map the linguistic terrain of both Facebook and 
Twitter’s privacy policy and terms of use, and, through the adoption of Norman 
Fairclough’s dialectical-relational model of critical discourse analysis, demonstrate the 
problematic language presented by this genre of text. The analysis was guided by the 
following questions:  
What dominant linguistic features characterize the privacy policies of Facebook 
and Twitter? How are these documents acting linguistically, i.e., what are they 
backgrounding, foregrounding, obfuscating, clarifying, etc.? 
 
The textual analysis of Facebook and Twitter’s privacy policy and terms of use has 
highlighted a number of linguistic characteristics that work toward concealing elements 
of their institutional processes, namely the commodification of user information. Though 
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it is clear that these documents function discursively as legal texts, as they draw from the 
legal discourse and explicate the roles and responsibilities of the user and provider (albeit 
in varying degrees of clarity), the policies also have a promotional quality to them, as 
they move away from boilerplate legalese and toward a more accessible advertising 
discourse. This process – conversationalization – is when a text is rendered more 
attractive and persuasive through the enhanced accessibility of the language used so that 
it may be maximally comprehensive and influential.  
Further, an attempt has been made to demonstrate how these documents, by way 
of their semantic and grammatical relations and their strategic use of nominalization, are 
indicative of a logic of appearances rather than an explanatory report. These documents 
may describe in great detail how data is curated, but in this descriptive role there is also a 
preclusion of any explanation as to why, beyond the business-centred rationale of service 
improvement, these data are collected at all.  
Moreover, by virtue of their genre as legal contracts, they are prescriptive 
documents that govern people’s behaviour (Graham 2001, 765) along with outlining 
rights and responsibilities of both user and provider, perhaps in ways that are not always 
obvious. This process of aestheticization is one of deflecting and concealing other aspects 
of reality than those described – namely, that through commodification, users are 
effectively put to work. So, although such aestheticization may satiate a collective desire 
to increase the readability and appeal of these documents, of which they still bear highly 
complex language that deter many from reading them, this does not mean that any 
significant change has taken place as regards Facebook and Twitter’s data handling 
practices, only how such processes are described in these texts. Since 2007, Facebook 
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began to generate revenues by developing advertising informed by user activities and 
preferences (Gane and Beer 2008, 48), and since at least 2009, Twitter began the same 
(Swisher 2009); the conclusion must be that the concealment of certain facts, ones that 
serve the material and financial interests of capital, and not users, is strategic, not 
accidental. It is simply not in Facebook and Twitter’s interests to emphasize to its users 
that the latter’s data are being commodified and sold. Concealing this aspect of online 
social networking behind the highly complex legal discourse deployed in these texts is 
indeed an effective deterrent from inquiry beyond first glance.  
The next section will attempt to theorize this new working relation using the work 
of Marx; in particular, his labour theory of value and his understanding of the role of rent 
in capitalist society. The digital, online context has both confirmed and challenged much 
of Marx’s observations and assertions, especially those centring on the labour theory of 
value. Indeed, capital’s mode of development has led to substantial and incremental 
reorientations of economic social relations in certain sectors, especially in light of 
information-communication technology advances; however, as the next section will 
demonstrate, much of what has been argued and described in the pages above confirm 
many of Marx’s observations. 
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THE EXPANDED FORM OF VARIABLE CAPITAL MODEL AND MARX’S 
THEORY OF RENT 
 
 
With the real subsumption of labour under capital a complete ... revolution takes 
place in the mode of production, in the productivity of the workers and in the 
relations between workers and capitalists .... [C]apitalist production now 
establishes itself as a mode of production sui generis and brings into being a new 
mode of material production. 
– Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy 
 
 Entertainment is the prolongation of work under late capitalism.  
– Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment 
 
 
How can we begin to understand social networking activity from a critical 
political economic perspective? In what particular way does the relationship between 
social network user and social network provider take on the characteristics of capitalist 
relations? How can we begin to identify the circuit of accumulation that transforms user 
activity into value-creating activity? These questions shall guide the discussion of this 
section. In order to address these questions, it will be necessary to return to the work of 
Marx and some of his contemporaries and their discussions on labour, value, the 
commodity, and other facets of capitalist production. To suggest that online social 
networking comprises a new circuit of capitalist accumulation implies that a number of 
political economic concepts, including Marxian ones, are at play, such as value (use, 
exchange, and surplus), exploitation, formal and real subsumption, and the commodity. 
But to simply transplant these concepts into a realm of activity sufficiently beyond the 
character of nineteenth century industrial labour and assume their conceptual and analytic 
efficacy would contravene the very notion of criticality and the historical contingency 
essential to Marxian analysis. The goal of this section, therefore, will be to critically 
engage with these concepts to permit us to make sense of the current object of study in 
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the current historical moment, and to also recognize that such an analysis is deployed not 
without difficulty. 
This section centres on the question of value creation in online social networks, 
and argues that, given the evidence presented in section three vis-à-vis the 
commodification of user-generated content of social media data, the importance of 
Marx’s labour theory of value will be reconsidered, despite claims of the 
inefficaciousness of such a theory in so-called post-Fordist or knowledge-based 
economies (Hardt and Negri 2000, 354; Negri 1989, 89–92; Negri 1999). This germinal 
debate within Marxian circles over value in the information economy can be framed in 
the following and admittedly oversimplified manner: “in the sale of manufactured 
commodities, capital grows ... through the accumulation of surplus value, but in the sale 
of information commodities, capital grows through the imposition of rents and the 
collection of tributes” (Adair 2010, 259).  
The argument will be that Marx’s theory of rent is, at best, a problematic 
framework with which to explain the value-creating activity of online social network 
users. In fact, such a theory risks reifying the role of those who are not only implicated in 
the value chain of capital, but who represent the source of value in these environments. 
The alternative, therefore, will be to propose a modified framework of Marx’s circuit of 
capital, what this study calls the expanded form of variable capital model.
4
 This expanded 
form of the circuit preserves Marx’s labour theory of value and, therefore, the moral and 
                                                 
4
 This model is formally expressed in Fuchs’ article “Web 2.0, Prosumption, and Surveillance” (2011). His 
work represents a highly developed and more formal expression of the author’s own research. However, 
prior to Fuchs’ publication, the author of the current study, in considering how the labour theory of value 
applies to prosumption work, developed a similar line of argumentation that less formally reflects the 
detailed work of Fuchs. As such, the timing of Fuchs’ publication and the author’s research is 
serendipitous, yet timely; ideas not the author’s own but Fuchs’ will be textually acknowledged inline. 
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political imperatives of the theory. This perspective, of which this chapter defends, 
forwards the view that immaterial labourers, whether formally employed or part of 
Terranova’s “free labour” paradigm (2004), i.e., unpaid labour performed outside the 
traditional work places, are the source of value of an information commodity, thus 
positioning and insisting upon the user as a necessary condition for the realization of 
profit in places like Facebook and Twitter. Value, as Marx always insisted, can only stem 
from human labour (1977, 1:128–131).  
The second perspective, to be critiqued, has been forwarded by those working to a 
greater or lesser extent in autonomist Marxist paradigms. Some who follow these currents 
hold the view that revenue generation in Internet “digital enclosures” (Andrejevic 2007b) 
is best explained using Marx’s theory of rent (Pasquinelli 2009; Caraway 2011; 
Vercellone 2008), which, as will be demonstrated, decouples, rather ironically, the 
relationship between user and value with the effect of depoliticizing the entire online 
labour relation. From a political point of view, the second view is seen as fundamentally 
problematic. Before these perspectives are considered in detail, however, a brief 
overview of some of the essential concepts in Marxian analysis will be presented in order 
to demonstrate how capital has developed to subsume into its logic those areas of social 
life that are not immediately understood as sites of production and work.  
4.1. Capital and its Circuit 
 
When speaking of the capitalist mode of production, one necessarily speaks of 
capital, or those basic elements that go into and come out of this particular mode of 
production. Marx, and the political economists before him, defines capital in a number of 
ways: capital is stored-up labour (1988, 36); capital is commodities (1977, 1:255); capital 
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is money which begets money (1977, 1:256); capital is made up of stock or funds that 
produce revenue or profit (1988, 36), which leads him to ultimately conclude that capital, 
being all of these things, are products of human labour, and therefore contain value 
(1977, 1:255). But capital is not simply a sum of discrete values, or useful things, put into 
a system of production; it is value which is in a constant state of metamorphosis from one 
form to another – the ends being the accumulation of more capital and the generation of 
profit. Despite the possibility for many things to be capital, the common thread linking all 
of them is that, unlike the view of classical political economists, value is transformed 
within a process involving the interplay of all of these elements: 
Capital is not a thing, but a process – a process, specifically, of the circulation of 
values. These values are congealed in different things at various points in the 
process: in the first instance, as money, and then as commodity before turning 
back into money-form. (D. Harvey 2010, 88) 
 
Marx repeatedly draws on the metaphor of metamorphosis to convey the importance of 
understanding capital in this way: “We perceive straight away the insufficiency of the 
simple form of value [the value of one commodity expressed in another, i.e., barter]: it is 
an embryonic form which must undergo a series of metamorphoses before it can ripen 
into the price-form” (1977, 1:154, 198–210). Capital is thus value in motion (Marx 1977, 
1:256; D. Harvey 2010, 90), and it takes a particular trajectory. This is an important 
departure that Marx takes, as it leads him to show how each of these traditionally 
hypostatized elements of the capitalist mode of production relate to one another as well as 
how they are linked by and operate in a larger process of circulation. This is to say that by 
understanding the capitalist mode of production as value in motion, involving the 
deployment of discrete capitals, Marx can begin to move beyond classical political 
economy’s fetishistic view of capital-as-things towards capital-in-motion to illustrate 
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where the profit generated from this process actually comes from. Namely, the reduction 
of the actual value of labour’s output to that of a wage, the latter reflecting only a portion 
of the value actually produced by labour over a given period of time. In so doing, Marx is 
able to also emphasize the political implications of this mode of production by locating 
the existence of class struggle within it (Cleaver 1979, 81–84). After all, “capitalist 
production is not merely the production of commodities, it is, by its very essence, the 
production of surplus-value” (Marx 1977, 1:644). More formally, the circulation of value 
can be represented generally as, 
  
 
where finance (M) buys commodities (C), labour-power (LP), and means of production 
(MP), such as machinery and raw materials, which together produce another commodity 
(C’), only for it to be sold in order to recoup the costs incurred producing it (M) and to 
collect an increment above the capital invested in its production (ΔM) (Marx 1992, 
2:124; D. Harvey 2010, 121). 
Each node along this cycle can be considered capital, because they are specifically 
deployed and employed in a process to generate money, not merely use-values. Important 
to observe here is the difference between M at the beginning and M at the end (M + ΔM). 
The idea is that M + ΔM must always be greater than M (implied by delta); otherwise, 
profit is not realized, the growth of a particular capitalist enterprise stops, and crisis 
ensues. As profit is realized, the process starts anew, but at a greater magnitude whereby 
some of the profit generated at the end of the cycle is invested back into production in the 
form of machinery, raw materials, or wages, thus expanding its scale. Overall, the 
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capitalist strategy of accumulation is a never-ending, ascending spiral of 
investment/reinvestment. Strategies intended to maintain the difference between M and 
M+ΔM are a direct result of, as Marx says, capitalists forced to operate under the 
“coercive laws of competition,” compelling them to always find innovative ways to 
improve their capital, so as to preserve it by means of progressive accumulation (1977, 
1:739). It is these coercive laws, according to Marx, that prevent capital from operating 
benevolently, ethically, morally, or by any other standard beyond that of mere 
accumulation (1977, 1:254). Competition among various capitals dictates the terms and 
nothing else. Capitalists are not above this law, nor can they ever be. 
Understanding capital as a process is also important because, as will be shown, 
the role of the online social network user is implicated in the cycle at the point of (LP), 
but in a rather unorthodox way. Only through understanding capitalist accumulation 
strategies in terms of a process can one begin to see how social networkers become 
subsumed under it. The implication then is that if they perform a function at point (LP), 
then they also must be involved in producing a commodity, and therefore value. 
4.1.1. The (Information) Commodity 
 
One of the more interesting socio-historical categories posing a challenge to 
aspects of the Marxist paradigm is the concept of the information commodity. It has an 
unusual character: it acts like and contains the elements of a material commodity (i.e., it 
possesses use-value and exchange-value, and is produced and exchanged for money), but, 
on the bases of its supposed immateriality, its lack of discreteness, and persistence even 
after consumption, it is quite plainly, unlike a material commodity. But when we consider 
for a moment Marx’s reflections on use- and exchange-value, we find that information 
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commodities meet the basic criteria of what constitutes the most basic unit of wealth in 
capitalist society, despite these imperfections. If information behaves like a commodity, it 
is only because capital finds innovative ways to impose the commodity-form upon it.  
Marx’s ontology of the commodity contains three essential elements: use-value, 
exchange-value, and value. As one might guess, something that is produced implies that 
it has use in that it fulfills a particular need or desire. A thing, therefore, has value in use, 
and such use is realized in consuming it (Marx 1970, 27; 1977, 1:126). This particular 
form of value comes from the properties of the object itself, but does not express the 
relations of production of a given society. Use-value expresses the qualitative, specific 
elements of a thing. So, for instance, Marx uses the example of a diamond being worn for 
aesthetic purposes and wheat being eaten for nutrition; but, the acts of wearing a necklace 
and eating bread tell us nothing about who and by what means these objects were 
produced. Marx concludes that, because this is the case, use-value lies outside of political 
economy (1970, 28). However, he is not suggesting here that it is irrelevant to political 
economic investigation, simply that use-value need not be considered beyond the fact that 
it is a necessary precondition for exchange, the latter expressing directly the relations of 
production. All things must have use before they can be exchanged. Plus, it is only in a 
commodity’s unique, specific, and physical character that it can be exchanged for another 
use-value of a different unique, specific, and physical character. It does not make sense 
for two things of equal quantity and quality to be exchanged. 
Exchange-value, in contrast, does not flow directly from the object itself like use-
value. One cannot dissect a potato and find exchange-value in it. This value-form, 
according to Marx, appears to express a quantitative relation between things which 
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eventually become bearers of exchange-value determined by capitalist social relations. 
Exchange-value is the proportion in which use-values are exchanged for one another 
(1970, 28). So, irrespective of their use-values, a car may be equal in exchange-value to 
that of thirty-five thousand donuts. In more formal terms, x Commodity y is worth y 
Commodity b: “Quite irrespective, therefore, of their natural form of existence, and 
without regard to the specific character of the needs they satisfy as use-values, 
commodities, in definite quantities are congruent, they take one another’s place in the 
exchange-process, are regarded as equivalents, and ... have a common denominator 
(1970, 28).” But the question is this: If a use-value embodies a unique property which is 
consumed because of its specific characteristics, how is it possible for two unique use-
values to be rendered exchangeable, a process implying congruency between disparate 
things? Marx explains: 
It follows from this, firstly, that the valid exchange-values of a particular 
commodity express something equal, and secondly, exchange-value cannot be 
anything other than the mode of expression, the form of appearance of a content 
distinguishable from it .... [Exchange-value] signifies that a common element of 
identical magnitude exists in two different things .... Both are therefore equal to a 
third thing, which in itself is neither the one nor the other .... human labor in the 
abstract (1977, 1:127–128). 
 
Labour in the abstract is the common element found in all commodities. It is what links 
use- and exchange-value into one dialectical unity and renders all things exchangeable. 
Therefore, labour creates value and value expresses that labour. Labour in the abstract 
refers not to the specific, qualitative aspects of producing a use-value, e.g., the skill of a 
craftsperson in creating a woodcarving, his or her technique, and the tools used. Rather, 
what is abstract is the average quantity of labour time congealed in that woodcarving, 
irrespective of how that labour is performed. Abstract labour flows from the fact that all 
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labour is an expenditure of human labour-power (1977, 1:137). Among other things, it is 
on the basis of the quantity of abstract human labour, or what Marx calls socially 
necessary labour time (1977, 1:129), that the capitalist mode of production relies upon. 
So, a commodity embodies not only useful, concrete labour (creating use-value), 
but also abstract labour time common to all other commodities (creating exchange-value). 
Marx writes: “Whereas labour positing exchange-value is abstract universal and uniform 
labour, labour positing use-value is concrete and distinctive labour, comprising infinitely 
varying kinds of labour as regards its form and the material to which it is applied” (1970, 
36; emphasis original). This dual character of the object is what differentiates a 
commodity from a useful thing. Things come into being as a result of labour which 
produces a use-value, but these things only become commodities (the expression of a 
social relation of production) when they are produced for others and are rendered 
exchangeable. But in what way does this relate to an information commodity, and, in 
particular, social media user-generated content?  
An information commodity behaves and takes on the appearance of the 
commodity-form. It embodies a use-value, an exchange-value, and is the result of human 
labour-power. However, relative to the physical discreteness of a material commodity 
like a bottle of wine or a loaf of bread, information commodities have unusual 
characteristics which do not fall so neatly within Marx’s schema. Daniel Solove explains 
the curious nature of information commoditization in the context of intellectual property: 
Information can be easily transmitted and, once known by others, cannot be 
eradicated from their minds. Unlike physical objects, information can be 
possessed simultaneously within the minds of millions .... There are problems 
with viewing personal information as equivalent to any other commodity. 
Personal information is often formed in a relationship with others. All parties to 
that relationship have some claim to the information .... Often, the market value of 
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information is not created exclusively by the labor of the individual to whom it 
relates but in part by the third party that compiles the information. (2008, 27) 
 
Here, Solove rightly emphasizes the non-scarcity of information commodities and their 
social character as products of collective social labour. Non-scarcity problematizes the 
notion of ownership, thus leading the law to distinguish between an idea and its formal 
expression, the latter capable of being possessed and controlled by an individual, the 
former less so. Solove’s analysis also implies that information commodities cannot be 
consumed in the traditional sense; that there is a persistent quality to them: one consumes 
a potato once, a book many times. Information commodities can be used repeatedly 
without losing their use-value. But these factors does not change the fact that information 
commodities behave just like physical, tangible commodities, i.e., they are packaged and 
circulate like discrete objects (Bansal et al. 2011; Valeski et al. 2011b). Despite this, 
however, ownership is still a necessary condition of exchange: “ For a thing to be sold, it 
simply has to be capable of being monopolized and alienated” (Marx 1991, 3:772). So, in 
what ways is the commodity-form imposed on the fluidic, ephemeral, and persistent 
information commodity? 
Adair develops what he calls an ideal-type of information commodities on the 
basis of five ontological propositions (2010, 248–252). Two of these propositions provide 
a clarifying perspective on how information commodities might come to be owned: (1) 
The value of information commodities is depleted through obsolescence; and (2) 
information commodities retain an exchange-value through a political process that creates 
scarcity and exclusivity (2010, 248, 250). Adair elaborates that information commodities 
have a short shelf-life and that high-priority is placed on newness and currency (2010, 
248). Old information is simply not useful in light of new information, the latter 
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maintaining the unique and specific quality of the commodity (i.e., its use-value). 
Solove’s analysis, then, can best be summed up as a synchronic, rather than a diachronic, 
analysis of the information commodity. He does not consider the temporal element – 
crucially dependent on an ongoing labour process – of an information commodity’s 
value. Terranova observes that the Internet is about the extraction of value out of 
continuous, updateable work, and it is extremely labor intensive” (2000, 48; emphasis 
added). By updateable work, she means such activities as chatroom typing, website 
construction, programming, newsletters, and real-life stories (2000, 38). 
Moreover, the notion of artificial scarcity is essential to maintaining capitalist 
social relations, and this process, argues Adair, is a political one achieved through the 
imposition of intellectual property rights, Digital Rights Management software, nurturing 
a discourse of criminality vis-à-vis piracy and peer-to-peer sharing, emphasis on 
innovation as guarantor of newness and exclusivity, branding and advertising, and 
celebrity endorsements (2010, 250–251). All of these strategies work toward the 
contradictory movement from maintaining property rights over public goods, (hence 
controlling the speed at which commodities circulate) to concomitantly allowing for such 
circulation to proceed in a productive manner, which realizes their value through the acts 
of purchase and consumption.  
What becomes immediately evident is that Facebook and Twitter’s terms of use 
and privacy policies, in conjunction with contract law, is a directly observable form of 
this political process, which creates artificial scarcity on the information commodities 
themselves and that act as mechanisms that impose the commodity-form on social 
networkers’ activity. By agreeing to the terms of use, social networkers also agree to the 
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commodification of their user-generated content and become implicated within a 
capitalist strategy of accumulation as they register with these sites.  
So, even despite the idiosyncrasies inherent in an information commodity, they 
still very much behave like any other commodity in physical form, be it gold, hay, corn, 
or DVDs: they are bearers of use-value and exchange-value as well as being products of 
human labour; however, they are not consumed, but rendered obsolescent. Even in this 
difference however, the result is the same: a tendency towards replenishment, be it in the 
form of consuming a physical quantity of something or gaining access to updated 
information on latest consumer trends. 
In much the same way that Marx identified a dialectical split in the commodity-
form (use/exchange, concrete/abstract, and quality/quantity), so too do user-generated 
data cum information commodities display a similar split. Turning to the question of user-
generated content, it was earlier defined as “content that is voluntarily developed by an 
individual or a consortium and distributed through online platforms” (Trosow et al. 2010, 
10). The use of the term content is often interchangeable with the term data; but, they do 
refer to two different aspects of what is effectively the same thing. In the same way that 
Marx’s mode of expression in Capital volume one oscillates between the concrete and the 
abstract (D. Harvey 2010, 109), and much like the dialectical tension found within the 
commodity-form produced by use- and exchange-value, the latter existing alongside 
concrete and abstract labour, respectively, content refers to the specific, qualitative aspect 
of a particular information object. The content of something implies an idiosyncratic 
quality of a given piece of information as well as the actual time taken to produce it. 
When we read a book, we read more than simple data on a page. We read a story, an 
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article by journalist x, an argument by author y, etc. However, even in a thing’s content 
data are present and vice versa; these elements are inseparable from one another, in the 
same way that one cannot separate use-value and exchange-value under the capitalist 
mode of production. This dialectical relationship between data and content is best 
understood as one of abstract and concrete respectively: Data are the abstraction of 
content, content the concrete instance of data.  
In the case of online social networking, content refers to the particular, unique, 
and qualitative elements of one’s profile made possible by the concrete labour of the 
individual. The content of a social media profile is a direct expression of a personality, or 
more generally, a living entity. It is that part of the social media information commodity 
which represents “some specific useful and concrete labour” (Marx 1977, 1:150). This is 
the primary reason why profiles are constructed. It is a useful, highly personal endeavour 
that enables a particular form of communication; they are not created to simply produce 
data. The use-value of a social media profile, and the service itself, is the raison d’être of 
the entire online social networking edifice. Often is the case with such lines of inquiry as 
Internet privacy, the formation of “networked publics” (boyd 2007; boyd and Ellison 
2008), and uses and gratifications research (Katz, Haas, and Gurevitch 1973; LaRose 
2010; Papacharissi and Rubin 2000; Rubin 1984; Ruggiero 2000) that the usefulness of 
social networking services are analyzed without adequate regard to understanding them 
as taking on a logic of commodification and exchangeability. That the contradictory 
nature of use- and exchange-value – i.e., usefulness, as a specific quality, cannot be 
exchanged without reduction to the abstract common element of labour – reveals that 
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what is actually commodified and rendered exchangeable are user-generated data, not 
necessarily content (Andrejevic 2009b, 418). 
Residing within user-generated content is user-generated data. The latter, though 
referring to the same object, comprises the “uniform, homogeneous, simple labour” 
(Marx 1970, 29) of the information commodity; or, the common form of labour across all 
social media information commodities. It is the substance that is common to all 
information commodities. Such data could be considered the result of the combination of 
labour-power (the social networker) and the means of production (among other elements, 
the algorithms deployed to mine aggregate data based on network connections, network 
nodes (i.e., a group of user profiles), and the links between them (Tang and Liu 2010)). 
These data can be, for example, the aggregate elements of each profile on a particular 
social network site, but stripped of their qualitative idiosyncrasies.  
For instance, in 2011, a two-hundred megabyte zip file containing supposedly 
anonymous Facebook user data was released by Oxford University researchers to the 
general public (Zimmer 2011; Porter 2012). This file is perhaps exemplary of the social 
media information commodity, insofar as it appears as data rather than as content. In a 
follow-up blog post to his analysis, Zimmer reported the following: 
The data files are separated by institution, and in total include, by my estimation, 
about 1.2 million user accounts. The content of each institution’s file is described 
as containing the following: 
Each of the school .mat files has an A matrix (sparse) and a “local_info” 
variable, one row per node: ID, a student/faculty status flag, gender, 
major, second major/minor (if applicable), dorm/house, year, and high 
school. 
Thus, the datasets include limited demographic information that was posted by 
users on their individual Facebook pages. The identity of users’ dorm and high 
schools were obscured by numerical identifiers, but to my surprise, the dataset 
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included each user’s unique Facebook ID number. As a result, while user names 
and extended profile information were kept out of the data release, a simple query 
against Facebook’s databases would yield considerable identifiable information 
for each record. In short, the suggestion that the data has been “anonymized” is 
seriously flawed. (2011, emphasis original) 
This is one example, among others, illustrating the dual-nature of the social media 
information commodity. Although stemming from the same source, there is both a 
qualitative and quantitative aspect to these commodities, made possible by the work of 
users and computer software engineers to create, mine, and package that data. As was 
discussed above, there is evidence to suggest that as the data granularity increases within 
each of these particular commodities, so too does the price (Bansal et al. 2011). The 
larger the dataset, the more value contained within it because data granularity depends on 
the sum of users, the detail of their profiles, the time spent networking (adding, updating, 
deleting information, etc.), and the diversity of the data contained within each 
commodity. It follows then if more value is contained within a given information 
commodity, then its price will also be greater, which seems to be the case. 
 What has been assumed up till now is that capitalist logic has somehow seeped 
into elements of life beyond its traditional workplaces such as the factory and farm. That 
the very “mode of development” (Castells 2007) of capital has exacerbated an outward 
expansion of its logic points to the dynamism of its ability to adapt in order to 
accumulate. Marx himself writes that 
capital is not a fixed magnitude, but a part of social wealth which is elastic, and 
constantly fluctuates with the division of surplus-value into revenue and 
additional capital. It has been seen further that, even with a given magnitude of 
functioning capital, the labour-power, science and land ... incorporated in it form 
elastic powers of capital, allowing it, within certain limits, a field of action 
independent of its own magnitude. (1977, 1:758) 
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It is clear that a major theme running through Marx’s work is an emphasis on the 
flexibility and dynamism of capital. Unlike the view of classical political economy, Marx 
did not see capital as a rigid monster; indeed, capital has and often deploys innumerable 
strategies of accumulation and organization (D. Harvey 2010, 262). In what way did 
Marx see capital develop over time? To answer this question is to begin addressing the 
ways in which capitalist logic has permeated areas of society which appear as the least 
likely locations of value creation, production, and valorization. Focusing in on the 
outward expansion of capital necessarily challenges many of the orthodox understandings 
of what constitutes labour, leisure, class, and other political economic categories. Perhaps 
the most fruitful direction in which to turn is the work of some in the Italian autonomist 
thread of Marxist inquiry, whose analysis of the social-factory (Tronti 1970) is predicated 
on Marx’s understanding of how capital subsumes labour into its fold. 
4.1.2. Formal and Real Subsumption 
 
Marx’s analysis on formal and real subsumption appear mainly in an appendix in 
volume one of Capital. There, Marx analyses the way in which capital uses labour in two 
forms: in its early form, formal subsumption, and in its more advanced form, real 
subsumption. Each of these forms of capitalist production is tied to his discussion on 
absolute and relative surplus-value, two ways in which surplus value is extracted from 
workers. Marx views the labour process as a moment of capitalist production. It is an 
instrument of capital that valorizes the entire process of production. The labour process 
under formal subsumption, Marx writes, is subsumed under capital and the capitalist 
intervenes in the process as director, manager (1977, 1:1019). Here, capital finds labour 
as the latter presents itself. It is clear that what Marx is describing here is the predominant 
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geography of capitalist relations in society, i.e., those directly observable sites of 
production like factories, farms, mines, offices, etc. These sites are distinct from non-
capitalist spaces such as the home and elsewhere. This early form of capitalist 
subsumption merely takes over an existing form of labour such as handicraft and brings it 
into the fold of, for example, factory production. Formal subsumption, Marx writes, is a 
method to establish a period of working time, i.e., the work day (1977, 1:1021), and, as 
such, is concerned with the extraction of absolute surplus-value, a form of surplus-value 
generated within a set period of time. These sites are the general form of every capitalist 
process of production (1977, 1:1019), but they are by no means the only sites.  
Marx goes on to identify what he calls the “specifically capitalist mode of 
production,” real subsumption (1977, 1:1021). In this advanced form, “a complete (and 
constantly repeated) revolution takes place in the mode of production, in the productivity 
of the workers and in the relations between workers and capitalists” (Marx 1977, 1:1035). 
He goes on to say that the tendency for capital to move from formal to real subsumption, 
even though they may coexist side-by-side, is a result of capital increasing the value of its 
operations to the point where it assumes social dimensions, and so sheds its individual 
character entirely (1977, 1:1035; emphasis original). Capital must extend itself beyond its 
general form in order to accumulate (cf. Circuit of Capital). This passage is of crucial 
importance, because Marx maps the cartography of a process that is still happening today, 
and, in part, exacerbated by the development of micro-processing, information-
communication technologies, and globalization: “Marx’s account of the arrival of [real 
subsumption raises] important questions as to the relationship between class struggle, 
development, and forms of exploitation” (Wright 2002, 37). 
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This movement from formal to real subsumption of the labour process, and the 
technological development determining such a shift, is a theme picked up and extended 
by Mario Tronti in his essay “La Fabbrica e la Società” [The Factory and Society] (1970). 
Tronti extends Marx’s account of the specifically capitalist mode of production to suggest 
that all of society becomes a moment of production: 
The more capitalist development advances, that is to say the more the production 
or relative surplus-value penetrates everywhere, the more the circuit production—
distribution—exchange—consumption inevitably develops, .... [t]he relationship 
between capitalist production and bourgeois society, between the factory and the 
society, between society and the state, become more and more organic. At the 
highest level of capitalist development social relations become moments of the 
relations of production, and the whole society becomes an articulation of 
production (Tronti 1970, 19–20; Cleaver 1992, 137; emphasis added). 
 
Online social networking on Facebook and Twitter is precisely a moment of this 
articulation between production and sociality. It is a process determined by the constantly 
revolutionary character of real subsumption, or that tendency in capital to find new, 
alternative ways to extract value from workers. It is a contradictory moment found in the 
space between leisure time and work time, the former taking place increasingly in online 
environments. Activity often assumed to be unproductive has been rendered productive, 
in the sense that users are implicated in creating value for the social network provider. 
The link Tronti identifies between the factory, society, and the State is readily observable 
in online social network infrastructures. The terms of use and privacy policies are the 
legal mechanisms by which not only the circulation of capital is sustained, through the 
codification of network provider rights which impose an artificial scarcity on social 
media data, but documents which turn a relation of sociality into social relations of 
production enforced by contract law. 
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 As Wright observes, Tronti’s essay was to “delineate the enormous changes that 
the generalisation of relative surplus-value in the form of social capital had wrought 
within capitalist society” (2002, 36). Relative surplus-value, recall, is that form of surplus 
value which results after a reduction of the necessary labour-time needed to meet the 
needs of a worker takes place (Marx 1977, 1:432) Surplus labour time, then, is that period 
of the work day where the worker, having already reproduced him or herself as well as 
realizing the production costs of creating goods, works for free for the capitalist. Rather 
than extending absolute surplus-value through the extension of the working day (hence, 
increasing both necessary and surplus labour-time), reducing only necessary labour-time 
in order to increase surplus labour over the same period of time results in a clever albeit 
intensified alternative by which surplus-value is squeezed out of workers. Marx writes, 
But when surplus-value has to be produced by the conversion of necessary labour 
into surplus labour, it by no means suffices for capital to take over the labour 
process in its given ... shape, and then simply to prolong its duration. The 
technical and social conditions of the process ... [of production] itself must be 
revolutionized before the productivity of labour can be increased. Then .... the 
value of labour-power will fall, and the portion of the working day necessary for 
the reproduction of that value will be shortened. (1977, 1:432) 
 
If the current historical period is characterized as a moment in the development of the 
social factory, how does this generalization of relative surplus-value present itself in the 
context of online social networks? If relative surplus-value is that part of the working 
period where the worker performs labour not for him or herself, but for the capitalist, then 
this would suggest that they, working within these society-factories, work for free, i.e., 
they perform pure surplus-labour and, therefore, create “pure surplus-value” (Terranova 
2000). But how is this possible? Does not the working day possess a dual nature, that of 
142 
 
 
 
necessary labour-time and surplus labour-time? Can necessary- and surplus-labour be 
divorced from one another? 
In a rather interesting passage in the third volume of Capital, Marx’s discussion 
of agricultural rent vis-à-vis the relation between capitalist, worker, and landlord, alludes 
to a different understanding of the relationship between necessary- and surplus-labour, 
We have already shown, just as the labour of the individual worker breaks down 
into necessary and surplus labour, so the total of labour of the working class can 
be divided in such a way that the part that produces the entire means of 
subsistence needed by the working class (including the means of production these 
require) [farming] performs the necessary labour for the entire society. The labour 
performed by the whole remaining part of the working class can be considered 
surplus labour .... Some, moreover, perform only necessary labour, from a social 
point of view, because others only perform surplus labour, and vice versa. This is 
simply the division of labour between them. (Marx 1991, 3:771) 
 
Marx goes beyond the specific, molar instance of the individual’s objective conditions of 
work in the production process and generalizes this relation between necessary- and 
surplus-labour to entire segments of society, where one segment performs free labour, 
and others necessary labour. Here, Marx is predominantly analyzing the relationship 
between established agriculture production processes and the nascent industrial 
production processes of industrial capitalism; but, could one not extend this 
understanding to online social networking, as a sector of the social factory that produces 
surplus-value relative to other sectors of society that perform necessary labour, i.e., 
primary, secondary, and tertiary industries? If we frame our understanding of social 
networking activity in terms of the totality of all human activity, a particular task carried 
out in relation to all other tasks under a particular economic system, then we may come 
closer to the idea that certain kinds of labour are for society more necessary (biologically 
speaking) than others.  
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Marx understands the relationship between necessary-labour and surplus-labour in 
this way, as a scalable phenomenon that exists not only at the micro-level of society, but 
at the macro-level of society as well, not only within the work process, but across sectors 
of the economic sphere. This would seem to make sense. Clearly, the work of social 
networkers in no way contributes directly to their reproduction in the same way that 
earning a wage does. One simply cannot live or subside on electronic communication of 
this kind, because there is no wage paid in order to earn their means of subsistence; 
nevertheless, such activity does take on the characteristics of labour under capitalist 
relations of production: surplus-value is realized in the commodification of user-
generated data made possible by the time users spend constructing their profiles as they 
communicate with others. If we understand one’s position within the totality of social 
relations, that is, if we consider online social networking in conjunction with a user’s 
employment, then it would make sense to understand the former as the surplus-value 
producing element, and the latter as their necessary labour element, which together 
determines their overall productivity as a worker under capitalist relations of production. 
Just as autonomist thinkers sought to expand and loosen some of the more restrictive 
definitions used in orthodox Marxist paradigms, such as class, work, and exploitation, so 
too must we consider here the extension of the working day to include the activity of 
online social networking. 
 
 
4.2. Marx’s Theory of Rent 
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Marx’s theory of rent shows how capitalist accumulation proceeds in the presence 
of landowners capable of capturing some of the surplus-value squeezed out of workers 
(Choonara 2009, 147). The analysis of rent presupposes, then, not two but three classes 
within the capitalist mode of production: wage-labourer, capitalist, and landowner (Marx 
1991, 3:756). In the context of agriculture, Marx understands the relationship between 
wage-labourers, landowners, and capitalists in the following manner: “the actual 
cultivators are wage-labourers, employed by a capitalist, the farmer .... this farmer-
capitalist pays the landowner, the proprietor of the land he exploits, a contractually fixed-
sum of money ... for the permission to employ his capital” (1991, 3:755). Rent, then, is 
revenue flowing from the capitalist to the landowner so that the former can employ 
labourers on the land of the latter. 
Rent is simply a payment made to landlords for the right to use land and its 
appurtenances (D. Harvey 2006, 330). This is what Marx calls ground-rent (1991, 3:755). 
The extraction of rents is made possible by private property, i.e., the expropriation of 
workers from the conditions of labour, which allows owners of that property “to enjoy the 
monopoly of disposing of particular portions of the globe as exclusive spheres of their 
private will to the exclusion of all others” (Marx 1991, 3:752). Private property 
guarantees ownership, and ownership allows for monopolizing land, which is the 
precondition for the capitalist production process.  
Rents exist as deductions from either wages paid to workers or the profits 
appropriated by capitalists on rented land (i.e., the total surplus-value), and are partially 
determined by the degree to which it can facilitate production, i.e., fertility. This is to say 
that rather than the entirety of the surplus-value generated from production flowing back 
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to the capitalist, a portion of that surplus-value goes to the landlord, thus economically 
realizing the latter’s land monopoly. So, landlords have nothing to do with the actual 
production process (Marx 1991, 3:960); rather, their role is to redirect into their own 
coffers some of the surplus-value generated by labourers who use a capital’s means of 
production. Landowners thus impinge on capitalist profit and can do so given their 
monopoly. The realization of rent payments is a redistribution of the total surplus-value. 
In a chapter on the sources of revenue in capitalist society, Marx distinguishes 
between three types: wages, which are attached to labour; rent, which is attached to land; 
and profit, which is attached to capital (1991, 3:953). He does so to illustrate that these 
sources of wealth “belong to completely disparate spheres and have not the slightest 
analogy with one another” (1991, 3:953). Specifically, rent is related to distribution (the 
divvying up of surplus-value) and profit is related to production (the realization of 
surplus-value into money-form). Marx writes, 
If we speak therefore of profit as the share of surplus-value accruing to capital, 
what we mean is an average profit ... that is already less than the total profit by the 
deduction of rent; the deduction of rent is presupposed. Capital-profit ... and 
ground-rent are thus nothing but particular components of the surplus-value; 
categories in which this surplus-value is distinguished according to whether it 
accrues to capital or landed property. (Marx 1991, 3:959) 
 
What this implies is that rent has to do with a capitalist’s access to land, the precondition 
for production. Rent in no way relates to production as such because “landed property has 
nothing to do with the actual production process” (Marx 1991, 3:960). 
When we consider the relationship between social media provider and social 
media user, it is clear that the relationship is one of capitalist and labourer, respectively. 
As has been shown, the user engages with the website, registers, and creates data, which 
is then mined, packaged, and ultimately sold as information commodities. What 
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Facebook and Twitter are are the means of production within a circuit of capital. They 
provide the constant capital that social media users confront, as variable capital, in order 
to produce information commodities. In this sense, sites like Facebook and Twitter 
cannot function as landlords because they are directly involved in the production process: 
they create the interface, the programming, the program updates, and the policies 
governing the use of their service and the distribution of data produced by users. Further, 
the realization of value into the money-form must necessarily be profit, not rent. 
 When considering the relationship between third-parties and social media 
providers, the relationship appears to be one of rent. The prospective advertiser, desiring 
access to Facebook and Twitter’s database (i.e., their land), must pay a sort of ground-
rent for access to these data: “Facebook charges $5 per thousand views for these 
[engagement] ads” (D. Kirkpatrick 2010, 261). So, it would seem that social media 
providers like Facebook and Twitter play a dual role of capitalist-landowner, roles which, 
according to Marx, have nothing to do with one another. But this view is problematic. If 
one is to understand Facebook and Twitter as landlords, one necessarily admits to their 
secondary and distant role in the production process. If one is to understand their role as 
capitalists, then the revenue generated by the production process cannot be rent, only 
profit. If rent is to be found anywhere within the totality of social relations discussed 
herein, it would make more sense to locate a relation of rent between Internet service 
providers, who supply access to the physical infrastructure of the Internet, and social 
media providers. This would suggest that rent is realized outside the relationship between 
social media provider and social media user, the latter understood as a relation of 
production, means of production and labour-power, respectively.  
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 The problem with understanding online social media providers like Facebook and 
Twitter as landlords, who claim a monopoly over digital property, is that it marginalizes 
their active role as managers in the production of social media information resources. 
Further, asserting such a relationship also tends to glaze over the central role played by 
social media users as productive labourers, the source of value in these environments. By 
insisting that online social networks are actually monopolized lands is to confuse land 
fertility (its natural use-value) with value. This is, at best, an error already produced 
centuries ago by the physiocrats (Marx 2000). An example of this confusion takes place 
in the work of Pasquinelli. 
Pasquinelli understands Google (another form of interactive media like social 
networking) as a “global rentier of the common intellect” (2009, 1), i.e., a landlord who 
claims monopoly over a particular online space and who extracts a rent for access to data. 
He writes, “Google is not simply an apparatus of dataveillance from above but an 
apparatus of value production from below” and that “value is determined by the number 
and quality of incoming links” (2009, 2). What Pasquinelli fails to address is Marx’s 
insistence that human labour is the only source of value: “Value is labour. So surplus-
value cannot be earth. The land’s absolute fertility does nothing but let a certain quantum 
of labour give a certain product, conditioned by the natural fertility of land” (1991, 
3:954). Elsewhere, Marx writes, “the earth is not a product of labour, and thus does not 
have a value” (1991, 3:760). But this is not what Pasquinelli suggests; he asserts that 
value is derived from the Google PageRank algorithm, the latter being, in a metaphorical 
sense, a quality within land that Google has monopolized. Part of the land (the algorithm) 
is not value; the labour of users who produce data on which that algorithm relies to 
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properly function is the source of value (not to mention the labour congealed in that 
algorithm expressed as code by Google’s programmers). Elsewhere, Arvidsson commits 
the same error when he asserts that “these forms of productive sociality [social media 
data produced by users in online environments] can be used as a kind of natural resource 
for brand managers” (2005, 248, emphasis added).  
What proponents of the rentier argument have in common is that they confuse 
means of production with labour-power, labour-power with means of production. In so 
doing, they reify the actual production process necessary for the realization of profit in 
these environments. By asserting that these sites operate as landlords implies that the 
more important relationship is between landlord (Facebook and Twitter) and capitalist 
(third-party advertisers) when, in fact, the fundamental relationship to be considered is 
between labourer (social networker) and capitalist (social network provider). The former 
position abstracts away from those actually generating the value in these environments. 
Populating a database is not a naturally occurring phenomenon separate from a labour 
process as in the evolution of carbon into diamonds. To frame it inversely, without the 
ongoing labour process of social network users, the algorithms used as means of 
production would have no data to mine, and, therefore, value could not be realized as 
profit. The general intellect must be produced; it is not a naturally given, a priori 
phenomenon. The necessary condition of value creation in online social networks stems 
from users’ time spent creating data. So, how is this relationship formalized into and 
expressed within the circuit of capital? 
4.3. The Expanded Form of Variable Capital Model 
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If we are to understand the role of social networking as an extension of the 
working day, then we must demonstrate, using Marx’s circuit of capital, how this can be 
expressed more formally. Fuchs provides a convincing schema that expresses exactly this 
understanding of online social networkers (Fuchs 2011a). Earlier there was allusion to the 
idea that social networkers are implicated in the production process at point (LP), or 
labour-power. How is this possible? Are not waged employees of Facebook and Twitter 
understood to be LP? Yes, but they are not the only source of labour-power. 
Returning to the circuit of accumulation, Marx understands labour-power (LP) 
and means of production (MP) as variable and constant capital, respectively (1977, 
1:317). Variable capital is labour-power transformed into a factor of production. Variable 
capital oscillates between constant and variable magnitudes because of its peculiar quality 
of reproducing its own value while at the same time exceeding it; however, the rate at 
which a worker is productive varies for a variety of reasons. Despite this, however, 
variable capital will constantly generate surplus-value, but that value will fluctuate over 
time. Waged-labour is variable capital, and since the wage is socially determined in that it 
varies according market conditions, it is not fixed. Constant capital is all the machinery, 
raw material, and “dead labour” (Marx 1977, 1:322) used in production, which does not 
add value to a product but merely transfers its use-value into the commodity produced. 
This is why labour creates value – it is the only commodity that can replenish itself and 
generate more value than it needs for its own survival. Constant capital becomes capital 
when it is drawn into the production process as machinery. Hence, variable capital is 
labour-power, and constant capital the means of production. Together, they constitute the 
subjective and objective factors of production (1977, 1:317). 
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By arguing that online social networkers are a source of labour-power, we are 
assuming that they also function as additional variable capital, and, as such, enter the 
sphere of production. Fuchs, in more formal terms, expands the general circuit of capital 
to include an additional node of variable capital (i.e., living labour) in the overall circuit, 
representing users’ free labour given over to Web 2.0 platforms (2011a, 298). Therefore, 
we move from, 
 
to 
 
 
 
 
where v1 = wages paid to employees of, say, Facebook and Twitter, v2 = wages paid to 
users, c = constant capital, and v = variable capital. What Fuchs establishes here is a 
formal expression of an expanded form of variable capital to include users of social 
media. This schema not only positions the social media user as immanent to the 
production process, but it also re-politicizes the terrain of social networking and 
prosumption media in general, as it demonstrates how capital relies on a massive pool of 
labour-power, a portion of which do not receive a wage beyond that of the “immaterial 
return” (Terranova 2010, 156) – here expressed as 0 – of using sites like Facebook and 
Twitter, while the latter are paid quite handsomely as a result of that labour. The 
providers of Facebook and Twitter, therefore, keep the costs of production quite low. The 
curious quality of v2 is that the wage is effectively zero, or v2 = 0. The typical situation is 
that v2 substitutes for v1: “If the production of content and the time spent online were 
151 
 
 
 
carried out by paid employees, the variable costs would rise and the profits would 
therefore decrease” (Fuchs 2011a, 298). So, it is not that there is no wage, but that the 
wage is effectively zero, representing more of an affective, fleeting, and ephemeral return 
than actual material compensation. The positing of a zero-wage does not in any way 
change the fact that online social network users are being productive. 
 It is this expanded form of variable capital that best describes the relationship 
between social network user and social network provider. It preserves the relationship 
between capitalist and the labour capacity necessary in creating value, and, therefore, 
surplus-value. But to what ends does demonstrating this relationship work? The 
expansion of Marx’s circuit of capital accumulation illustrates how users are effectively 
working when they think they are not. Many still take “solace in the belief that their 
information is fairly unimportant or not valuable, and [that they] expected no one to be 
using it or wanting it” (Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 2009). To identify 
the extension of the working day is the first step towards resisting it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS THE REDUCTION OF THE WORKING DAY 
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The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, 
however, is to change it 
-Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach 
 
 
This study has focused extensively on the political economy of the online social 
network industry with specific reference to Facebook and Twitter. It has forwarded an 
argument meant to illustrate how social media users can and are directly implicated in a 
capitalist circuit of accumulation. It has also identified the mechanisms through which 
social media users are transformed into social net-workers. The terms of use and privacy 
policies of Facebook and Twitter, as exemplars of online social networking, not only 
function as (problematic) treatises on the protection of one’s online privacy, but together 
they function as a new species of work contract, rendering the activity of their users 
productive, and, ultimately, exchangeable due to the subsequent commodification of their 
data.  
When thinking about the relationship between social media user and social media 
provider, it is not a case of merely understanding the economic implications of this 
relationship. This is to say that understanding the economic consequences of prosumption 
media is merely a means to understanding the political consequences of this relationship, 
lest one falls into the same mode of reification as that of economic science, which cannot, 
or will not, account for the systemic inequalities of class relations brought on by the 
capitalist mode of production. If, as Mosco points out, political economy is focused on 
human wellbeing and their needs, one must admit with equal force that an explanation of 
the economic is but a process of working towards a greater political proposal, one which 
leads to not only a new mode of production, but also to a new and more direct mode of 
sociality without the imposition and mediation of the commodity-form along 
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communicational lines. Just as Marx and his successors sought to unravel the dialectical 
relationship between capital and labour, so too should one also unravel the same 
relationship between political economy. Insofar as this study has concerned itself with the 
economic aspects of social media, this section leaves the reader with thoughts on the 
political tactics required to address the problems inherent in online social networking, 
insofar as Facebook, Twitter, and any other commodity-producing social network site is 
concerned.  
Harry Cleaver has forwarded the view that the work of Marx is, above all, a 
political tool meant to be “a weapon in the hands of the working class” (1979, 23). For 
inasmuch as Marx sought to discover the general laws of capitalist accumulation and to 
move beyond the fetishism of the system to its very essence, so too did he seek in his 
work tactics to change that which he discovered in the English factories of the nineteenth 
century. What are some of the ways one can begin thinking about tactics of resistance 
against the valorization of social network activity? This study concludes with a radical 
proposal in an effort to negate and resist what has been identified as the extension of the 
working day within the twenty-first century social factory.  
5.1. Current Policy Recommendations 
 
There have been several policy recommendations related to circumventing 
prosumption work in online social networks. It has been suggested that a way to 
strengthen the privacy rights of Internet users, and, in turn, weaken the economic 
imperative to commodify user-generated data, is to call for prosumption websites to move 
from an opt-out to an opt-in framework regarding the sharing and distribution of user-
generated data, primarily meant to circumvent this particular form of soft-extortion. The 
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idea is that the default option of opting-in to sharing personal information will 
“strengthen user’s collective possibility for self-determination” (Fuchs 2011b, 160). This 
idea is supported by privacy advocates who believe that giving users additional control 
over their data will aid in balancing the asymmetries between user and provider data 
flows and, at the same time, curtailing the revenues drawn from them. The problem with 
this measure is that it is not necessarily a solution to the electronic surveillance inherent 
in online social networks (Fuchs 2011a, 307) because those who choose to opt-in will 
simply reproduce the commodification process rather than eliminating it. The 
individualist approach to ameliorating the asymmetries of this social relation is quite 
limited as some may presumably have no problem with Facebook and Twitter using their 
data for profitable gains. Secondly, limiting data to the form of privacy controls does not 
necessarily prevent the commodification of user data. Though it may be effective from a 
peer-to-peer perspective, it is less so from a peer-to-provider one. This is especially the 
case if the terms of use and privacy policy legally (en)force users to give their 
information over to these websites as part of the registration process and as a condition of 
usage. So, if such a change for default opt-in was to occur, there must be a concomitant 
change in the role that privacy policies and terms of use documents play in these 
environments; namely, documents that actually protect a user’s privacy and strictly limit 
the way in which website owners monetize user data. 
Another solution has come in the form of alternative, non-profit, and non-
commercial social networks such as Diaspora (Diaspora* 2010). Diaspora, the “privacy 
aware, personally controlled, and open source social network” (Daniel, Maxwell, and IIya 
2011) is currently in development as an alternative to for-profit social networking 
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platforms, which do not normally allow users to retain control of their data. Diaspora is 
described as follows: 
Diaspora aims to be a distributed network, where totally separate computers 
connect to each other directly, [and] will let us connect without surrendering our 
privacy. We call these computers ‘seeds’. A seed is owned by you, hosted by you, 
or on a rented server. Once it has been set up, the seed will aggregate all of your 
information ...We are designing an easily extendable plug-in framework for 
Diaspora, so that whenever newfangled content gets invented, it will be 
automagically integrated into every seed .... Decentralizing lets us reconstruct our 
“social graphs” so that they belong to us. Our real social lives do not have central 
managers, and our virtual lives do not need them. (Diaspora* 2010) 
 
Its website also is akin to that of a manifesto, a rallying point around which you can “take 
back your network,” to “maintain ownership of everything you share,” and to give “you 
full control over how [your information is] distributed” (Diaspora* 2011). A brief look at 
the interface and into the privacy policies of the distributed Diaspora seeds (hosts) will 
reveal greater transparency in terms of what data are collected, for what purpose, and by 
whom; a greater concern for the user in terms of information visibility; and a platform 
that allows users to exercise stronger privacy controls. Although a start, transparency is 
only the first step toward protecting users from organizational commodification. 
What is perhaps most interesting about Diaspora is that it operates as a distributed 
network rather than as a centralized server-client network like that of Facebook or 
Twitter. This architecture is a progressive step forward in thinking about how to curtail 
the privacy abuses commonly associated with centralized networks like Facebook: 
A completely centralized social network is a network made up of individuals and 
a supernode. Individuals do not form relationships with each other. Rather, each 
individual forms a relationship with the supernode. The supernode may then 
register quasiconnections between pairs of nodes with which it has relationships, 
and may inform the nodes of these quasiconnections, allowing the nodes to form 
quasirelationships among themselves. But, ultimately, traces in centralized 
systems always pass through the supernode. (Lucas 2008, 8–9) 
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Even though users may experience user-to-user connections in Facebook and Twitter, 
these connections are always mediated by the owners of the site. In centralized networks 
all information must pass through the system or supernode before connections to peers 
are made. Lucas has noted that since centralized client-server systems aggregate 
information at a centralized point, it creates the opportunity for violations of privacy even 
if the privacy of the information is protected by law (2008, 1). The virtue of a distributed 
system is that peer connections are unmediated in the same way as centralized networks 
that aggregate data in one place, which potentially lead to increased privacy violations of 
greater magnitude as a result of this aggregation. Secondly, a distributed-network 
operating on a non-profit model, such as the donations-based Diaspora, effectively 
nullifies the need to create and sell audience commodities, thus decreasing the privacy 
concerns associated with sites like Facebook and Twitter whilst negating the imposition 
of the commodity-form.  
Fuchs forwards another recommendation in favour of stronger civil-society 
organizations that govern online corporate behaviour and their privacy practices (2011b, 
160). The problem with this strategy has already been raised in section three. There is a 
risk of these organizations, like the TRUSTe initiative, to not follow through with privacy 
complaints and to move away from impartiality. Further, such initiatives do not have any 
legislative or regulatory power to correct for potential privacy violators, so they can only 
serve as public awareness initiatives. Though this is by no means problematic, it may take 
long periods of time before measures can be put in place that work in favour of protecting 
consumers and social media users, especially if alleged violations move to litigation. 
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5.2. Social Net-work as Employment in the Informal Economy 
 
In following with the above initiatives, this study proposes a radical policy 
recommendation in the interests of developing what Fuchs calls a “socialist view of 
privacy” (2011b), that is, a prosumer-centred tactic that protects users from economic 
surveillance and exploitation. Seen from the perspective of commodity-negation, and 
understood as an information-flow control mechanism, privacy is instrumental in 
challenging corporate and commercial techniques of online surveillance and 
commodification. But, a sufficiently different view of privacy is what is needed; not one 
based on the more liberal, individualist interpretations that work more in the interests of 
capital than consumers. Recognition on a global level of these economically-driven 
information flows in online environments is an added step towards balancing the 
asymmetries between Internet users and Internet prosumption websites.  
The informal economy can be defined as “jobs that generally lack basic social or 
legal protections or employment benefits and may be found in the formal sector, informal 
sector or households” (Diez de Medina 2011, 11). Further, “employees are considered to 
have informal jobs if their employment relationship is, in law or in practice, not subject to 
national labour legislation, income taxation, social protection or entitlement to certain 
employment benefits” (Diez de Medina 2011, 11). The informal economy is 
predominantly observed and measured in order to curtail tax evasion from employers or 
employees who wish to increase their earnings; but this has a negative effect on a 
region’s development as it limits the amount of government revenue for infrastructural 
improvement, thus leading to increased taxation in the formal sectors. Beyond the need 
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for governments to quell tax evasion in order to lower taxation, the informal economy can 
also be a useful political paradigm in which to situate prosumption work.  
The common sense view of online social networking is that is not a form of 
employment in the same way as formal sector work. There is a zero-wage, no set standard 
of hours that users must work, no benefits paid to workers, no bosses or supervisors that 
oversee the work day, and there is no explicit job description or workplace objectives. 
Yet, the end result of online social network activity produces commodities and generates 
a profit for the owners of online social networks. Moreover, it has already been argued 
that users enter into a work relation with these social network sites the moment they 
register, as evidenced by their terms of use and privacy policies. So even though there is 
significant disparity between prosumption work and formal sector work, the former do 
take on the characteristics of work. As such, prosumption work, by virtue of this 
invisibility, falls completely outside of any social or legal protections afforded by labour 
laws and other regulatory frameworks that govern employment. 
Could prosumption work not be included as informal sector work? If the impetus 
is to develop alternative methods of sociality and to ultimately negate and resist the 
imposition of the commodity-form in all areas of social life, then it would seem that 
recognizing prosumption work as a legitimate form of informal work is one step towards 
increasing global awareness of the changing nature of work in the face of knowledge-
producing industries and the wider information society, with the hope that such 
awareness will lead to a more equitable social arrangement. Measures taken by 
organizations such as the United Nations, the International Labour Organization, and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development all attempt to statistically 
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graph the extent and breadth of informal sector work to understand how it functions 
alongside and against other sectors of the global economy. More importantly, the ongoing 
project of measuring the informal sector is a means towards exposing situations that may 
exacerbate broader social consequences like inequality (Andrews, Caldera Sanchez, and 
Johansson 2011, 5). By including prosumption work into the informal economy, one can 
begin to address the lack of social and legal protections against economic surveillance 
and exploitation. Officially recognizing at the international level areas of social life not 
normally associated with the work place but areas that nonetheless take on the 
characteristics of exploited work may facilitate support for the other initiatives listed 
above. Garnering recognition of prosumption work may raise greater awareness of not 
only the changing nature of work in the information economy, but expose the unequal 
social relations produced by these online environments.  
And awareness is clearly needed. Recent reports suggest that many still take 
“solace in the belief that their information is fairly unimportant or not valuable, and [that 
they] expected no one to be using it or wanting it” (Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
of Canada 2009). Further, when users think about user privacy,  
... the impression [is] that the privacy settings already in place on Facebook 
provide an adequate level of comfort and control over who can and cannot see 
their personal information. It is worth noting that when discussing the privacy 
concerns relating to social networking sites, the conversation always defaulted to 
being about the information that can be seen by people who visit a user’s page – 
not the information provided to the social networking site for its own use [italics 
mine]. Some did augment the discussion by mentioning this aspect, but the overall 
view was that providing the “mandatory” information was a reasonable price to 
pay in exchange for using the service free of charge. (Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada 2009, 14) 
 
Joseph Turow’s work on online privacy and consumers’ misconceptions about corporate 
information-usage practices is clear evidence demonstrating the troubling gap between 
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actually existing corporate data-handling practices and consumers’ knowledge of them 
(2005). In a nationally-representative sample of fifteen-hundred American consumers, 
Turow et al. found that 75 percent of respondents thought that if a website had a privacy 
policy, then that company would not share information with other Web sites or 
companies (Turow, Hennessy, and Bleakley 2008, 416). 
 If the project of communication in the twenty-first century is to proceed on fair, 
accessible, and equitable ground, then prosumption work in its current state must be 
called into question. The asymmetric social relations between social media user and 
social media provider is evidence of what Althusser has called the “reproduction of the 
conditions of production” (2001a, 86), i.e., the sustainment of class relations within 
communicational (productive) processes through the imposition of the commodity-form. 
Raymond Williams observed that mass media forms tend to become naturalized as they 
are used. The same can be said today with new media. This naturalization process 
mystifies the actually existing social relations within communicational processes. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that new media networks are often accessed free of charge, and 
many see this as a reasonable arrangement in exchange for their user information. But the 
problem is not a matter of equitable exchange; it is a matter of equitable, autonomous, 
and democratic communication practices, free from private interests and their control 
over the value produced by users. Recognizing the extension of the working day to 
include online social networking, as a specific, concrete example of a greater trend in 
online digital labour, is one step closer towards the creation of a more socialized 
communications array whereby “the means and systems of the most direct 
communication [are] under our own direct and general control” (Williams 2010, 69). 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Creative Commons Copyright Information 
 
Attribution-Noncommercial-Sharealike 3.0 Unported 
 
CREATIVE COMMONS CORPORATION IS NOT A LAW FIRM AND DOES NOT 
PROVIDE LEGAL SERVICES. DISTRIBUTION OF THIS LICENSE DOES NOT 
CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. CREATIVE COMMONS 
PROVIDES THIS INFORMATION ON AN "AS-IS" BASIS. CREATIVE COMMONS 
MAKES NO WARRANTIES REGARDING THE INFORMATION PROVIDED, AND 
DISCLAIMS LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM ITS USE.  
License 
THE WORK (AS DEFINED BELOW) IS PROVIDED UNDER THE TERMS OF THIS 
CREATIVE COMMONS PUBLIC LICENSE ("CCPL" OR "LICENSE"). THE WORK 
IS PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT AND/OR OTHER APPLICABLE LAW. ANY USE 
OF THE WORK OTHER THAN AS AUTHORIZED UNDER THIS LICENSE OR 
COPYRIGHT LAW IS PROHIBITED. 
BY EXERCISING ANY RIGHTS TO THE WORK PROVIDED HERE, YOU ACCEPT 
AND AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THE TERMS OF THIS LICENSE. TO THE 
EXTENT THIS LICENSE MAY BE CONSIDERED TO BE A CONTRACT, THE 
LICENSOR GRANTS YOU THE RIGHTS CONTAINED HERE IN 
CONSIDERATION OF YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS. 
1. Definitions 
a. "Adaptation" means a work based upon the Work, or upon the Work and other 
pre-existing works, such as a translation, adaptation, derivative work, arrangement 
of music or other alterations of a literary or artistic work, or phonogram or 
performance and includes cinematographic adaptations or any other form in 
which the Work may be recast, transformed, or adapted including in any form 
recognizably derived from the original, except that a work that constitutes a 
Collection will not be considered an Adaptation for the purpose of this License. 
For the avoidance of doubt, where the Work is a musical work, performance or 
phonogram, the synchronization of the Work in timed-relation with a moving 
image ("synching") will be considered an Adaptation for the purpose of this 
License. 
b. "Collection" means a collection of literary or artistic works, such as 
encyclopedias and anthologies, or performances, phonograms or broadcasts, or 
other works or subject matter other than works listed in Section 1(g) below, 
which, by reason of the selection and arrangement of their contents, constitute 
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intellectual creations, in which the Work is included in its entirety in unmodified 
form along with one or more other contributions, each constituting separate and 
independent works in themselves, which together are assembled into a collective 
whole. A work that constitutes a Collection will not be considered an Adaptation 
(as defined above) for the purposes of this License. 
c. "Distribute" means to make available to the public the original and copies of the 
Work or Adaptation, as appropriate, through sale or other transfer of ownership. 
d. "License Elements" means the following high-level license attributes as selected 
by Licensor and indicated in the title of this License: Attribution, Noncommercial, 
ShareAlike. 
e. "Licensor" means the individual, individuals, entity or entities that offer(s) the 
Work under the terms of this License. 
f. "Original Author" means, in the case of a literary or artistic work, the 
individual, individuals, entity or entities who created the Work or if no individual 
or entity can be identified, the publisher; and in addition (i) in the case of a 
performance the actors, singers, musicians, dancers, and other persons who act, 
sing, deliver, declaim, play in, interpret or otherwise perform literary or artistic 
works or expressions of folklore; (ii) in the case of a phonogram the producer 
being the person or legal entity who first fixes the sounds of a performance or 
other sounds; and, (iii) in the case of broadcasts, the organization that transmits 
the broadcast. 
g. "Work" means the literary and/or artistic work offered under the terms of this 
License including without limitation any production in the literary, scientific and 
artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression including 
digital form, such as a book, pamphlet and other writing; a lecture, address, 
sermon or other work of the same nature; a dramatic or dramatico-musical work; a 
choreographic work or entertainment in dumb show; a musical composition with 
or without words; a cinematographic work to which are assimilated works 
expressed by a process analogous to cinematography; a work of drawing, 
painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving or lithography; a photographic work to 
which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to photography; a 
work of applied art; an illustration, map, plan, sketch or three-dimensional work 
relative to geography, topography, architecture or science; a performance; a 
broadcast; a phonogram; a compilation of data to the extent it is protected as a 
copyrightable work; or a work performed by a variety or circus performer to the 
extent it is not otherwise considered a literary or artistic work. 
h. "You" means an individual or entity exercising rights under this License who has 
not previously violated the terms of this License with respect to the Work, or who 
has received express permission from the Licensor to exercise rights under this 
License despite a previous violation. 
i. "Publicly Perform" means to perform public recitations of the Work and to 
communicate to the public those public recitations, by any means or process, 
including by wire or wireless means or public digital performances; to make 
available to the public Works in such a way that members of the public may 
access these Works from a place and at a place individually chosen by them; to 
perform the Work to the public by any means or process and the communication 
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to the public of the performances of the Work, including by public digital 
performance; to broadcast and rebroadcast the Work by any means including 
signs, sounds or images. 
j. "Reproduce" means to make copies of the Work by any means including without 
limitation by sound or visual recordings and the right of fixation and reproducing 
fixations of the Work, including storage of a protected performance or phonogram 
in digital form or other electronic medium. 
2. Fair Dealing Rights. Nothing in this License is intended to reduce, limit, or restrict 
any uses free from copyright or rights arising from limitations or exceptions that are 
provided for in connection with the copyright protection under copyright law or other 
applicable laws. 
3. License Grant. Subject to the terms and conditions of this License, Licensor hereby 
grants You a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual (for the duration of the 
applicable copyright) license to exercise the rights in the Work as stated below: 
a. to Reproduce the Work, to incorporate the Work into one or more Collections, 
and to Reproduce the Work as incorporated in the Collections; 
b. to create and Reproduce Adaptations provided that any such Adaptation, 
including any translation in any medium, takes reasonable steps to clearly label, 
demarcate or otherwise identify that changes were made to the original Work. For 
example, a translation could be marked "The original work was translated from 
English to Spanish," or a modification could indicate "The original work has been 
modified."; 
c. to Distribute and Publicly Perform the Work including as incorporated in 
Collections; and, 
d. to Distribute and Publicly Perform Adaptations. 
The above rights may be exercised in all media and formats whether now known or 
hereafter devised. The above rights include the right to make such modifications as are 
technically necessary to exercise the rights in other media and formats. Subject to Section 
8(f), all rights not expressly granted by Licensor are hereby reserved, including but not 
limited to the rights described in Section 4(e). 
4. Restrictions. The license granted in Section 3 above is expressly made subject to and 
limited by the following restrictions: 
a. You may Distribute or Publicly Perform the Work only under the terms of this 
License. You must include a copy of, or the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) 
for, this License with every copy of the Work You Distribute or Publicly Perform. 
You may not offer or impose any terms on the Work that restrict the terms of this 
License or the ability of the recipient of the Work to exercise the rights granted to 
that recipient under the terms of the License. You may not sublicense the Work. 
You must keep intact all notices that refer to this License and to the disclaimer of 
warranties with every copy of the Work You Distribute or Publicly Perform. 
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When You Distribute or Publicly Perform the Work, You may not impose any 
effective technological measures on the Work that restrict the ability of a recipient 
of the Work from You to exercise the rights granted to that recipient under the 
terms of the License. This Section 4(a) applies to the Work as incorporated in a 
Collection, but this does not require the Collection apart from the Work itself to 
be made subject to the terms of this License. If You create a Collection, upon 
notice from any Licensor You must, to the extent practicable, remove from the 
Collection any credit as required by Section 4(d), as requested. If You create an 
Adaptation, upon notice from any Licensor You must, to the extent practicable, 
remove from the Adaptation any credit as required by Section 4(d), as requested. 
b. You may Distribute or Publicly Perform an Adaptation only under: (i) the terms 
of this License; (ii) a later version of this License with the same License Elements 
as this License; (iii) a Creative Commons jurisdiction license (either this or a later 
license version) that contains the same License Elements as this License (e.g., 
Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 US) ("Applicable License"). You 
must include a copy of, or the URI, for Applicable License with every copy of 
each Adaptation You Distribute or Publicly Perform. You may not offer or 
impose any terms on the Adaptation that restrict the terms of the Applicable 
License or the ability of the recipient of the Adaptation to exercise the rights 
granted to that recipient under the terms of the Applicable License. You must 
keep intact all notices that refer to the Applicable License and to the disclaimer of 
warranties with every copy of the Work as included in the Adaptation You 
Distribute or Publicly Perform. When You Distribute or Publicly Perform the 
Adaptation, You may not impose any effective technological measures on the 
Adaptation that restrict the ability of a recipient of the Adaptation from You to 
exercise the rights granted to that recipient under the terms of the Applicable 
License. This Section 4(b) applies to the Adaptation as incorporated in a 
Collection, but this does not require the Collection apart from the Adaptation 
itself to be made subject to the terms of the Applicable License. 
c. You may not exercise any of the rights granted to You in Section 3 above in any 
manner that is primarily intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or 
private monetary compensation. The exchange of the Work for other copyrighted 
works by means of digital file-sharing or otherwise shall not be considered to be 
intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary 
compensation, provided there is no payment of any monetary compensation in 
con-nection with the exchange of copyrighted works. 
d. If You Distribute, or Publicly Perform the Work or any Adaptations or 
Collections, You must, unless a request has been made pursuant to Section 4(a), 
keep intact all copyright notices for the Work and provide, reasonable to the 
medium or means You are utilizing: (i) the name of the Original Author (or 
pseudonym, if applicable) if supplied, and/or if the Original Author and/or 
Licensor designate another party or parties (e.g., a sponsor institute, publishing 
entity, journal) for attribution ("Attribution Parties") in Licensor's copyright 
notice, terms of service or by other reasonable means, the name of such party or 
parties; (ii) the title of the Work if supplied; (iii) to the extent reasonably 
practicable, the URI, if any, that Licensor specifies to be associated with the 
175 
 
 
 
Work, unless such URI does not refer to the copyright notice or licensing 
information for the Work; and, (iv) consistent with Section 3(b), in the case of an 
Adaptation, a credit identifying the use of the Work in the Adaptation (e.g., 
"French translation of the Work by Original Author," or "Screenplay based on 
original Work by Original Author"). The credit required by this Section 4(d) may 
be implemented in any reasonable manner; provided, however, that in the case of 
a Adaptation or Collection, at a minimum such credit will appear, if a credit for all 
contributing authors of the Adaptation or Collection appears, then as part of these 
credits and in a manner at least as prominent as the credits for the other 
contributing authors. For the avoidance of doubt, You may only use the credit 
required by this Section for the purpose of attribution in the manner set out above 
and, by exercising Your rights under this License, You may not implicitly or 
explicitly assert or imply any connection with, sponsorship or endorsement by the 
Original Author, Licensor and/or Attribution Parties, as appropriate, of You or 
Your use of the Work, without the separate, express prior written permission of 
the Original Author, Licensor and/or Attribution Parties. 
e. For the avoidance of doubt: 
i. Non-waivable Compulsory License Schemes. In those jurisdictions in 
which the right to collect royalties through any statutory or compulsory 
licensing scheme cannot be waived, the Licensor reserves the exclusive 
right to collect such royalties for any exercise by You of the rights granted 
under this License; 
ii. Waivable Compulsory License Schemes. In those jurisdictions in which 
the right to collect royalties through any statutory or compulsory licensing 
scheme can be waived, the Licensor reserves the exclusive right to collect 
such royalties for any exercise by You of the rights granted under this 
License if Your exercise of such rights is for a purpose or use which is 
otherwise than noncommercial as permitted under Section 4(c) and 
otherwise waives the right to collect royalties through any statutory or 
compulsory licensing scheme; and, 
iii. Voluntary License Schemes. The Licensor reserves the right to collect 
royalties, whether individually or, in the event that the Licensor is a 
member of a collecting society that administers voluntary licensing 
schemes, via that society, from any exercise by You of the rights granted 
under this License that is for a purpose or use which is otherwise than 
noncommercial as permitted under Section 4(c). 
f. Except as otherwise agreed in writing by the Licensor or as may be otherwise 
permitted by applicable law, if You Reproduce, Distribute or Publicly Perform the 
Work either by itself or as part of any Adaptations or Collections, You must not 
distort, mutilate, modify or take other derogatory action in relation to the Work 
which would be prejudicial to the Original Author's honor or reputation. Licensor 
agrees that in those jurisdictions (e.g. Japan), in which any exercise of the right 
granted in Section 3(b) of this License (the right to make Adaptations) would be 
deemed to be a distortion, mutilation, modification or other derogatory action 
prejudicial to the Original Author's honor and reputation, the Licensor will waive 
or not assert, as appropriate, this Section, to the fullest extent permitted by the 
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applicable national law, to enable You to reasonably exercise Your right under 
Section 3(b) of this License (right to make Adaptations) but not otherwise. 
5. Representations, Warranties and Disclaimer 
UNLESS OTHERWISE MUTUALLY AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES IN WRITING 
AND TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW, 
LICENSOR OFFERS THE WORK AS-IS AND MAKES NO REPRESENTATIONS 
OR WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE WORK, EXPRESS, 
IMPLIED, STATUTORY OR OTHERWISE, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, 
WARRANTIES OF TITLE, MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE, NONINFRINGEMENT, OR THE ABSENCE OF LATENT OR OTHER 
DEFECTS, ACCURACY, OR THE PRESENCE OF ABSENCE OF ERRORS, 
WHETHER OR NOT DISCOVERABLE. SOME JURISDICTIONS DO NOT ALLOW 
THE EXCLUSION OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES, SO THIS EXCLUSION MAY NOT 
APPLY TO YOU. 
6. Limitation on Liability. EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED BY 
APPLICABLE LAW, IN NO EVENT WILL LICENSOR BE LIABLE TO YOU ON 
ANY LEGAL THEORY FOR ANY SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, 
PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THIS LICENSE OR 
THE USE OF THE WORK, EVEN IF LICENSOR HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE 
POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. 
7. Termination 
a. This License and the rights granted hereunder will terminate automatically upon 
any breach by You of the terms of this License. Individuals or entities who have 
received Adaptations or Collections from You under this License, however, will 
not have their licenses terminated provided such individuals or entities remain in 
full compliance with those licenses. Sections 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 will survive any 
termination of this License. 
b. Subject to the above terms and conditions, the license granted here is perpetual 
(for the duration of the applicable copyright in the Work). Notwithstanding the 
above, Licensor reserves the right to release the Work under different license 
terms or to stop distributing the Work at any time; provided, however that any 
such election will not serve to withdraw this License (or any other license that has 
been, or is required to be, granted under the terms of this License), and this 
License will continue in full force and effect unless terminated as stated above. 
8. Miscellaneous 
a. Each time You Distribute or Publicly Perform the Work or a Collection, the 
Licensor offers to the recipient a license to the Work on the same terms and 
conditions as the license granted to You under this License. 
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b. Each time You Distribute or Publicly Perform an Adaptation, Licensor offers to 
the recipient a license to the original Work on the same terms and conditions as 
the license granted to You under this License. 
c. If any provision of this License is invalid or unenforceable under applicable law, 
it shall not affect the validity or enforceability of the remainder of the terms of 
this License, and without further action by the parties to this agreement, such 
provision shall be reformed to the minimum extent necessary to make such 
provision valid and enforceable. 
d. No term or provision of this License shall be deemed waived and no breach 
consented to unless such waiver or consent shall be in writing and signed by the 
party to be charged with such waiver or consent. 
e. This License constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to 
the Work licensed here. There are no understandings, agreements or 
representations with respect to the Work not specified here. Licensor shall not be 
bound by any additional provisions that may appear in any communication from 
You. This License may not be modified without the mutual written agreement of 
the Licensor and You. 
f. The rights granted under, and the subject matter referenced, in this License were 
drafted utilizing the terminology of the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works (as amended on September 28, 1979), the Rome 
Convention of 1961, the WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996, the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty of 1996 and the Universal Copyright 
Convention (as revised on July 24, 1971). These rights and subject matter take 
effect in the relevant jurisdiction in which the License terms are sought to be 
enforced according to the corresponding provisions of the implementation of 
those treaty provisions in the applicable national law. If the standard suite of 
rights granted under applicable copyright law includes additional rights not 
granted under this License, such additional rights are deemed to be included in the 
License; this License is not intended to restrict the license of any rights under 
applicable law. 
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